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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a case study of Yulia Tymoshenko, who was twice prime minister of 
Ukraine in 2005 and from 2007-2010 yet failed to achieve the position of president in 
2010. Due to her political achievements and her inability to reach the highest position of 
power in Ukraine, Tymoshenko presents an interesting case study. I begin with Nirmal 
Puwar’s (2004) discussion of women politicians as "space invaders" and analyze how 
societal understandings of gender intertwine with assumptions about spatial barriers. By 
analyzing Tymoshenko's biographical information, including her personal details and 
political background as well as media representations of Tymoshenko in the English-
language press, I seek to understand the gendered aspects of Tymoshenko's political 
career and how gender has affected her access to the prime ministership and the 
presidency. The conclusions offer insight into strategies women leaders use to access 
positions of leadership, while also performing their gender normativity. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is a case study of Yulia Tymoshenko, who was twice prime minister of 
Ukraine (from January 2005 to September 2005 and December 2007 to March 2010) yet 
failed to achieve the position of president in 2010. As a high-profile politician in Eastern 
Europe, Tymoshenko presents an interesting case study because of her political 
achievements as well as her inability to reach the highest position of political leadership 
in Ukraine. For my thesis, I selected the specific experiences and professional political 
ascendency of Yulia Tymoshenko of Ukraine as an interesting case study. By analyzing 
Tymoshenko’s biographical information, including her personal details such as her 
ethnicity, religion, marital status, education and employment backgrounds as well as 
media representations of Tymoshenko in the English-language press, I seek to understand 
the gendered aspects of Tymoshenko’s political career and how gender has affected her 
access to the prime ministership and the presidency.  
Popular and scholarly understandings of contemporary Eastern European 
women’s political leadership and authority lack more in-depth gender analysis. The 
purpose of this thesis is to analyze women’s political prospects in post-communist 
Europe using a single case study of Ukrainian political leader, Yulia Tymoshenko.  The 
study of her career allows me to better understand how women, more generally, are 
perceived (or questioned) as authority figures and, in particular, how one woman enabled 
or was limited in her pursuit of the positions of president and prime minister in post-
communist Europe beginning in 1991.  
I begin with a review of secondary literature mainly produced by feminist 
political scientists in the wake of globally relevant questions of how gender impacts 
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women's authority as political leaders. That scholarship, as Chapter one reviews, 
discovered that the number of the women political leaders worldwide is quite small.  
While there have been 32 women prime ministers and presidents in Europe or 41 percent 
of those worldwide, the highest number of any region worldwide, women political 
leaders have somewhat limited routes to power and hold positions with dispersed and 
restricted powers in comparison to their male counterparts as scholarship that quantifies 
women’s presence shows.1 Furthermore, the scholarship reviewed in Chapter One also 
determines that regional differences exist between Western and Eastern Europe. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, post-communist countries underwent great 
institutional, economic and cultural changes that generally affected women and men 
differently. The thesis uses Yulia Tymoshenko’s career to understand how this context 
played out on her success and failure in the political domains conventionally dominated 
by men.  
One important theorist used throughout the thesis to indicate where women fit, or 
misfit, the political landscape is political scientist Farida Jalalzai (2013, 2014). I am 
convinced by Jalalzai’s assertions that women are more likely to occupy positions of 
leadership but only within positions that wield dispersed or restricted powers, such as 
prime minister and less powerful presidencies.  Apparently, according to Jalalzai’s 
research, those positions of political leadership such as prime minister and president with 
a higher concentration of political powers are more masculine. Resultingly, women are 
less likely to achieve that position of power. This situation was undoubtedly the case in 
                                                          
1 “Farida Jalalzai, “Gender, Presidencies, and Prime Ministerships in Europe: Are Women Gaining Ground.” 
International Political Science Review 35 (2014): 578. 
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my case study of Tymoshenko who attained the position of prime minister, a position 
with less centralized powers but failed to become president, a position with more 
centralized powers.  
I chose the case of Yulia Tymoshenko compared to other women because of 
Tymoshenko’s terms as prime minister and her subsequent run for president. Table 1.1 
previews the number of female leaders in post-communist Europe since 1992, including 
their positions and terms. While it appears there are many women prime ministers and 
presidents in post-communist Europe, comparatively, Tymoshenko is the only prime 
minister who has maintained her position for the most prolonged period and therefore 
presents a compelling case. Additionally, most women leaders held positions of prime 
minister, while those who did manage to cede to a president possessed somewhat weak 
presidential powers. My case study confirms the claims of Jalalzai (2013) that when the 
powers associated with positions of the prime minister are more dispersed, it is generally 
more straightforward for a prime minister to be removed from power as compared to a 
president. 
Table 1.1 provides a quick glimpse of her political career by indicating she held 
her position as prime minister longer than any other female prime ministers in other post-
communist countries. Tymoshenko’s case is also exceptional, and useful to make 
arguments about women’s political successes or failures, as she went on to run for the 
position of president but failed to become president of Ukraine in 2010.  
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Table 1.1 Female Leaders in Post-Communist Europe Since 19922 
Country Name Position Dates in Office 
Bulgaria Reneta Indzhova Prime Minister 10/16/1994-01/25/1995 
Croatia Jadranka Kosor Prime Minister 07/06/2009-12/23/2011 
Georgia Nino Burdzhanade President 11/23/2003-01/25/2004 
Latvia Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga President 06/17/1999-07/08/2007 
Latvia Laimdota Straujuma Prime Minister 01/22/2014-02/11/2016 
Lithuania Irena Degutienė Prime Minister 05/04/1999-05/18/1999 
Lithuania Dalia Grybauskaitė President 07/12/2009-present 
Macedonia Radmila Šekerinska Prime Minister 05/12/2004-06/12/2004 
Moldova Zinaida Greceanîi Prime Minister 03/31/2008-09/14/2009 
Poland Hanna Suchocka* Prime Minister 07/08/1992-10/26/1993 
Poland Ewa Kopacz Prime Minister 09/22/2014-11/16/2015 
Poland Beata Szydlo Prime Minister 11/16/2015-12/11/2017 
Romania Viorica Dancila Prime Minister 01/29/2018-present 
Serbia Nataša Mićić President 12/29/2002-02/04/2004 
Slovakia Iveta Radičová Prime Minister 7/8/2010-04/04/2012 
Slovenia Alenka Bratušek Prime Minister 03/20/2013-09/18/2014 
Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko Prime Minister 01/04/2005-09/08/2005 
    12/18/2007-03/04/2010 
Significant to my study of an individual female leader in post-communist 
Ukraine, is that most countries in post-communist Europe—including Ukraine--adopted 
political systems with strong presidencies. Table 1.1 illustrates this argument and Table 
1.2 outlines the presidential powers in Ukraine over time. Again, Jalalzai’s (2013) 
findings are useful in my discussions of the difficulty for women to attain positions with 
concentrated powers. She argued that the stronger the presidency, the harder it is for 
women to reach these positions. While Tymoshenko was prime minister for a surprisingly 
long period in comparison to other female prime ministers in post-communist Europe and 
manages to wage a campaign as a presidential candidate in 2010, the powers designated  
                                                          
2 Farida Jalalzai, Shattered, Cracked, or Firmly Intact? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013),33-5. With 
updates 
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to the position of president  
Source: Alan Siaroff, Presidential Selection and Powers in Selected Post-Communist Countries 
Handout, Presented October 9, 2013 (updated to include 2014) 
in Ukraine was, during the time of her candidacy, at its weakest point, although still 
strong. It is my supposition, therefore, that Jalalzai’s argument about power attached to 
these positions are credible in considering Tymoshenko’s failure to secure the presidency. 
Ukraine is a fascinating nation to contextualize Tymoshenko's political career case 
study.  At the time of her political journey, Ukraine was transitioning from the Soviet 
Union in the early 1990s and struggling with the introduction of a new political system; 
the nation oscillated from democracy to autocracy post-transition. Table 1.3 highlights 
the periods of oscillation and identifies who held the presidency during the period from 
Soviet era through the transition to post-communism. I compare Tables 1.2 and 1.3 to 
make it apparent that the powers of the presidency also increased during periods of 
autocratic oscillation. These periods are essential to understanding the political climate 
when Tymoshenko sought executive political leadership in Ukraine. The tables point to 
the instability of political development in the country and provide some insight into the 
political cleavages in Ukraine. As the thesis will show Tymoshenko aligned herself with 
Table 1.2 List of Presidential Powers in Ukraine Over Time 
Powers 
1992-
1996 
1996-
2006 
2006-
2010 
2010-
2014 
2014-
present 
Elected by Popular Vote 1 1 1 1 1 
Appointment powers to cabinet and 
judiciary 1 1 1 1 1 
Chairs cabinet meetings 1 1 0 1 0 
Veto 1 1 1 1 1 
Emergency and/or decree powers 0 1 0 1 0 
Central Role in Foreign Policy 1 1 1 1 1 
Central Role in Government Formation 1 1 0 1 0 
Conditional Dissolution Powers 0 0 1 0 1 
Total 6 7 5 7 5 
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these political cleavages as a democratic leader. As the press coverage will show in 
Chapter Three, Tymoshenko was also represented and reinforced as a democratic leader 
due to her femininity. 
Table 1.3   Periods of Democratic to Autocratic Oscillation  
Democratic/Autocratic Period  President  Term 
Democratic 1991-1994 Leonid Kravchuk 1991-1994 
Democratic 1994-1999 Leonid Kuchma 1994-1999 
Autocratic 1999-2004 Leonid Kuchma 1999-2005 
Democratic 2005-2010 Viktor Yushchenko 2005-2010 
Autocratic 2012-2014 Viktor Yanukovych 2010-2014 
Democratic 2014-present Petro Poroshenko 2014-present  
 
As scholars reviewed in Chapter One make clear, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, women suffered disproportionately economically, politically and socially. They 
were generally left out of major formal decision-making processes in the creation of the 
newly independent state which worked to reject communism. During this period, 
traditional gender roles associated with Ukrainian independence before the imposed 
Soviet rule, and even reconfigured from some Soviet state values, were reinforced. This 
resurrection of traditional gender roles impacted the perceptions of women, like 
Tymoshenko, who ran for a role conventionally exclusive to men. She was among a small 
number of female politicians to achieve legislative success. Tymoshenko is exceptional in 
her political success, therefore. As scholars show, following the end of communism 
women were seldom found in positions of authority. Women were also economically 
disenfranchised as they made up 70 percent of those unemployed, two-thirds being 
women with high levels of education. Politically, in the post-communist era, women’s 
representation in parliaments across Eastern Europe plummeted from 38.5 percent in 
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1985 to 4.3 percent in 1994.3  The question this thesis asks is what unique conditions 
gave rise to Tymoshenko's empowerment in Ukraine despite all these adverse 
circumstances for women more generally?  
Perhaps the context of Ukraine provides some answers to my query.  Ukraine borders 
eight other states, some that are democratic members of the European Union (EU) but the 
largest and arguably the most influential country is Russia, an authoritarian state that 
holds clear anti-EU policies and views. Since 1999 President Vladimir Putin has held 
executive and exclusive power in Russia, either as president or indirectly as prime 
minister. Putin is seen in general to have strengthened the powers of the president as an 
authoritarian. Furthermore, gender politics can be understood as part of his empowerment 
as they were during the era when Tymoshenko sought political power in Ukraine. Putin 
has consolidated his power through the hyper-masculinization of the position of 
president, firmly linking male-exclusive leadership to the preservation of the Russian 
state.4 This masculinization of the Russian state as embodied by Putin and his wielding of 
authority is crucial to understanding the gender dynamics of Ukraine's political history. 
Ukraine’s political cleavages have been consistently factionalized between pro-Ukrainian 
and pro-Russian stances, and therefore any political leadership must engage with these 
politics—women like Tymoshenko must compete in this landscape. Pro-Ukrainian voters 
may see a leader that is not only pro-Ukrainian, but also representationally appears equal 
or better than the hyper-masculinized authoritarianism of the Russian state and President 
                                                          
3 Sarah Birch, “Women and Political Representation in Contemporary Ukraine,” in Women’s Access to 
Political Power in Post-communist Europe, eds. Richard E. Matland and Kathleen Montgomery (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 130-131. 
4 Oleg Riabov and Tatiana Riabova, “The Remasculinization of Russia? Gender, Nationalism, and the 
Legitimation of Power Under Vladimir Putin,” Problems of Post-Communism 61 (March-April 2014): 23. 
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Vladimir Putin. The thesis, therefore, considers this question acknowledging that gender 
is central to the politics of Ukraine: I ask how Tymoshenko, who lacks all the strongman 
typologies embodied by Putin or competitors in Ukrainian politics, has navigated the 
many cultural, political, institutional and representational barriers to become one of the 
longest lasting and successful politicians in Ukraine. Also, why, ultimately, she was 
unable to achieve the position of president.   
This thesis, therefore, takes as a fundamental framework of analysis the relationship 
between gender and formal political leadership in post-communist Europe (PCE).  I 
explore, using Tymoshenko as my case study, how gender, power, and leadership affect 
the perceptions of political leadership in Ukraine.  I seek to understand not only the 
possibilities open to women in politics in post-communist Europe but also the limitations 
and constraints to their political participation.  
Chapter One, reviewing the scholarship on women in politics, begins with Nirmal 
Puwar’s (2004) inspirational discussion of the “space invader.” Puwar uses this term to 
describe women and others from marginalized communities who occupy, or seek to 
occupy, positions traditionally created for and held by white, privileged men.5 I enlist 
Puwar’s (2004) conceptualization “space invader” to theorize the gendering of political 
space and also space more generally.  I also incorporate the scholarship that reviews 
historical understandings of societal roles for men and women.  
Additionally, Chapter One is inspired by Farida Jalalzai’s (2004, 2013, 2014) 
discussions of the influences of gender on political power and her emphasis on how 
                                                          
5 Nirmal Puwar, “Thinking About Making a Difference,” BJPIR 6 (2004): 65. 
 15 
 
powers associated with the positions of prime minister and president affect women's 
ability or inability to access these positions.  Subsequent sections in Chapter One discuss 
the gendered division of public and private space under communism and during the 
transition to post-communist Europe to identify how gender was understood through 
social, political and economic policies. The scholarship shows that transition politics in 
Eastern Europe of the post-communist era were vital in all aspects of life.  Gender roles 
return to more traditional understandings of gender that had been part of the communist 
state political and policy landscape. So, women did not earn new liberties or opportunities 
in the post-communist era or within the new age of capitalism.  The final section of 
Chapter One reviews scholarship that reveals the factors inhibiting and promoting 
women's access to parliament worldwide and in post-communist Europe as well as the 
reasons associated with the lack of women political leaders. All of this scholarship and 
the gender framework it offers, allows me to understand the social and cultural context of 
Tymoshenko's successes and failures and how the media perceived her as a potential 
candidate for political leadership. 
Chapter Two sketches Tymoshenko’s biography. Comprehensively describing 
Tymoshenko’s background (socio-economic status, education, career, class, religious 
affiliations) the Chapter also offers a detailed analysis of her political trajectory: her 
entrance into politics, her political party platform, cabinet positions she held, involvement 
in the Orange Revolution, her time as prime minister and her campaign for president. 
Furthermore, I focus on two inter-related themes of women and formal political space, 
and gender and nationalism to answer the question of what made Tymoshenko a viable 
candidate for prime minister but not the presidency. I collect data from a number of 
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secondary sources, such as encyclopedias, to shape Tymoshenko’s biography, her 
entrance into politics, and her party platform. 
Chapter Three focuses on three major English-language press sources to highlight 
critical points of Tymoshenko’s political career from an international perspective. The 
analyzed periods of these news sources include dates Tymoshenko held or lost positions 
of power between 2004 and 2010; this period encompasses significant events such as 
Tymoshenko's rise to international popularity during the Orange Revolution in 2004, the 
periods in 2005, 2007 and 2010 leading up to and following her two terms as prime 
minister, and her (unsuccessful) presidential run in 2010. My purpose in analyzing these 
English-language media sources is to understand how women seeking positions of power 
are represented and, further, to consider how the media uses gendered perceptions of 
political leaders. The scholarship on the personalization of politics is particularly useful 
in understanding how the press saw Tymoshenko. Furthermore, analyzing English-
language sources reveals how what feminist scholar Gayle Rubin calls the sex-gender 
system permeates across national borders and is unequivocally applied to any woman, 
like Tymoshenko, who dares to “invade” male-dominated public space irrespective of 
variations in national context. This statement implies that women who challenge the 
masculinization of politics must strategically battle on multiple fronts.  
 I conclude by sharing the insights I have gained with my examination of the 
strategies Tymoshenko adopted to achieve the position of prime minister. My conclusion 
also speculates why Tymoshenko failed at being elected President of Ukraine in 2010. 
My findings, based on a unique case study of a woman who found quick and popular 
success in the male-dominated public realm of politics, enhance the global conversation 
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about what circumstances need to change to ensure more significant numbers of women 
rise to political leadership. I hope the thesis clarifies the obstacles and opportunities 
available to women politically and what work remains to understand gender dynamics in 
politics. 
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Chapter I: Literature Review 
My literature review primarily analyzes women’s access to positions of leadership 
in Eastern Europe and more specifically, in Ukraine. Throughout the chapter, I am 
informed by the notion that women who infiltrate the political sphere are understood as 
“space invaders” as conceptualized by political scientist Nirmal Puwar (2004) who 
discusses gender and leadership as well as how women are perceived once they gain 
entry to positions of leadership. Puwar defines “space invaders” as historically 
marginalized bodies that hold a diminished level of power within political institutions. 
For example, women and visible minority members of parliament (MPs) in the United 
Kingdom are considered “space invaders” according to Puwar because the political 
spaces they now occupy have traditionally been occupied by privileged white, upper-
class men.6 Puwar notes that women’s presence as “space invaders” disrupts, and calls 
attention to, how political institutions have been created by and for a specific type of 
authority figure. To some extent, the spaces of these political institutions are perceived as 
being occupied by men alone.7 Therefore, the presence of women and visible minorities 
in traditionally white male-dominated institutions wield a socio-spatial impact upon the 
Westminster political system used by Britain, and beyond.8 Puwar critiques the idea that 
the presence of women and/or people of colour alone makes a difference in shifting 
political policy and perceptions of authority. She concludes that deeper ethnographic 
                                                          
6 Nirmal Puwar, “Thinking About Making a Difference,” BJPIR 6 (2004): 65. 
7 Ibid., 66. 
8 Ibid. 
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research within political institutions will aid in understanding political authority is 
informally or formally regulated.9  
In section one of the Chapter, I explore the divisions between public and private 
spaces and the way in which these spaces have been historically constructed and upheld, 
including within the organization of the nation-state. Puwar’s category of the “space 
invader” is used to analyze these divisions as well as to review the prescribed gender 
roles associated with space. I adopt Puwar’s theme of invasion, to describe how social 
meanings have been historically reinforced through the sexual division of public and 
private spheres. Section two of the Chapter focuses on the gendering of spaces under 
communist regimes in post-communist Europe and how nationalist movements 
reconfigured space in society to revert to traditional understandings of appropriate spaces 
for men and women.  
Section three involves a discussion of the pre-existing secondary literature about 
women in politics and more specifically women’s political leadership. This section 
includes a brief review of the broader theme of women in politics, women's access to 
seats in parliaments, and political leadership both worldwide and in post-communist 
Europe and Ukraine as well as the barriers women confront in seeking positions of 
political leadership. The discussion considers the invasion of political institutions by 
women using themes present in the literature to address social and cultural 
understandings tied to gender and political leadership. 
                                                          
9 Ibid., 78. 
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It is important to note that current literature on women prime ministers and 
presidents is quite limited as is the literature regarding their access to positions of 
political leadership in the geographical region of post-communist Europe. I suggest that 
the low number of women leaders that have historically held positions of political power 
since World War II correlates to the lack of literature about women’s political leadership. 
As such, as the number of female political leaders increases, so do the studies. However, 
Sarah Elise Wiliarty suggests that although there is a growing influx of women political 
leaders the subject of women’s leadership continues to be understudied because none of 
these women are leaders of geopolitically powerful countries except for Angela Merkel 
of Germany.10 
Section I – The Invasion! Socially Constructed Meanings of Spaces and 
Gender Roles Influenced by the Nation-State 
 This section begins with the concept of the “space invader” as proposed by 
scholar Nirmal Puwar (2004) who suggests women and those from marginalized 
communities are so unusual in British parliament they are seen as “alien.” In this section, 
“invasion” is defined as follows: 
Invasion /ɪnˈveɪʒ(ə)n/  
1. An instance of invading a country or region with an armed force 
2. An incursion by a large number of people or things into a place or sphere of 
activity 
3. An unwelcome intrusion into another’s domain11 
 
                                                          
10 Sarah Elise Wiliarty, “Chancellor Angela Merkel – A Sign of Hope or Exception That Proves the Rule?” 
Politics and Gender 4 (Issue 3, 2008):  485. 
11 English Oxford Living Dictionaries, “Invasion,” (accessed July 12, 2017), 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/invasion. 
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According to the Oxford Dictionary, there are three different uses for the definition of 
invasion. First, invasion addresses an unwelcome occupation of space by an individual or 
group(s), who do not traditionally occupy the space in question. An invasion might be 
coercive or peaceful. However, the act of invasion generally is unwelcomed by those 
whose space is invaded.  
Similar to other feminist theorists in disciplines of history and political science, 
Puwar considers the construction of private and public space to be historically gendered. 
Puwar does not necessarily give specific definitions of the term “invasion” or “invader,” 
rather she begins her article with an excerpt from a monograph by feminist geographer 
Doreen Massey (1996). What Massey provides is her understanding of public rugby and 
football (soccer) pitches growing up in Manchester that was given up almost exclusively 
to boys.12 Massey describes those pitches as a place she did not inhabit – as if they were 
another world or privatized space. Puwar (2004) applies Massey’s understanding of 
women’s disenfranchisement from certain types of male occupied space to her discussion 
of the Westminster political system as being created and upheld in a similar manner as 
the rugby and football pitches observed by Massey. Puwar states, 
The sheer maleness of particular public spaces and women's experience of 
increasingly occupying them while still being conscious of being ‘space invaders' 
even while they enjoy Doreen Massey vividly captures these places. Westminster 
has also been a space that has been given over to men, and has, over time, witnessed 
the increased entry of women and ‘other' excluded groups, such as racialized 
minority groups. When minorities or hitherto excluded groups enter institutions that 
have for a long time been dominated by men (usually white and from a speciﬁc 
social class), people are generally inquisitive to know whether these ‘newcomers’ 
are making a difference.13 
                                                          
12 Nirmal Puwar, “Thinking About Making a Difference,” 65 quoting Deborah Massey, Space, Place and 
Gender, 1996, 185.  
13 Puwar, “Thinking About Making a Difference,” 65. 
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Using Massey’s description, Puwar (2004) argues convincingly that political 
institutions have been created for racially privileged masculine bodies. Moreover, the 
entry and presence of women's bodies alter the way in which these institutions are 
understood, and that political authority is gendered due to the influence of these gender 
exclusive institutions. Grounding her arguments in feminist theories of the public/private 
gender divide, Puwar (2004) argues that the political actor in the public sphere is 
traditionally assumed to be a white male body. For example, women in the UK – or 
Canada for that matter – gained the right to vote in 1918 although political institutions in 
both countries were formed long before. Therefore, there is an extended history of 
normalizing political power as predominantly masculine. The public/private dichotomy 
fundamentally is understood as gendered: the public is dominated by men, while the 
private is dominated by women. However, essentializing these spaces does not allow for 
an in-depth understanding of designated social roles. 
Puwar’s concept of the “space invader” is also a useful analytic tool to discuss 
political power more generally. Puwar identifies the importance of gendered socio-
cultural understandings of the public and private spheres and the place of political 
institutions within those understandings. These concepts illuminate how women access 
positions of political leadership because of social perceptions associated with both 
political institutions and social understandings of women's roles more generally. Women 
may be excluded from political leadership because they have not traditionally held 
positions of political leadership and therefore while there are exceptions, in many cases 
historically, women more infrequently do not formally wielded power over an entire 
people.  
 23 
 
Puwar’s discussion of the socialization of space leads to questions and discussions 
about the rooting of women’s oppression more broadly. For example, in her often cited 
essay titled, “The Traffic in Women” feminist anthropologist Gayle Rubin (1975) has 
incorporated historical analysis to understand the root of women’s oppression by 
conceptualizing the sex/gender system.14 Rubin defines the “sex/gender system” as “the 
set of arrangements by which a society transforms biological sexuality into products of 
human activity, and in which these transformed sexual needs are satisfied.”15 By using a 
historical approach, Rubin finds that gender oppression is embedded through the traffic of 
women between men through marriage, and notes how these arrangements are grounded 
in social systems that have been organized according to biological characteristics. For 
example, kinship systems are part of cultural traditions that persist over time and space. 
Rubin’s history of kinship uncovers more meaningful terms associated with culture and 
the social organization of gender.  
Additionally, Rubin discusses how social organization, based on biological 
characteristics, has led to the creation of the sex\gender system as a root of oppression. 
Rubin also includes a discussion of Marxist theory to analyze how capitalism relies on 
the contribution of free domestic labour. As she explains, the purpose of capitalism is to 
gain a surplus and that  women’s lower wages provide surplus value (the transformation 
of money or commodity into capital) for a capitalist employer.16 Rubin notes how 
feminist scholars find the root of women’s oppression by identifying the relationship 
between housework and the reproduction of labour and showing how capitalism, and 
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men, profit.17 She builds off Marx’s premise that a worker is paid just enough for what it 
takes to meet their biological needs rather than being paid a fair portion of that worker’s 
contribution to the surplus value.18 Rubin concludes that Marx essentially believes that 
women as wives provide domestic services to ensure the survival of men and children 
and the family, and women’s provision of free labour, is among the necessary modes of 
satisfaction for workers because women have conventionally provided all domestic 
labour for the household.19  
Whereas Rubin discusses the social organization of oppression and its relation to 
capitalism and the reproduction of an inequitable family dynamic between men and 
women, feminist Marxist theorist Heidi Hartmann (1979) discusses the utility of the term 
“patriarchy.” She uses this term to identify the gender hierarchy and male dominance 
through social relations as central to the present system. Hartmann takes issue with how 
Marxist feminists have centralized women’s oppression within Marx’s critiques of 
capitalism by understanding women’s oppression as another type of class oppression. In 
other words, the values and structures of Marxist theory have dominated feminist 
economic theory but failed to question why women are subordinate inside and outside the 
family.20  
Hartmann defines patriarchy as, “a set of hierarchal social relations between men, 
with a material base, which establishes or creates interdependence and solidarity among 
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men that enable them to dominate women.”21 Similar to Rubin, Hartmann explains that 
men’s interdependence on one another is upheld because of their need of each other and 
their collective desire to maintain power over women. In Hartmann’s arguments, 
biological traits are the basis for the sexual divisions of labour. Gender is a cultural 
system/a way of organizing a society which, in turn, creates “appropriate” spaces for men 
and women and promotes heterosexual relationships dependent on economic relations. 
Hartmann insists that although power structures between gender exist, patriarchy is 
flexible and adaptable, shaping itself to various economic systems making it nearly 
indistinguishable especially in the private sphere where intimacy is struck between men 
and women.22 The notion of gendered spaces is reinforced and categorized by patriarchal 
characterization of women as irrational and emotional whereas men are seen as rational 
and pragmatic.23 Hartmann states that the hierarchy and interdependence of men and the 
subordination of women in our society is dependent on this systemic binary opposition.24 
Hartmann provides an example of how social relations between men and women 
affected capitalism and the plight of workers. She describes how during the Industrial 
Revolution in the United States that women and children were ushered into wage labour 
because of the demand for workers. This threatened men’s power and women and 
children’s dependence on them because women and children could provide for 
themselves through waged labour. Men protested through unions who responded by 
restricting women’s waged work and blocking women from attaining “male” positions. 
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Furthermore, men demanded family wages to provide enough for their families so their 
wives could remain at home. As a result, Hartmann states that,” in the absence of 
patriarchy a unified working class might have confronted capitalism, but patriarchal 
social relations divided the working class, allowing one part (men) to be bought off at the 
expense of the other (women).”25 Hartmann states that the family wage cemented the 
relationship between capitalism and patriarchy and that they are intertwined. The 
marriage of capitalism and patriarchy subordinate groups in capitalist systems by 
maintaining wealth as well as power. This example also reinforces the perceptions of how 
women were “space invaders” within a new world order that challenged patriarchal 
notions of the family. 
Hartmann describes how capitalism and patriarchy are interrelated. She notes that 
generally capitalists make up the dominant group. The result being that capitalism 
inherits the ascribed characteristics of the dominant groups. Hartmann notes that 
additionally that the sexual division of labour in the labour market is also explained by 
the manifestation of patriarchy which serves to perpetuate it.26 Therefore, Hartmann has 
argued through historical analysis that there has been a marriage between capitalism and 
patriarchy that continue to shape and subordinate women as well as those who are outside 
the dominant, or ruling, race.  In essence Hartmann describes the origins of the 
subordination of women across and within the public sphere.  
While Hartmann (1979) reveals the role patriarchy and capitalism plays in 
creating gendered spaces, these categories of the public space as a male domain, and 
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private space as a female domain, are not understood merely as fixed gendered categories 
when scholars discuss the fluid nature of categories of masculine and feminine through 
time and over space. Historian Joan Scott (1988) claims the deficit in the histories of 
women’s lives may be resolved by using gender as an analytic category. By using this 
tool, scholars may demonstrate how knowledge about women and gender fluctuates 
across cultures, social groups and over time.27 Scott argues that existing social 
assumptions about gender roles in society as fixed are disrupted because gender is in 
constant flux, specific to the context, and changing over time. Therefore, this notion that 
definitions of femininity or masculinity are stable across all of time is exposed as false.28 
Scott cites the deconstruction of language about gender norms as fundamental in 
understanding who is excluded from certain spaces and how they are excluded.29  
Essentialist notions of women as confined or relegated to the domestic (private) 
sphere and men as occupying the public sphere, becomes a problem, according to British 
historian Amanda Vickery (1993), when the notion of public/private spheres is not 
questioned because to erase women’s participation in public events or spaces negates 
women’s influence on history and  society.30 For example, Vickery states that cultural or 
medical assumptions about women's frailty or delicacy either physically or mentally (or 
both) negate the narratives that wives were also strong-minded or frustrated with their 
husband's frail egos.31 Vickery tracked the historical origins of the division of private and 
public spheres to the industrial revolution when product manufacturing was taken out of 
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the home and into the modern factory. By separating the home and the workplace gender 
roles were reconfigured. Vickery argues recognizing the public/private spatial dichotomy 
is essential to expose the marginalization of women. However, she further noted that 
public/private is a flawed way of understanding the marginalization of women in society 
because there is little agreement over the definitions of the boundaries of public and 
private spheres.32 
Puwar (2004) notes that gender stereotypes between men and women have also 
been associated with how (the public and private) spaces have been created and upheld. 
Essentially, bodies and spaces are interconnected in such a way that traditionally one has 
helped to define the other. The public political realm may be understood through 
oppositional categories of gender: public space is perceived as occupied by the male body 
and as a place of reason and logic whereas private or domestic space is occupied by the 
feminine body and is characterized as emotional and nurturing. However, as previously 
noted, this binary understanding of the public/private sphere is too simplistic.  
To deepen the gender analysis of political space, there first needs to be a brief 
discussion about the social construction of the nation-state as well as how political 
leadership is tied to the nation-state. Current understandings of the social construction of 
the meanings of space are incomplete without an analysis of the nation. Notably, in post-
communist European states where the underpinnings of nationalism have veered towards 
traditional gender roles to justify and reinforce their independence. Furthermore, those 
who have traditionally controlled power within political institutions have been men who 
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hold gender privilege. Positions of political leadership are representative of the cultural 
politics and gender values of the nation-state which intertwine in its rhetoric as the type 
of preferred leadership. An understanding of the composition and history of the nation-
state under examination is also valuable as political institutions and their state-specific 
arrangements are the bones of state politics. Further, the structures of political leadership 
within each state reproduce historical gender relations. 
I begin with the assumption that the nation is a socially constructed entity, rather 
than a naturalized one. Professor of International Studies, Benedict Anderson has 
provided an interesting discussion on how national identities are socially constructed and 
reinforced through history in Imagined Communities (1983). Anderson traces the spread 
of nationalist consciousness back to the decline of monarchies and with the rise of the 
industrial revolution. Political institutions, he states, have been created and legitimated 
through historical discourse voiced under a banner of nationalist, collective or imagined 
identity. This rhetoric of “imagined communities” unites citizens across a country, what 
Anderson calls a “horizontal comradeship,” regardless of inequality or exploitation.33  
The social construction of the nation, as Anderson describes, infers that power 
relations within the nation are also socially constructed to preserve the nation. Joan Scott 
(1986) steps further to discuss how gender power relations uphold and maintain the 
nation-state and reinforce gendered spaces. Structurally, nation-states were derived from 
the writings of political philosophers. For example, Scott’s (1986) discussion of gender 
and the nation-state describes how political philosophers such as Edmund Burke wrote 
about men wielding political power, while women were either absent entirely or 
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represented only as secondary or supportive generally associated through kinship 
(marriage or family).34 She points out that Burke’s 1790 pamphlet, Reflections on the 
French Revolution contributed to the ideological foundations and development of 
national identities of the nation. In all cases of the ideological conceptualization of the 
nation, women, for example, were excluded from major powerful roles. According to 
Scott, the consequences of neglecting gender, race, or class as categories of analysis 
allow the state to be conceived as founded on a belief system that women were irrelevant 
to the social order. This privileging of upper-class, European and masculine dominance in 
politics allows for the marginalization of all those understood as different. Moreover, in 
the name of self-preservation, the male-dominated national formation organizes gender 
relations to suit their own needs embedding these gender biases within public policy and 
law. Scott argues that masculine power is solidified by limiting the power of others and 
women most specifically. Men in this way centralize their (classed) authority, strength, 
and domination over others.35 In this case, masculine empowerment has a long structural 
history and is reconfigured as gendered oppression in the present. Although a state 
political formation may vary culturally and historically, similar forms of gender 
oppression continue. 
In her critique of the formation of the democratic state, feminist scholar and 
political scientist Wendy Brown (1995) harmonizes her arguments with political 
scientists and activists Georgia Duerst-Lahti and Rita Mae Kelly (1995) by further 
critiquing the dominance of western European liberal philosophy by suggesting how 
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liberal philosophers have historically avoided the power relations between gender, race or 
class.36 Avoiding an intersectional discussion of how the social order is reproduced limits 
one’s understanding of the nation, how it is built and how specific actors in the nation-
state’s existence is reliant on the dynamic of exclusion and inclusion. Brown describes 
the divisions of the social order: the state, the economy (or civil society) and the family. 
Brown notes that the distinctions between these realms have been understood, and 
reinforced, as separate rather than mutually constituted by legal, academic and other 
institutions.37 From the 18th century onward, liberal philosophic thought, such as that 
expressed by Locke, Tocqueville, Bentham, Constant and Rawls have assumed the social 
order to be natural rather than constructed liberating men to circulate in civil society 
while women are entrapped in the family.38  
Similarly, Duerst-Lahti and Kelly (1995) link the writings of philosophers such as 
Thomas Hobbes to how a white elite class of men has historically controlled avenues of 
public power and authoritative organizations in the American polityen.39 The authors 
describe how politics has historically been intertwined with masculinity and the 
distribution of power and privilege.40 Therefore, politics has historically been used to 
maintain the power of socially privileged groups of men. 
In discussing the complexities of citizenship, Nira Yuval-Davis (1997) describes 
that the liberal tradition of citizenship is that citizens basically have equal status to one 
another and that differences of class, ethnicity and gender are not supposed to be relevant 
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to the status of citizenship.41 However, she points out how the social welfare state is 
founded on the premise that there is a difference between the social needs of citizens.42 
Yuval-Davis argues that social welfare rights meant to improve the quality of life for the 
working class.  She draws on concepts originally imagined by William Beveridge of the 
United Kingdom in 1942. He challenged the liberal notion that all citizens were equal 
because of the differences of class. However, Beveridge’s report rested on the assumption 
of social solidarity, and is challenged by a variety of ethnic, racial, religious and sexual 
sub-collectivities which, as Yuval-Davis noted, exists “within the marginal matrix of 
society” and those with these identity markers experience formal and informal types of 
discrimination because of “their credited lower social worth.”43 Yuval-Davis discusses 
the importance of individual rights of the citizen within the state. She notes that although 
individuals may have citizenship rights, rights of the collective and collective freedoms 
are also inherently important to the state.44 Therefore, the role of communities and 
individuals are important but the lived experience of the citizen may be contradictory, 
especially if one is a minority. Yuval-Davis states, 
“These collectivities are attributed with collective needs, based on their different 
cultures as well as on their structural disadvantages. Resistance to these policies has 
been expressed by claims that constructing employment and welfare policies in 
terms of group rights can conflict with individual rights and are therefore 
discriminatory.”45 
While the state is founded on the premise of the collective identity of the majority 
the minority poses challenge to these foundations. 
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While discussing the complex power relations within the concept of citizenship, 
feminist scholar Yuval-Davis describes the boundary between the public and private 
spheres as problematic and as well as gender- and culture-specific.46 Additionally, she 
notes how the idea of citizenship and the public and private intertwine with capitalism. 
Yuval-Davis states the meaning of the “private” is usually related to the “autonomous” 
individual, able to exercise agency in all social spheres or as part of the collective.47 
However, this definition of the “private” reinforces the idea that the state is completely 
separate from the political (public) sphere.48 Yuval-Davis notes that one of the most 
important contributions of feminism to social theory is to uncover how power relations 
operate horizontally as well as vertically. She describes that these power relations operate 
within primary social relations as well as within more impersonal secondary social 
relations within the civil and political domain.49 This recognition, according to Yuval-
Davis, compounds the Foucauldian perspective that the there is no need to theorize the 
state as a separate from the private or domestic sphere.50 However, Yuval-Davis’ 
approach is more nuanced.  She discusses how the state is not unitary in its practices, its 
intentions or its effects, and it often perceived as separate sphere: a body of institutions 
which are centrally organized around the intention of control.51 Yuval-Davis states that in 
the era of the modern welfare state, there is no social sphere that is protected from state 
intervention.  Although there may not be state intervention into the private sphere, the 
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state actively or passively creates its own boundaries of non-intervention.52 Therefore, 
suggesting the private/public dichotomy is flawed, Yuval-Davis advocates for a more 
nuanced approach the spheres of the state, civil society and the domain of the family, 
kinship and other primary relationships as the state influences each of these domains.53  
 Shifting the discussion towards how political space is social, culturally and 
historically specific to the nation-state, Professor of English and Rhetoric Rebecca 
Richards (2015) discusses how leadership is closely linked to the nation-state. For 
positions of leadership, the importance of the doxa of the nation-state reinforces who is 
perceived as a political leader. By doxa she denotes an opinion or belief that is shared by 
a group of people that “holds some truth about the world the group inhabits.”54 
Nationalist rhetorical traditions, described by Richards, as well as unspoken images of the 
nation-state ensure “a limitless, eternal, and inevitable nation-state.”55 The implicit doxa, 
as Richards (2015) describes, depends on tradition and social order to maintain the 
nation-state and varies between each entity. Richards (2015) explains that women's roles 
within the social order of the nation-state may be oppressive yet are essential to the 
biological and ideological reproduction of the nation.56 Therefore, while women's social 
roles may slightly vary between nation-state, women generally have the same purpose of 
supporting the nation-state through reproducing the nation-state.   
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In discussing this masculinization of the political sphere and political leadership, 
Richards (2015) analyzes the rhetorical creation of politics. Leadership, Richards affirms, 
has been assumed to refer to the male body because of specific socio-cultural 
characteristics associated with leadership: men are perceived as competitive and decisive 
symbolic of an effective leader.57 Definitions of leadership merge with social and 
historical constructions of masculinity so much so that Richards argues there is little need 
to gender the term “leader” when the leader is always assumed to be male. When a leader 
of the nation is a “woman leader” they must be hyphenated as such to differentiate 
between genders because leadership has been long sketched by the false gender 
dichotomies of power relations that characterize women as inadequately emotional, 
sensitive, and dependent.58 
Richards’ discussion about the role of the nation-state at its reproduction of the 
social roles of gender compounds my earlier discussion of the historical construction of 
space as linked to sexed bodies. Gendered assumptions about women and men are 
important to understanding women’s lack of access to political leadership which will be 
explored in the subsequent section. The historical construction of space may hinder 
women from participating in formal politics. Or, conversely, women themselves may not 
feel comfortable in electoral politics due to their historical exclusion from political, 
economic and familial spaces or the perceptions of women as “space invaders.”  
The above section has outlined how public and private spaces are interconnected 
and have been created, re-created, and reinforced over various historical periods and 
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places.  This section has also noted the complexity of characterizing space in a binary 
fashion of public and private. To characterize space in this oppositional and bounded way 
negates the ways in which subordination occurs across both public and private space and 
how subordination is interconnected. The significance and social understandings of 
acceptable gender roles within space have shifted over time. Their definitions and 
boundaries are constantly in flux. The ways in which women have been perceived as 
“space invaders” in the labour market during the Industrial Revolution, as described by 
Hartmann and Vickery, re-emerges in the political system. The emergence of the nation-
state, based on western European philosophies that distinguished men from women to 
reinforce gender norms, has been a blueprint for the gendered organization of society and 
politics across many nations and historical periods. 
Furthermore, the foundation of the nation-state through philosophical texts that 
distinguished the roles of men, privileged through class and race, also excluded women 
from political power. This gender construct preserved the political rule of the nation-state 
as exclusive to men of a particular class and race. Before the emergence of the modern 
nation-state, elite men inherited and then wielded political power through dynastic and 
monarchic rule or affiliations of marriage. For example, Rubin points out in the “Traffic 
of Women,” that women were used as currency within power relations between men, but 
less frequently held or embodied power.59 Although in the contemporary era, laws in 
several countries around the world allow women to run for political office, many avoid 
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stepping into the political realm because of the historical legacy of political space as 
being primarily understood as a masculine domain.   
Section II— State and Nationalism and Gender Relations in Post-Communist 
Europe 
Gender relations in post-communist Europe and Ukraine have been influenced 
and shaped in part by regional communist legacies as well as by nationalist movements 
following the end of communism. The section is concerned with the overarching theme 
of how the state tried to control all aspects of life for Soviet citizens including women’s 
place in economic, social, political, and familial space. Furthermore, this section reviews 
the transition from communism and the role of nationalist movements in re-defining these 
spaces as gendered in the adaptations to a market economy. Scholars of post-communist 
Europe have considered women’s experiences with authoritarian governments, on the 
matter of equal access to work, the double and triple burden, family, motherhood and the 
flaws of the communist system.60 
As noted above, Joan Scott (1986) argues that the nation-state creates laws and 
promotes certain aspects of gender norms that benefit the state. This was no different 
within the Soviet Union and other communist countries. Over time these nations changed 
their policies and laws in response to internal and external problems such as economic 
change, war, and demographic change such as declining birth rates. Therefore, the 
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communist period, from 1922 until early 1991, is not monolithic regarding laws or 
political structures. Instead, communist nation-states evolved into a space of oppression 
and authoritarianism where citizens experienced blurred boundaries lines between private 
and public aspects of life because of state interference and oppression. Domestic and 
public spaces were re-defined to benefit and accommodate the state. The social 
expectations of women under communism are crucial to understanding gendered spaces 
in the post-communist era. These themes of women's experience under communism 
persisted over the transitionary period even once new structural and cultural attributes 
occur. 
Political scientists Marilyn Rueschemeyer and Sharon L. Wolchik (2009) define 
the shared experiences of post-communist European countries enduring authoritarian 
communist legacies as important to understanding the present political situation in the 
region.61 In their edited collection, the authors discuss the contextual factors for women's 
low numbers in parliaments in post-communist parliaments by utilizing statistics and 
individual interviews with women parliamentarians. The authors note how although the 
countries included are currently EU members except Russia, their shared history 
continues to affect their government and economies.62 This history that the authors 
describe includes how the Communist Party exclusively controlled the government, and 
economy and resultantly, citizens were tools of ideological support. Rueschemeyer and 
Wolchik characterize the Party as designing and controlling education, the broadcast and 
print media, and the arts, and monitoring smaller political parties and mass organizations, 
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the latter essentially controlling social life and censoring speech.63 The Party also 
politicized all areas of life and by so doing, secured power and prevented independent 
challenges.64 Furthermore, Communist parties attempted to discourage the population’s 
association with religion and redirect allegiances to values approved by the Communist 
Party.65 The authors describe that the Party used coercion such as purge trials and labour 
camps, which declined after the death of Stalin leading to de-Stalinization policies 
beginning in 1956, were used to intimidate citizens.66 
Although the implementation of economic, social and political equality of the 
sexes in the communist constitutions was common to communist nations in Europe, the 
authors argue that this equality was mostly superficial rather than structural and 
implemented in a way that would advance state rather than individual needs. Feminist 
political theorists including Larissa Lissyutkina (1993), Nanette Funk (1993), Susan Gal 
and Gail Kligman (2000), and Barbara Einhorn and Charlotte Sever (2003) have 
discussed the flaws of these seemingly progressive policies and social programs. They 
include claims that communism would advance women's equal access to the labour 
market, or quotas employed to guarantee women's parliamentary participation, state-run 
daycare, and legal access to abortion and birth control. This slate of gender-specific 
programs and policies would, theoretically, open political, economic and social spaces 
not usually occupied by women. Guarantees for the right to work and the right to be 
included in public policy, promised innovative social structures to relieve women of their 
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traditional maternal duties and state-run childcare would potentially alleviate burdens 
women face in the home.   
Post-communist countries also utilized Marxist theory to inform social policies 
that affected women’s lives. Alfred G. Meyer (1985) describes Marxist theorists as 
promoting equal access to labour to emancipate women from their dependent positions in 
the home.67 However, Meyer reveals the flaws of Marxist theory to appropriately address 
and categorize issues such as women’s sexuality, reproduction, and the sexual division of 
labour. These shortcomings in addition to patriarchy contributed to the communism’s 
failure to liberate women.68 Barbara Einhorn and Charlotte Sever (2003) likewise 
describe the number of women participating in the communist national labour sectors as 
far outnumbering women in waged work in most liberal democracies. Similarly, the 
number of women in communist parliaments outnumbered liberal democracies, averaging 
30 percent.69 While equal rights were, in theory, guaranteed under communist 
constitutions, in practice women did not experience equality relative to men. Public space 
was superficially open to women however public and political realms remained gendered 
restricted by authoritarianism to maintain the existing system. 
Many scholars agree that the manner by which communist governments were 
authoritarian deprived male and female citizens of their independence. Political scientists 
Sharon L. Wolchik (1985); Alfred G. Meyer (1985), Larissa Lissyutkina (1993), and 
Alexandra Hrycak (2005) argue that equal rights policies under communism were driven 
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by economic demands to fill the need for many people to work for the state, rather than 
for the explicit purpose of women’s liberation. The authors expose how communism’s 
claims that gender equality policies concretely emancipated women were mostly 
propaganda rather than reality.  
Wolchik (1985) describes communist governments as strictly in control of public 
life and viewing women as a useful employment reserve for industrialization. They 
promoted women's emancipation through paid labour. She notes that some policies such 
as access to education and access to the labour market were liberating by expanding 
educational opportunities and eliminating illiteracy. These policies limited the types of 
skills women developed in comparison to men, therefore, reinforcing the feminization of 
sectors of women's labour.70  
Meyer (1985) describes how communist governments attempt to reconcile 
women’s maternal duties by providing state-run daycare and paid maternity leaves. 
However, the way in which the policies were enacted was ambiguous.71 As Meyer shows, 
women certainly entered the workforce like men however these policies likely did very 
little for women regarding true emancipation because cultural gender norms were static. 
Economically, the number of women in the workforce appeared high, but as Larissa 
Lissyutkina (1993) illustrates, compulsory sectors of labour in the Soviet Union were 
used to control dissident movements and monitor those who expressed dissatisfaction. 
She claims work environments were generally discriminatory towards women and due to 
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strict state control, women had no recourse for grievance. Although women’s access to 
education and paid work increased; their entry was under strict government control and 
only implemented half-heartedly. Therefore, as sociologist Alexandra Hrycak (2005) 
explains, a statistically high number of women visible in the labour market was a 
superficial picture of women’s emancipation. She notes that women generally occupied 
low-level, dead-end menial jobs or were employed in traditionally feminized 
occupations.72 
Similarly, as for women’s presence as active in the political sphere, the numbers 
of women cited as being involved in politics did not truly reflect the lack of actual 
political representation that women experienced. For example, in 1985 women occupied 
an average of 27 percent of seats in the Eastern European region, at that time the highest 
percentage reported globally.73 This percentage varied over the region: countries of the 
Soviet Union such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine reported all over 30 
percent, whereas women's political representation was less than 25 percent in Hungary 
and Poland.74  Einhorn and Sever (2003) describe how these percentages have widely 
been understood as quite nominal as women parliamentarians exercised minimal 
influence over policy formation outside of the Central Committees and Politburo who are 
attributed as the real decision holders.75 Therefore, the high percentages reported of 
women's participation in the political sphere failed to support the supposed Soviet goal of 
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women's emancipation concretely. Further, women’s formal political representation 
declined sharply following the end of communism. This decline indicates that 
emancipation was not achieved. While government-funded programs allowed women to 
work while at the same time the opportunity to fulfill their socially prescribed duties as 
mothers, the programs granted the government permission to intervene in family life. In 
other words, structural top-down economic policies of communist parties in East and 
Central Europe failed to create true emancipation for women. 
State control destabilized the fixed boundaries of public and private spaces in 
communist countries yet failed to address women’s concerns within the private – the 
family home. As a result, the meaning of home was reconstructed. Domestic spaces 
became places of politicized resistance where families could vocally criticize the 
government, and in households that were not ethnically Russian, children were educated 
in their native language. During the Soviet period, the domestic sphere was recreated as a 
place of resistance consolidating new values for the home in excess of the personal. 
Gender and political theorist Nanette Funk (1993) describes the changing worth of the 
family explaining how the domestic realm became a substitute location for political 
activism.76 Accordingly, women used their duties as caregivers to sidestep government-
control over women’s social participation. Lissyutkina (1993) reinforces the notion of 
private as the political, noting that during the communist era, the kitchen emerged as a 
dynamic hub of intellectual thought, where political and cultural debates took place and 
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where women could educate their children away from the controlling eyes of the state.77 
Therefore,  women politicized the domestic sphere and a place where women were able 
to control their lives and exhibit individual ambitions. For some, the private sphere 
enabled individual and political expression away from state interference and a place for 
citizens to exert power over their own lives.  
Yet government restrictions limited how citizens interacted with public space 
forcing citizens to express dissenting opinions solely within the private spaces of the 
home. Anthropologist Katherine Verdery (1996) claims the socialist state created a 
system of socialist paternalism to enhance familial dependency on the state.78 Verdery 
describes how gender roles were constructed under a system of authoritative socialism as 
follows: 
Subjects were morally tied to the state, where citizenship did not occur through 
political or active participation, rather citizens were treated as children. Socialist 
paternalism implicated gender by seeking to eradicate male/female differences to 
an unprecedented degree as both gender and nation are essential to the hegemonic 
projects of modern-state building.79 
The role assumed by the socialist state was paternal dictating how public space was 
defined and how citizens interacted with those spaces. This paternalism, in turn, affected 
gender roles. Verdery (1996) notes that state paternalism re-drew the masculine and 
feminine space as bounded or clear-cut while at the same time undercutting men's 
authority within the "feminized" household which reinstated gender differences. 
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According to Verdery, domestic work was exclusively feminine, but with the 
implementation of early retirement state polices, pensioners were incorporated as 
domestic workers.80 Verdery (1996) describes how women's bodies were treated as 
reproductive instruments wherein non-reproductive, or celibate and childless adults were 
penalized through state taxation. The result was a different gendered type of "public" and 
"domestic” where "biological reproduction permeated the public sphere" instead of being 
restricted to the domestic.81  
Whereas Verdery (1996) discussed the broader theme of the gendered meanings 
of space, sociologists Barbara Einhorn and Charlotte Sever (2003) examine how the 
private space of the home allowed for a discourse of political resistance to the state and in 
some ways replaced the function of civil society in liberal democracies.82 The authors 
suggest the private or domestic sphere became a site of unchallenged solidarity. 
However, this implied women's issues such as spousal or domestic violence remained 
invisible and unaddressed by the state.83 Einhorn and Sever note that the state control of 
the public realm versus the private home altered “the concepts of citizenship and civil 
society which inﬂuenced (and constrained) the political possibilities and collective 
identities that could form in this context and in its wake.”84 Likewise, anthropologist 
Susan Gal and sociologist Gail Kligman (2000) assert that because women occupied the 
lower rungs of economic and political life, there was little opportunity for them to vocally 
challenge the contested, or violent, aspects of the home.85 During the Stalin era, Gal and 
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Kligman note that Stalin declared the "woman question" resolved. This declaration led to 
greater inequality because any contest with his conclusion was “unsayable.”86 In sum, the 
authoritarianism of the communist system created an environment where both men and 
women were unable to address gender inequality within the household and also within the 
public sphere. However, the home became an essential part of civil resistance.  
The state also constrained women's roles in the communist system in ways that 
affected their emancipation. Policies strictly controlled citizens during the communist 
period, altering the way in which public and private spaces were utilized. Women, 
although present in public spaces through work, politics, and social organizations as 
dictated by the government, did not experience liberation within their homes. They bore 
the double or even triple burden. If in theory women were encouraged to transgress the 
gendered private-public divide, in practice this meant they were expected to participate in 
paid labour, community organizations while also do the majority of caregiving and 
nutritional activities in the home. Wolchik (1985) states that in some cases, and 
particularly in rural areas, the government’s version of the liberation of women not only 
enforced the double or triple burden for women but state focus on modernization 
eliminated traditional ways of life which, in some cases, jeopardized women’s influence 
in the domestic sphere.87 
Gal and Kligman’s (2000) analyze how the attempt by communist states to 
reconstruct space relied on stereotypical perceptions of women upheld under capitalism:  
The “gender regimes” of state socialism in East Central Europe were built out of 
these ideological critiques and failed utopias, as well as out of the pre-existing 
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arrangements of capitalist gender relations that structures male dominance in 
households, politics, and workplaces. After the Second World War, the new 
communist states tried to erase the existing institutional forms of the 
public/private dichotomy. Many of the distinctive characteristics of state 
socialism derive from this ideological rejection. Once again, this suggests how 
ideas about gender – and its long-standing linkage to the public/private – shaped 
political and economic arrangements. Ironically, however, new and subtle 
configurations of public/private emerged in the course of four decades, as state 
socialism succeeded in producing another system that, though quite different in 
institutional organization from capitalist gender regimes nevertheless was equally 
effective in securing an altered form of male privilege.88 
Fundamentally, communist governments reconfigured public and private spaces in a way 
that sustained patriarchy existing under the former social system. While these spaces may 
have appeared different institutionally, they were similar in the promotion of male 
privilege. Therefore, policies that meant to emancipate women were ineffectual without a 
parallel agenda of re-educating society and the state about women’s needs. A cultural 
revolution, like feminism, was needed to be taken seriously by the state. 
Historian Maria Bucur (2008) reinforces Gal and Kligman’s (2000) discussion of 
the reinforcement of gender roles under state communism but trace the origins of this 
mandate to the 1920’s following the Bolshevik Revolution. Bucur suggests that the 
influence of more radical gender-role thinkers such as Aleksandra Kollontai was 
fundamental. Kollontai was head of the Zhenskii Otdel or Zhenotdel, the Women’s 
Bureau, which was an organization attached to the Central Committee organized to 
introduce cultural and educational work for women from 1920 to 1922.89 As a member of 
the Soviet government during the 1920s, Kollontai questioned gender divisions within 
family relations and the domestic sphere. However, by the 1930s the party had adopted a 
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more traditional masculinist view as proposed by Lenin and Stalin, squarely reinforcing 
that women’s roles in the home were vital to the moral upbringing of the nation. Men 
were secondary partners.90 Bucur suggests women were in a position of dependency on 
the communist state without any tools to question the apparent advantages they had 
received.91 
The Communist State, Maternalism and the Family 
As Scott (1986) describes, the nation-state uses the law to control its citizens. 
Communist states were no different. The state considered women not only as a type of 
economic source but also the preservers and reproducers of the population. State policies 
and laws permeated the domestic, politicizing the home and women’s roles within it. 
Verdery (1996) suggests that the shift or governance and re-organization created a 
different gendered type of “public” and “domestic” wherein the concern for biological 
reproduction was integral to the public rather than confined to the domestic sphere.92 
Verdery suggests that this type of re-organization at the state level resulted in re-
organization of the definition of gender roles. The state attempted to solidify these gender 
roles through state paternalism that promised to take care of citizens through the 
implementation of state social programs. These programs were meant to transform gender 
roles by shifting women’s labour from primarily the domestic sphere, to the public.93  
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Gal and Kligman (2000) describe the effect of re-organization of labour on some 
women carrying the double and triple burden during the communist period. They note 
that in some cases, women saw themselves as courageously and unselfishly coping with 
difficult demands made by the state.94 These demands, according to Gal and Kligman, 
resulted in exhaustion as well as a sense of gratification and moral superiority, but also 
lead to feelings of victimization and guilt. Feelings of gratification and moral superiority 
were tied to women's central role in the home whereas feelings of victimization and guilt 
came from a sense of lack of professional accomplishment, especially as mothers.95 
Furthermore, Gal and Kligman discuss how state media reinforced these gender roles 
through women’s magazines and displays of women who could effortlessly be “engineer, 
pretty wife, mother, fashion plate, and political activist.”96The guilt women felt was 
partially derived from the media occasionally blaming societal ills such as demographic 
decline to lapses in morality on women’s inadequate mothering and supposedly excessive 
selfishness.97 
Government expectations pressured women to be mothers, first and foremost, 
especially during periods following World War II and the 1960s when birth rates declined 
for which women were blamed. Alexandra Hrycak (2001) states that policies in the 
Soviet Union during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s encouraged fertility, therefore 
reinforcing the importance of motherhood and the nuclear family, however, women were 
excluded from influence over public life.98 Hrycak notes that the Soviets reinforced 
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women’s roles as reproducers of the nation by rewarding women “Mother Heroine” 
awards if they bore ten or more children.99  
The meanings and symbolism of maternalism shifted over different eras of the 
communist period. Although the state promoted motherhood as Hrycak described, the state 
did not fully implement adequate support for mothers. Hrycak notes that although women 
were idolized in state rhetoric as child bearers, the Soviet state neglected to invest in 
primary healthcare including maternal health. Additionally, Hrycak (2001) reviews how 
the state refused to provide sufficient sex education and by so doing, promoted marriage at 
a young age.100 As a result of these maternalist policies, historian Barbara Engel (2005) 
suggests that in the Soviet Union gender inequality intensified in the Stalin-era which was 
caused by the state encouragement of women to reproduce. Two policies were significant: 
the length of time for maternity leaves was increased, and women received benefits based 
on the number of children she bore.101 Engel (2005) describes pro-natalist legislation 
passed in 1936 that designated motherhood as a responsibility to society.102 In sum, 
women’s bodies as reproductive instruments permeated into the public sphere, according 
to Verdery (1996) whereas celibacy and childlessness punitively resulted in higher 
taxation.103  Engel, Hrycak, and Verdery demonstrate how the state may have valued 
women's maternalism and reproductive rights, but not other capabilities of women. 
Therefore, pro-natalism reinforced traditional gender roles of women, keeping them in the 
                                                          
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid., 139. 
101 Barbara Engel, “Russia and the Soviet Union,” in Women’s History in Global Perspective, ed. Bonnie 
Smith Vol. 3 (Champaign: University of Illinois), 171. 
102 Ibid., 169. 
103 Verdery, What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?, 65. 
 51 
 
home. They were conceived as tools of reproduction of benefit to the state who failed to 
adhere to constitutional obligations for women's equality.   
Transitional Politics and the Reconfiguration of Space  
Other scholars look to the transition from communism to capitalism from 1989 to 
1992 to understand how gender relations were reconfigured in the post-communist 
period.104 The transition and early years following national independence in the 1990s 
would set the stage – a kind of foundation – for gendered space and relations in the post-
communist era.  
The rise of nationalist movements that challenged the Soviet state reconceived the 
way in which public spaces were imagined. Public space was used by citizens to 
communicate their dissatisfaction with communism. Furthermore, the move for 
nationalist independence drove the call for changes in political, economic and social 
policy following the transition from communism. Feminist scholars such as Katherine 
Verdery (1996), Susan Gal (1997), Diane Duffy (2000), Susan Gal and Gail Kligman 
(2000), Alexandra Hrycak (2001 and 2005), Barbara Einhorn and Charlotte Sever (2003), 
Kathleen Montgomery (2003), Sarah Birch (2003), Barbara Engel (2005), Maria Bucur 
(2008) and Maxime Forest (2011) point to nationalist and independence movements' use 
of cultural preconceptions about gender some of which recreated historical myths of the 
nation in order to gain the support of a populace discontented with communism. 
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Traditional gender roles embedded in historical nationalist myth before communism was 
used to justify the existence of national identity.  
Political scientist Duffy (2000) describes nationalist movements use of gender. 
She suggested that traditional gender roles after communism particularly those relating to 
women’s identity were “closely associated with national, cultural, and family 
survival.”105 While Gorbachev’s administration continued to implement the ineffective 
policies experienced under communism through Glasnost and Perestroika, in the post-
communist era women sought alternatives to resolve their problems. In Ukraine, as 
Alexandra Hrycak (2001) notes the Rukh nationalist movement promised progressive 
solutions to grant equal parental responsibility for child-rearing. However, this promise 
found parallels in the conservative approach reinforcing the traditional family unit. Rukh 
Nationalists emphasized healthy and nationally conscious Ukrainian families however 
they went no further than that. 106  Einhorn and Sever (2003) suggest that Rukh’s 
openness ultimately lead to a return to the ideal of the "mother/eternal feminine" as part 
of nationalist and traditional and religious platforms. This rhetoric, in turn, influenced the 
character of women's activism within nationalist movements.107  
Mainly, women's disillusionment with the communist system and the introduction 
of some new policies directed towards women in the 1980s as introduced by nationalists 
and independence movements attracted women to support nationalist movements. 
However, nationalists treated women's issues close or similar to how communist 
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governments had treated these issues. While nationalists relied on women's popular 
support of the movement, they considered women's issues secondary. 
Duffy (2000) further explained that with women’s increased participation in 
national independence movements in Central and Eastern Europe their visibility in the 
political transition from communism to a market economy is evident. However, she also 
acknowledged women’s minimal active presence in state reformation and formal 
decision-making.108 Moreover, no significant leaders within nationalist movements were 
women, so the movement visibly appeared less committed to women. However, if the 
types of work women performed in nationalist movements were primarily supportive, 
they also contributed important yet less visible work such as running dissident 
newspapers and or managing underground cells of opposition.109 On the other hand, 
Einhorn and Sever (2003) also claim that women's mobilization rarely included issues we 
would understand as ‘feminist.'110  
Hrycak (2005) describes how women did eventually emerge as charismatic 
leaders within Rukh, especially at the local level in eastern Ukraine. However, the most 
influential leaders within the movement and the movement's allies such as with the 
Native Language Society or the Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox Churches were men.111 
Nationalist movements were supported by the re-emergence of religious organizations 
which had generally been persecuted during the communist period. For example, in 
Lithuania and Poland, Maxime Forest (2011) describes the expression of faith as 
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significant to advancing nationalism and opposing communism. Forest (2011) indicates 
that since 1989 the re-establishment of traditionalist and Christian democratic parties 
have questioned or even suppressed women's sexual, reproductive and social rights.112 
Therefore, as many scholars conclude, that the alliances struck between nationalist 
movements and religious organizations resulted in reconstitution of traditional, maternal 
roles for women in the post-communist state.  
Nationalist movements further marginalized women because of the perception of 
gender roles carried over from communism and the supposed damage caused to men and 
masculine identity when women were relegated to the private sphere. As Verdery (1996) 
explains, the paternalism of the Soviet state removed power away from men and 
transferred it to the state.113 As Susan Gal (1997) describes, the private sphere was the 
site of individual conscience which allowed it to be used for significant political action.114 
Since the private sphere was mainly understood as feminine and the public understood as 
masculine, many men viewed this spatial binary as an affront to their masculinity. This 
view encouraged a disregard of women’s grievances that they had against the communist 
system. For example, Maria Bucur (2008) argues that the perceived benefits women 
experienced under socialism disadvantaged them during the transitional period because 
women could not speak about their experience of the double and triple burden.115 
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Therefore, grievances women expressed about the communist system were pushed aside 
if they did not adhere to the goals of the nationalist movements.  
Nonetheless, women's issues were not entirely dropped by nationalist movements. 
Instead, the nationalist movements reinforced women's roles as mothers and the 
reproducers of the nation. As Einhorn and Sever (2003) describe, the maternalism 
inherent in these cultural values influenced the type and degree of political activism in 
which women partook.116 Women dominated environmental and peace groups, according 
to Einhorn and Sever (2003), mobilized for children’s health or against state recruitment 
of sons and husbands in violent conflict.117 Reviewing women’s social activism in 
Ukraine, Sarah D. Phillips (2008) also describes women’s groups in Ukraine as 
exclusively organized around maternal or environmental issues. Phillips exemplifies, 
Mama-86, founded in 1990, by women whose newborns had suffered from Chernobyl-
related illnesses caused by the Chernobyl reactor meltdown of 1986.118 
 Following independence, major decision makers of the transition including 
leaders from involved in nationalist movements created the governing bodies of countries 
who achieved independence. For example, Solidarity, formed by Poland’s independence 
movement and trade union, became the major political party and leader Lech Walesa 
became president from 1990-1995. In Poland, and within Solidarity, women remained 
disproportionately disadvantaged politically and economically.119  
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While quantitative statistics map out the shifts, or divisions, in the public and 
private spaces women occupied, the number of women recorded as holding political and 
economic spaces under a communist regime was not representative. The authoritarian 
nature of the communism meant that the women's statistical representation was politically 
symbolic rather than accurate. Thus, many scholars describe the effects of the transition 
as disproportionately affecting or even eroding, women’s participation in the labour 
market or politics. It is clear that women’s participation in these public sectors was 
challenged by nationalism re-inscription of traditional misogynist narratives that 
ultimately expected women to remain in the private sphere.  
The gendering of spaces during the various nation state’s transition from 
communism to the market economy is also essential in understanding women's access to 
positions of political power in post-communist Europe. Scholarly literature addresses the 
effects of communist transition, how nationalist movements during the transition 
understood women’s societal roles, women’s disillusionment with feminism, women’s 
engagement in civil society, and the effect of women’s disillusionment with the political 
system.120  
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Einhorn and Sever (2003) believe the transition to democracy and capitalism has 
not been kind to women. Other scholars agree. Sarah Birch (2003) found in her study of 
women's parliamentary representation in Ukraine that women made up 70 percent of the 
unemployed, where two-thirds of those impacted possessed higher education.121 In her 
study of women’s place historically during and after the Soviet Union, historian Barbara 
Engel (2005) states that the number of women in positions of authority declined 
everywhere. Engel emphasizes the socio-economic issues women faced following the end 
of communism. Women’s unemployment was inflated disproportionately to men because 
women were not privileged to take advantage of privatizations of state-controlled 
businesses. Additionally, the high cost of education forced families to choose which 
children to educate, and boys were conventionally privileged. Employers’ called for 
women applicants on the based on physical attractiveness rather than qualifications. 
Violence and pornography were noticed to be increasing.122  
In her introduction on women’s parliamentary representation in post-communist 
Europe, political scientist Kathleen Montgomery (2003) describes a dramatic drop in 
women parliamentarians from 30 percent (during the last communist elections in the 
1980s) to under 10 percent (in the first post-communist elections in the late 1980s to the 
early 1990s) in some countries. Her statistics imply women were practically absent from 
political party leadership, cabinet positions, key ministries, or other institutions of social 
bargaining.123 Moreover, according to Birch (2003), the drop in the number of women 
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parliamentarians was related to the opening up of the political system in the wake of 
communism. For example, in 1985, 38.5 percent of deputies in the Ukrainian parliament 
were women, whereas, in Ukraine's first post-Soviet election of 1994, a mere 4.3 percent 
of women were elected to parliament.124 These low percentages of women’s participation 
in the political sphere, as Birch noted, were caused by the transition process from 
communism to capitalism.125 If perhaps women's statistical participation was inflated as 
part of an authoritarian communist agenda;  the comparison of percentages over the two 
periods insightfully shows how women may have been excluded or, in some cases, did 
not participate in the labour and electoral political sectors.   
The decline in women’s wage employment paired with the decline in women’s 
participation in the electoral politics has drawn scholarly attention. Some have described 
the post-communist era as regressive whereby values of the transition masculinized 
public space and feminized private space. Using identity theory and by looking at 
women's access to the labour market and formal political institutions, Duffy (2000) 
suggested that during the transition there was a return to a more patriarchal ideology 
associated with the pre-Soviet period.126 Duffy also identifies the prevalence of shared 
values, patriarchal structures, and gender-role stereotyping that exist after the end of 
Soviet communism to suggest that private space were popularly understood as protecting 
moral values for families.127 Birch (2003) echoes Duffy's belief that traditional gender 
roles return during the transition, adding that women's place within political 
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democratization became once again focused on women as child-bearers and keepers of 
the private sphere.128 Einhorn and Sever (2003) also point to women's increased 
inequality during the post-communist era as a result of a revival of traditionalist and 
nationalist ideologies. They also argue that women faced an increased risk of violence 
and discrimination in the labour market.129  
Hrycak (2001) presents a different approach to women’s perceived gender roles 
after the communist transition. She suggests that the gender system re-established after 
the end of communism by nationalist movements is a continuation of earlier gender 
expectations. Hrycak states Soviet policies definitively increased the birth rate which 
encouraged all members of society to treat women’s role to be primarily as mothers.130 
As Hrycak asserts, Soviet policies reinforced sexual divisions of labour that 
correspondingly strengthened traditional gender roles while also convincing women to 
take on additional responsibilities.131 As a result, gender equality policies in the labour 
force, as well as social programs such as state-funded childcare and maternity leaves that 
relieved some pressures experienced by mothers in the post-transition era, were removed. 
Hrycak notes that external concerns with abuses of women’s rights within post-
communist states as well as internal media and political promotion of maternalism 
pushed Eastern European women to frame their own economic and social welfare and 
their reproductive rights as real issues.132 
                                                          
128 Birch, “Women and Political Representation in Contemporary Ukraine,” 130. 
129 Einhorn and Sever, “Gender and Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe,” 164.  
130 Hrycak, 137. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid., 157. 
 60 
 
The re-establishment of a communist defined traditional gender order in the post-
communist period appears to be related to the reconfiguration of state-controlled systems 
to privately owned businesses. Capitalism was new to these countries. Gal and Kligman 
(2000) describe the reconfigured system as erection a new order of social stratification 
and inequality, where new elites joined with the old, “who now appear in different 
ideological garb.”133 The authors state that conservative social orders continued during 
the transition. However, there is a "change in the principles by which stratification is 
ordered and justified."134 Gal and Kligman’s described old elites joined by new elites as a 
system that appears outwardly different but this slight reconfiguration continues to 
benefit those previously empowered during the communist era. Women continue to be 
subordinate.  
Section III – The Old Boys Club: Theorizing the Gendering of Political 
Spaces and the Effects of Masculine Leadership Women’s Access to Executive 
Political Leadership 
Political institutions have been historically characterized as masculine by feminist 
scholars as discussed in previous sections. Masculinity, as these scholars argue, has been 
naturalized as the basic requirement of political leadership within the nation-state. This 
section considers the masculinization of political leadership more specifically first by 
reviewing the scholarship on women’s access to positions in parliament.  
Puwar’s concept of women as “space invader” exemplifies how certain 
constituencies, and women specifically, are historically excluded from specific domains 
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despite the fact women are involved in political space, formally and informally. Scholarly 
literature that addresses women in formal political spaces includes statistical analysis 
quantifying the number of women elected to hold positions in parliament, cabinets, and 
political leadership. Conversely, scholarly literature about women in informal politics 
considers women’s activities outside of formal political system including the work by 
women in non-governmental organizations or as individuals.  
Women's access to parliament has been extensively discussed. For the most part, 
worldwide and regional studies of women's access to parliament have prioritized socio-
economic, political and cultural factors on women's access to parliament. Political 
scientist Richard Matland (1998), for example, finds socio-economic factors such as 
female presence in the labour force as well as women's higher levels of education are less 
significant in female levels of political representation. Cultural factors, he implies, are 
difficult to measure and need further study. Instead, Matland finds that in developed 
countries, the type of political system may limit (majoritarian) or promote (proportional 
representation) women’s access contributing to the electoral opportunity structure.135 
In their cross-cultural study, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2000) found that 
cultural factors matter in women's electoral success worldwide and are especially 
important in post-industrial nations. However, the authors also note that the 
modernization and evolution of cultural attitudes alone in some countries such as the 
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United States and Spain are not enough to overcome institutional barriers against 
women's political participation.136  
Sociologists Sheri Kunovich and Pamela Paxton (2005) analyzed the role of 
political party gatekeepers whom they define as those who hold power to decide who 
represents their political party. Gatekeepers, according to Kunovich and Paxton, play 
essential roles in preventing women's electoral success. However, they found that the 
presence of women as part of the political party elite had a positive effect on women's 
electoral success in plurality-majority systems.137  
Does the presence of women in political decision-making positions make a 
difference in the creation of women-friendly policies? Critical mass theory suggests that 
women must make up 30 percent of decision-making positions to affect substantial 
political change. Scholars who theorize the effect of critical mass question to what extent 
the greater statistical presence of women in parliaments will generate changes in social 
policy. In their study following the election of the 1997 British Labour Party in Great 
Britain, Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris (2003) find that although radical change in 
policies may not occur relative to a more significant number of women in electoral 
politics, their numerically higher presence will gradually re-shape attitudes and policy.138 
Pamela Paxton and Melanie Hughes (2014) state that the impact of critical mass can be 
better assessed by noting the nuances of power differences within legislatures. For 
                                                          
136 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, “Cultural Barriers to Women’s Leadership: A Worldwide 
Comparison,” (Conference presentation, International Political Science Association World Congress, 
Quebec City, 2000), 14. 
137 Sheri Kunovich and Pamela Paxton, “Pathways to Power: The Role of Political Parties in Women’s 
National Political Representation,” American Journal of Sociology 111, no. 2 (September 2005): 540. 
138 Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris, “Westminster Women: the Politics of Presence,” Political Studies 51 
(2003), 100. 
 63 
 
example, women may be more likely to influence policy when they are part of political 
parties in power as the elected party generally control the overall political agenda and 
have greater opportunity of passing bills. Another example of increased influence is 
women who are elected as legislators who are committee members or cabinet members as 
they have increased access to major decision-making bodies.139 The authors conclude that 
a critical mass of women elected will lead to increased women in leadership who, in turn, 
will influence policy.140 
As previously discussed, the end of communism caused a decline in women's 
parliamentary representation including in Ukraine. After the transition, in post-
communist Europe, political barriers to women's parliamentary representation can be 
strongly correlated to the development of political institutions as well as to cultural 
factors. For example, Matland and Montgomery (2003) and Rueschemeyer and Wolchik 
(2009) note that the instability of the party systems and the fleeting nature of political 
parties in post-communist Europe resulted in the emergence of professional politicians 
who, to a documented extent, classified women's issues as secondary.141 Furthermore, 
Matland and Montgomery (2003) and Rueschemeyer and Wolchik's (2009) also 
discussed the impact of political party gatekeepers in addition to the presence of religion 
and gender binarism as influential on conservative cultural attitudes. They identify these 
limitations as major barriers to women’s political representation.142 However, 
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Rueschemeyer and Wolchik (2009) emphasize the importance of a growing divide 
between those post-communist countries with western linkages, influenced by the 
European Union and those without links to Europe. According to the authors, the EU 
yields an immense amount of leverage in specific areas such as gender equality and has 
helped the development of certain countries by providing a framework for gender equity. 
143  
Since the beginning of the 1990s women’s parliamentary representation has 
experienced “modest improvements” as political scientist Frank C. Thames (2015) 
shows. However, this statistical representation has remained consistently below average 
compared to other democratic countries in Europe.144 Thames discusses the impact of a 
traditional, patriarchal culture and the electoral system on women’s political 
representation using cultural and institutional factors. He finds that the implementation of 
a closed-list PR system in Ukraine in the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections 
counteracted the negative cultural attitudes towards women politicians as the number of 
women elected to Ukrainian parliament (the Rada) increased.145 
In an evaluation of the effect of institutional structures on women's political 
representation in cabinet in industrial democracies, political scientist Alan Siaroff (2000) 
affirms that women's executive representation is related to women's parliamentary 
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representation. Siaroff finds that institutional and cultural factors are the most significant 
in women's representation in cabinets. However, this link he establishes between 
parliamentary systems and the executive also depends on whether the recruitment process 
is specialist or generalist. Whereas a specialist system picks ministers based on their 
credentials and experience with a particular type of ministry, a generalist recruitment 
process chooses people in parliament. As Siaroff shows, the generalist recruitment 
process leads to the choice of experienced back-benchers who have been part of 
parliament for an extended period. He observed leftist governments as more likely to 
include more women as cabinet ministers.146 
Section IV: Scholarship on women’s political leadership 
Genovese (1993), Jalalzai (2004, 2008, 2013, 2014), Watson et al. (2005), and 
Jalalzai and Krook (2009) have found that gender and political institutions play a 
significant role in women's success or hindrance in winning positions as an elected 
official. These scholars discuss in detail the winning characteristics of women as political 
leaders and the contexts that lead to a successful rise to power. 
In the early 1990s political scientist, Michael Genovese (1993) edited a collection 
of case studies of seven women presidents and prime ministers. These case studies 
illuminated the relationship between gender and leadership.147 The individual case studies 
Genovese featured provide insight into women’s biographies and the context in which 
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they have succeeded. As he observed, leadership is more than just occupying a political 
position, but instead includes the influence one has over others to convince them to act 
and believe in certain political platforms and policies.148 Jalalzai (2013) found 
Genovese’s (1993) study useful in understanding how women political leaders’ 
biographical history and status as well as the contexts in which they have led their 
country matters. However, Jalalzai (2013) critiques Genovese’s (1993) study as limited in 
that he does not allow for a broader comparison.  
Subsequently, Jalalzai (2004, 2009, 2013) and Watson et al. (2005) pursued large-
scale analyses of women executives worldwide, documenting their paths context, and 
powers. These scholars searched for common characteristics among those women who 
have succeeded as political leaders worldwide. This approach of conceptualizing the 
causes of women's success or absence in executive electoral power corresponded with the 
increasing election of women political leaders worldwide from 2000 onwards. These 
studies identified whether these women executives were prime minister or president. 
Moreover, the scholars detailed the powers associated with those positions as well as 
determining the personal characteristics of each individual and inclusive of identifying 
familial ties to former political leaders. The women's political profiles, including their 
ideological perspectives, level of education achieved at the election, their career paths, 
marital status, religious beliefs and length of the term were also enumerated and 
compared. This scholarship found that historically, there have been more women prime 
ministers than presidents. 
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For example, according to Jalalzai (2004), the number of total women executives 
accessing positions of prime ministers was 73 percent while the total number of women 
executives presidential positions was lower at 23 percent as of 2004.149 A year later, 
Robert P. Watson et al.'s (2005) findings correspond with Jalalzai (2004) when they 
noted that more women have served as prime minister (27) than president (23).150 Both 
Jalalzai (2004) and Watson et al. (2005) conclude that the difference in the women's 
accession to prime minister in higher numbers than as president may be related to the 
process by which leaders reach these positions as well as the powers that are attached to 
the respective position of leadership. 
Familial ties to women political leaders, as Jalalzai (2004) noted, have aided some 
women in south and Southeast Asian countries, with more conservative values. These 
associations allow individual women to ascend positions of political power. Familial ties 
to well-known and high-level political figures played an essential role among 30 percent 
of women who had ties to former presidents or prime ministers, the majority of the 
women being wives or daughters. As Jalalzai argues, these familial ties provide some 
understanding of why women in cultures that are more oriented towards traditional 
gender roles can access positions of political leadership. However, her conclusions 
provoke consideration of identifying similar characteristics amongst women in political 
leadership elsewhere worldwide. 
Jalalzai (2008, 2013, 2014) identifies the potential obstacles and opportunities for 
women seeking positions of leadership by using a multifaceted analysis of political 
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structures and cultural norms as well as showing the characteristics associated with 
current and former women political leaders worldwide.151 She (2013) found that women 
were more likely to occupy positions of leadership with dispersed powers and 
parliamentary collaboration. As well, Jalalzai attributes the obstacles women face in 
accessing leadership to perceptions of women’s traditional roles as subordinate to men.152  
Jalalzai provided detailed characteristics of the women who cede to political 
leadership whereas Puwar (2004) interrogated how women invaded the political spaces 
dominated by men and changed seemingly cemented masculine definitions of leadership. 
Jalalzai (2004) correspondingly understood how women accessed positions of head of 
government or head of state in countries where gender roles are culturally conservative, 
and where the social and political rights of women are suppressed.153  
Puwar (2004) notes that politicians in Great Britain's parliamentary system are 
commonly privileged upper-class, and white, men. Her study of gender and leadership 
focuses on the masculinization of political power, and the effect of masculine dominated 
politics has on women's access to political leadership. However, as she has shown, 
statistically the women who become prime ministers or presidents are privileged and 
mostly Caucasian. 
Analyzing the backgrounds of women prime ministers and presidents, Watson et 
al. (2005) noted that nearly all women successful in these categories of executive 
leadership possess higher levels of education compared to other women in their countries. 
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In circumstances when women leaders did not come from affluent families, they 
eventually attained high levels of education.154 Therefore, women who ceded to prime 
minister or president are privileged through familial ties in addition to higher education. 
Consequently, it may be determined that class is a significant value to ensure success as 
many are from wealthy families with ties to politics or have acquired the privileges that 
come with education. Finally, most women practiced the dominant religion of their 
country.155 Watson et al.'s (2005) finding that women who achieved the position of prime 
minister or president practiced the dominant religion is vital in countries where religion, 
linguistic, or ethnic affiliation is culturally influential.156 Therefore, while these women 
elected may be perceived as "space invaders" in the political systems of their countries-- 
in other words biologically distinct from traditional male political leaders—they 
consistently possessed recognizable values such as dominant religious, ethnic or 
linguistic affiliation. Therefore, these findings determine, to succeed politically a woman 
must align with a prevailing belief system in a country. The authors note that there is little 
variation in the experiences of women world leaders however they also note that this 
finding should be treated with caution not to create a generic worldview of women 
leaders.157 
Thus by identifying the types of positions women held (prime minister versus 
president), previous scholarship implies institutional structures play an essential role in 
women's ability to access political leadership because presidential and prime ministerial 
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positions differ in two significant ways: how the respective executive positions are 
elected and how voters or gatekeepers perceive the positions of power.158 Scholarship in 
general, as discussed above, shows that women are more likely to ascend to position of 
prime minister than president. Jalalzai (2013) affirms that the selection process, as well as 
institutional structures, have the most significant effect on women's political 
achievements because both are gendered.159 She (2013) finds that women’s location in 
the power hierarchy and her leadership responsibilities are critical to women’s success as 
leaders.160 
In her regionally-based study of women leaders in Europe, Jalalzai (2014) 
confirms that the more powerful the positions of leadership, the harder it will be for 
women to get elected to such positions. In 2014, she considered European leadership and 
calculated 32 women to have ascended to executive power to date or approximately 41 
percent of worldwide examples of women in political leadership.161 Although the 
numbers of women political leaders appear high in Europe, and the dual executive offers 
opportunities for women, women are often hindered from reaching more powerful 
positions within the dual executive where national leadership is divided and shared.162  
Jalalzai (2014) asserts the existence of geographical and historical differences 
between the paths of women political leaders in Western and Eastern Europe, affirming 
that women in Eastern Europe may travel slightly different paths to political power than 
do women in Western Europe. Jalalzai includes whether women come to power through 
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the popular vote, legislative appointment, presidential appointment, or constitutional 
succession.163 Eastern European women, Jalalzai shows, gained political experience 
through activist movements. In her conclusion, Jalalzai also questions to what extent 
women make a difference in appointing other women and whether women who achieve 
political success as leaders implement women-friendly policy. She also states more 
research is needed to fully comprehend the gendered strategies women use to get elected 
to understand to what extent these strategies are successful.164  
If political institutional frameworks and gatekeepers work against women’s 
access, what strategies are needed to erode the many barriers women face? Genovese 
(1993) reinforces the notion that the perception of women’s biological identity as women 
affects the type of interactions women experience during their path to political leadership. 
Women are also impacted while they hold positions of leadership.165 When discussing 
whether women prime ministers or presidents lead differently than men, Genovese (1993) 
states that gender will influence a leader's performance because allies and adversaries will 
adjust their behaviour when interacting with a woman leader. Therefore, at the political-
level, gender—whether you are perceived as biologically female or male--impacts how 
women lead because they are viewed by men as different and therefore, treated 
differently by men who dominate the political realm. Genovese (1993) shows that 
successfully elected women political leaders will have developed specific strategies 
related to dealing with these types of challenges and often turn them into opportunities. 
These strategies, Genovese (1993) notes, are connected to how gender is perceived and 
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performed in individual societies. The gendered strategies political leaders adopt or 
challenge are, therefore, contextually and culturally dependent.  
Scholarship providing insight into the gendered context of the barriers to women’s 
political leadership in Eastern Europe remains minimal. Most studies, such as that by 
Forest (2011), consider women in parliament in post-communist Europe or global 
statistical accounting of women’s access to positions of prime minister and president. For 
example, Forest linked the exclusion of women from parliamentary politics and 
leadership under nationalist movements to the masculinization of the political system as a 
reason for the rollback of policies specific to women.166 Furthermore, Forest discussed 
how EU gender policies influenced women's access to politics whereby member-states 
are required to implement specific gender policies to promote gender equality. Forest's 
analysis includes historical, institutional, religious, and socio-economic factors however 
unlike Jalalzai (2013), Forest, using a "just add and stir approach" does not deeply or 
theoretically study the gender dynamics of political leadership.  
Conclusion 
To conclude, three themes emerge in this literature review:  
• in the political realm women are perceived and assumed to be “space 
invaders” as proposed by Puwar;  
• political space is definitively gendered with a fissure between the formal 
(masculine) and informal (feminine);  
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• women’s ability or inability to attain the highest rank or embodiment of 
electoral political power depends on context and culture of the individual 
nation in which she seeks power.  
Greater understanding of how political space is gendered and distinguished from 
domestic or private space provides further insight into reasons why women may face 
specific barriers to political power that men do not. Furthermore, the historical 
construction of space in post-communist Europe is valuable in laying out the gender 
landscape in post-communist Europe especially in the case of why more women have not 
ceded to political leadership.  
The biographical characteristics of Yulia Tymoshenko including her class status 
and social-cultural history (family, religion, education, linguistic affiliation, employment 
and business record in the gas industry, marital affiliation, educational and occupation 
history) suggest she would be well-qualified and positioned to aspire to Ukraine's 
Presidency. Once historical events intervened, her rise into the highest rank—the 
Presidency—didn't happen. Tymoshenko's strategic self-representation as the "mother 
protector" of Ukraine against Putin and Russia was ultimately not successful because 
Tymoshenko did not fit the mandate of paternal nationalism at this moment in the 
political history of geopolitical relations. Chapter two discusses this specific regional 
history and the impact of Tymoshenko's biography relative to her rise to political power. 
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Chapter II: Yulia Tymoshenko: Personal and Political History 
“Men accept defeat from other men, but they hate to lose to women. So they fight 
women harder than men. I am the best example of that.”167 -Yulia Tymoshenko 
 
 Yulia Tymoshenko has been a prominent politician in Ukraine since the country's 
independence on August 24, 1991, from the Soviet Union. She is most widely recognized 
for her part in the Orange Revolution in 2004, and her presidential run and subsequent 
arrest in 2010 because of her opposition to then-President Viktor Yanukovych. Her 
political career has flourished in an arena primarily dominated by men a fact she has 
pointed out in the quote stated above. Since 1996, she has held various political positions 
including as a Member of Parliament and leader of the All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" 
political party; she was appointed Prime Minister twice, and she ran for President twice. 
She is considered a polarizing figure in Ukrainian politics because of her ability to 
personalize politics. She has been labelled by her detractors as the "Gas Princess" or the 
"oligarch in skirts" because of her professional occupation as the President of the 
Ukrainian gasoline company, Ukrainskiy Benzin (UESU) where she earned her millions. 
Critics have compared her to Stalin and Catherine the Great, and some have labelled her a 
common criminal.168 Conversely, she has been characterized as the “Ukrainian Joan of 
Arc,” “warrior princess,” “Orange Princess,” and “Goddess of the Revolution” by those 
who view her positively as a defender of Ukrainian nationalist values as well as because 
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of her charismatic and fiery orations.169Her politics can be described as nationalist 
democratic with a populist anti-corruption focus.  That said, her politics shifted from 
initially being a business opportunist to those of preserving the Ukrainian nation. She has 
supported policies in favour of government interventions in economic policies and 
maternalist policy issues related to improving the welfare of the family. Her politics have 
mostly been defined through her relationships with other politicians in Ukraine and 
abroad, and her popularity comes mainly from her personalization of politics. 
  This Chapter outlines Tymoshenko's life and political career spanning over two 
decades. I discuss the factors related to her political successes and ultimately her failure 
to achieve the highest position of power: the presidency. In the Chapter, I identify aspects 
of Tymoshenko's life and political career that scholars perceive as common to other 
women political leaders (Michael Genovese (1993), Watson et al. (2005), Farida Jalalzai 
and Mona Lena Krook (2009), Farida Jalalzai (2004, 2013, 2014), Pamela Paxton and 
Melanie Hughes (2014), and Rebecca Richards (2015)). Some factors are personal such 
as marital status, number of children, level of education, familial ties to other political 
leaders, ethnic, religious or racial identification whereas others are more contextual 
including, for example, the institutional circumstances such as power associated with the 
positions that women occupy or seek to occupy or the contextual issues the ruling 
government confronted at the time. Tymoshenko's biography shows the fluidity of her 
identity through time, as she altered and adapted her identity and appearance to create and 
take advantage of economic and political opportunities. 
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Furthermore, my review of Tymoshenko includes how other political actors, 
including her enemies and allies, attempted to control her behaviour because she was 
perceived as a threat to the political status quo, not only because of her politics but 
because of her gender. These threats have continued to position Tymoshenko as a “space 
invader.”170  
Early years before Tymoshenko's political career 
Yulia Volodymyrvina Tymoshenko (nee Telegina) was born November 27, 1960, 
in the eastern city and oblast of Dnipropetrovsk, Soviet Ukraine, in the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Union. Although born in Ukraine, Tymoshenko is not ethnically Ukrainian but 
Armenian and Russian. Tymoshenko’s Armenian father abandoned her family when she 
was very young, and she took her Russian mother’s name. Eighteen-year-old Yulia 
Telegina married Oleksandr Tymoshenko, the son of a mid-level Communist Party 
official, in 1978 receiving her Ukrainian name of Tymoshenko. Yulia and Oleksandr 
Tymoshenko have one child, Evgenia born in 1980.   
Many women in the Soviet period were well-educated, and Tymoshenko was no 
exception. She received her bachelor’s degree in Economics and Engineering from the 
Dnipropetrovsk State University in 1984. She defended her Ph.D. dissertation at Kyiv 
State University in Economics in 1999.171 Tymoshenko is a practicing Ukrainian 
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Orthodox Christian, and she primarily speaks Ukrainian. However, her first language is 
Russian.172  
Like other Ukrainian politicians, most of Tymoshenko’s professional career 
before politics was spent in business. Tymoshenko took advantage of institutional 
structures available to her as well as worked her way up through business ranks to 
achieve success in business. During the Perestroika period of the 1980s, Tymoshenko 
became a member of the Komsomol, a branch of the Communist Party for young people. 
The Komsomol was a communist political, mixed gender, youth organization designed to 
groom young people into ‘ideal’ communist citizens. 173 However, near the end of the 
Soviet Union, in 1989, the purpose of the Komsomol in Dnipropetrovsk began to support 
small business ventures. Taras Kuzio (2015) states that by 1991, there were 100 
Komsomol-backed businesses in Dnipropetrovsk.174 Kuzio (2015) describes Tymoshenko 
at the time as a “rising star” and in an unusual position as a woman in the Komsomol 
leadership. Her lack of Ukrainian roots made her somewhat suspect to Ukrainian 
nationalists. Nevertheless, she fit in well with the city’s Russian-speaking Komsomol 
youth.175  
Following the completion of her bachelor’s degree and small-business endeavour 
in 1984, Tymoshenko secured a position as a planning engineer for the Dnipropetrovsk 
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machine-construction plant from 1984 to 1989. While a member of the Komsomol, 
Tymoshenko and her husband borrowed 5,000 rubles to open a video salon called 
Terminal Loop.176 From 1989 to 1991, disguised as the Dnipropetrovsk Youth Centre, 
Terminal Loop rented and showed pirated videos from the west.177 In 1991, the year of 
the fall of the Soviet Union, a period of significant turbulence, Tymoshenko's business 
career took off: until 1995 she was director general of Ukrainskiy Benzin, a family 
cooperative selling gasoline to farmers in Dnipropetrovsk. Ukrainskiy Benzin was re-
organized in 1995 into United Energy Systems of Ukraine (UESU), an energy company 
importing gas from Russia to Ukraine, which Tymoshenko was the president. As 
president of UESU, Tymoshenko acquired patronage from politicians such as Pavlo 
Lazarenko, former Governor of Dnipropetrovsk. In 1996, by working closely with 
Lazarenko and taking advantage of government connections, UESU became the largest 
gas trader in Ukraine, turning over billions of dollars each year.178 This wealth was 
significant in the early post-Soviet period because there were no other millionaires in 
Ukraine at this time. Subsequently, Tymoshenko's wealth transformed her into a 
Ukrainian oligarch, and she entered politics to preserve her economic status. Lazarenko 
was the leader of the centrist Hromada Party and was part of a powerful political clan in 
Dnipropetrovsk, the same clan as the president at the time, Leonid Kuchma.179 Under 
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Kuchma, Lazarenko was appointed to the position of deputy prime minister in charge of 
fuel and energy in 1995 and then was promoted to prime minister in May 1996. 
Tymoshenko's position as UESU president was essential to Lazarenko and Kuchma in 
their contest with the competing clan of Donetsk in their desire for economic gains.   
Although Tymoshenko benefited from her family and business connections, she 
also has been noted for her work ethic. Oksana Kis (2007) describes Tymoshenko as 
being “utterly efficient in every position she has occupied.”180 Kis states that 
Tymoshenko’s colleagues confirm that she is unusually hardworking and her political 
opponents are unable to deny her expertise.181 Therefore, Tymoshenko capitalized on her 
familial, business and geographic positions. Tymoshenko’s strong work ethic, familial 
connections to the Communist Party and her managerial position in a high-profile 
resource-based business during the transition from communism provided her with an 
advantage over other Ukrainians, a story familiar to many other Ukrainian oligarchs. 
Furthermore, Tymoshenko's advantages were helpful in overcoming extremely high rates 
of unemployment among women in the transition from communism. Tymoshenko's 
economic advantage because of the business sector she was in as well as her geographical 
position and connections to male politicians offered her entry into a political career by 
1996. 
Most women political leaders worldwide like Tymoshenko have high levels of 
post-secondary education inclusive of professional designations (i.e., engineers, doctors, 
lawyers). As well, many successful women leaders come from lives of social and 
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economic affluence and are part of the dominant racial, ethnic or religious group of their 
respective nations. Farida Jalalzai and Mona Lena Krook (2010) show that women 
political leaders may even lead in countries where women of the general population lag 
economically and educationally or confront many social and political constraints.182 
However, it is important to remember that many women political leaders consistently 
emerge from privilege. On her part, Tymoshenko was raised by a single mother, which 
may be considered a disadvantage in some countries but less so in the Soviet Union 
during this period. The loss of life of men during the Second World War meant many 
families consisted of single mothers and their children and Soviet legislation reflected 
and legitimated this type of family composition with the Family Law of 1944.183 
Furthermore, structural policies such as Soviet policies on women’s access to higher 
education, as well as Tymoshenko’s personal circumstances marrying into a family with 
ties to the Communist Party, and her membership in the Komsomol provided social, 
economic and political capital that Tymoshenko utilized during the transition from 
communism. As noted by Jalalzai and Krook (2010) Tymoshenko’s status as an ethnic 
Russian practicing Orthodox Christianity from an Eastern oblast (region) meant she was 
part of the dominant linguistic and religious groups in the area. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that Tymoshenko strategically capitalized on her mother’s Russian 
identity and her husband’s family’s ties to the Communist Party during her time in the 
Komsomol as political currency. In other words, Tymoshenko adapted her ethnic 
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attachments or identity to prosper socially and economically. This characteristic of her 
political strategy to lever influence is a common narrative throughout this Chapter.  
Moving through the political ranks, 1996-2002 
Tymoshenko was elected at a time when parliament was split between the old left 
of the Communist Party, the Socialists, and the Peasant Party and their allies, and the 
fractured centre and right that were considered political opportunists instead of 
reformers.184 In 1996, Tymoshenko ran in legislative succession elections in the single-
member district of Kirovograd, Bobrinsky Congressional District (a neighbouring oblast 
west of Tymoshenko's birthplace, Dnipropetrovsk). It is unclear what type of platform 
Tymoshenko ran on at this time however she won her seat with 92.3 percent of the 
vote.185 Once elected, Tymoshenko joined Lazarenko’s Constitutional Centre faction 
Hromada that supported President Leonid Kuchma.186  
A woman winning a seat within the single-member district (SMD) electoral 
system is significant because Tymoshenko was among the few women elected to 
Parliament.187 17 women deputies were elected in 1994 making up 4.3 percent of women 
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in Parliament. Scholars such as Pippa Norris (1997), Richard Matland (1998), Pamela 
Paxton and Melanie Hughes (2014) and Frank Thames (2015) have examined the effects 
of single-member districts on women's parliamentary representation and have found that 
a proportional representation system (PR) is more likely to yield a higher number of 
opportunities for women in parliament compared to SMD. The introduction of a PR 
system in Ukraine, therefore, translated to a higher number of women parliamentarians 
than the SMD system under which Tymoshenko was first elected. The SMD electoral 
system provided far fewer opportunities to nominate women candidates.188 Further, the 
combination of Lazarenko’s support and Tymoshenko’s position as an oligarch won her 
legitimacy as a woman candidate elected to the Verkhovna Rada. Her example is 
significant especially instead of the unfavourable conditions for women in parliament and 
economically in Ukraine, especially in the early post-Soviet period. 
As an influential member of parliament, Tymoshenko's political career flourished, 
and her politics began to evolve. The subsequent five years of Tymoshenko's political 
career would provide her with substantive political experience and strengthen her image 
as competent. She held several important parliamentary and governmental positions 
including head of the Budget Committee (1998-2001), leader of the Fatherland political 
party (1999-present), and the Deputy Prime Minister for fuel and energy (1999-2001). As 
the head of the Budget Committee (1998) Tymoshenko reformed taxation codes and 
pensions. Left of centre on the political spectrum, she created new projects such as 
                                                          
Kingdom. Pippa Norris, "Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems," 
International Political Science Review 18, no. 3 1997: 299-301. 
188Frank C. Thames, “The Electoral System and Women’s Legislative Underrepresentation in Post-
Communist Ukraine,” (paper presentation, Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, 
Las Vegas, NV, April 2-5, 2015): 26. 
 83 
 
developing budget and taxation codes, created a new system for pension and medical 
security, and designed a mechanism for paying off pension and salary debt.189   
In 1999, Tymoshenko capitalized on a shift in larger political context by bringing 
together former members of the Hromada Party after its dissolution in 1997 when leader 
Pavlo Lazarenko fled to the United States to avoid embezzlement charges. Tymoshenko 
founded and was elected to lead the All-Ukrainian Union “Batkivshchyna” 
(“Fatherland”), a centre-left party its formation in 1999, although the party is now 
perceived as centre-right.190 The party was established as part of a “protection pact” 
based on Tymoshenko’s personal “non-aggression agreement” with President Kuchma 
from 1999 to 2000.191 Represented by a symbol of a heart, the party led by Tymoshenko 
is considered pro-nationalist, pro-European and pro-democratic. Fatherland attracted 
populist and nationalist members of the Rada and was initially aligned with other pro-
presidential parties in 1999 while the party would also support government spending and 
economic interventionism.192  
According to Taras Kuzio (2007), Lazarenko was perceived as a threat to 
President Leonid Kuchma because of his "virulent hostility, his wealth and political 
ambitions" resulting in charges of embezzlement.193 The accusations and subsequent 
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criminal charges Lazarenko experienced may be seen as a widespread practice in Ukraine 
as a means of countering political competition. This corruption would become all too 
familiar for Tymoshenko as a result of being a woman who voiced strong criticisms and 
in possession of political ambition. However, in 1999 by forming Batkivshchyna, 
Tymoshenko was able to capitalize on the instability of Ukraine's political party system 
for her political advancement and demonstrate her leadership skills.   
Tymoshenko continued to advance politically in 1999 when Prime Minister 
Viktor Yushchenko appointed her to the prestigious position of deputy prime minister for 
fuel and energy.194 As deputy prime minister, Tymoshenko was responsible for cleaning 
up corruption within the energy industry and as a consequence, she developed the anti-
corruption program "Clean Energy."195 According to Tymoshenko, 5 million hryvnia was 
taken out of the shadow economy and directed toward energy producers to help pay off 
Ukraine’s energy debts to Russia as a direct result of her government's actions.196 Her 
anti-corruption reforms led to the arrest of her husband in August 2000 on charges of 
embezzlement because of his role as a board member of United Energy Systems, 
Tymoshenko's former business. Tymoshenko's husband’s arrest was a direct consequence 
of her reforms to the energy sector because of the pressure it put on Kuchma's energy 
allies.197 Tymoshenko believed her husband’s arrest was meant to put pressure on her by 
local oligarchs profiting directly from the shadow economy.198 
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However, Tymoshenko herself was not immune to investigations on corruption 
into her former business dealings. By January 2001, six months following her husband's 
arrest, Tymoshenko was dismissed by presidential decree because of an investigation into 
her status as head of the UESU from 1996 to1997. One month later Tymoshenko was 
arrested on charges of smuggling and fraud, spending a month in jail. Tymoshenko 
attributed her dismissal to her reforms and the unwillingness of President Kuchma and 
oligarchs to allow reforms to be applied to the energy sector.199 Five years into her 
political career, Tymoshenko had positioned herself as a politician that disrupted the 
status quo through her policies on corruption and by advocating an increase in 
government regulations.  
In February 2001, Tymoshenko formed a bloc alliance of political parties named 
the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT). The name BYuT reflects the personalization of 
Tymoshenko’s politics and attracted political parties from different parts of the political 
spectrum. Serhiy Kudelia and Taras Kuzio (2014) describe BYuT as drawing leaders with 
eclectic personalities from incompatible ideological, political forces from the liberal 
Yabloko party to the nationalist-populist Conservative Republican Party.200 The authors 
describe BYuT as utilizing an “eclectic ideology” based on the personality of 
Tymoshenko and “the ideological amorphousness of post-Soviet Ukrainian and Eurasian 
politics.”201 Kuzio (2010) describes the politics of Tymoshenko/BYuT as “solidarism,” 
third wayism, oriented between capitalism and socialism, resembling Poland’s Solidarity 
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movement.202 Kuzio states that the language of BYuT's political platforms are 
reminiscent of Solidarity in seeking to combine the good sides of both capitalism and 
socialism, and individualism and collectivism. Kis describes Tymoshenko's rhetoric as 
advocating for liberal principles in the market economy and promoting democratization 
in Ukraine while she took a more socialist approach to the state economy for rooting out 
corruption.203 Furthermore, she advocates for restoring social justice to solve the most 
burning social issues.204 The positive aspects of capitalism and socialism would likely 
prove appealing to many voters who were interested in the individual elements of 
capitalism yet longed for the programs and state involvement of socialism.  
Although criticized as a populist bloc and being criticized for being 
"chameleonic," Kuzio (2010) argues that Tymoshenko/BYuT did not incorporate 
principles common to populist parties such as euroskepticism, xenophobia, or economic 
nationalism.205 Furthermore, Kuzio states that most political parties in Ukraine are 
chameleonic, where once in government, political parties change direction from their own 
election platforms.206 Subsequently, political platforms during elections appear somewhat 
irrelevant.  
As Tymoshenko differs because of her gender, there are generally questions 
whether she is a feminist. Kis discusses that the BYuT would vote in favour of legislation 
meant to preserve the family but not in support of legislation intended to reform political 
structures to get more women elected into parliament. For example, in 2003, the BYuT 
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voted against a bill for women's quota in Parliament, and in 2005 also voted against the 
first reading of a bill on gender equality.207 However, Tymoshenko has advocated for 
maternalist policy issues related to improving the welfare of families and children by 
increasing “mother’s pensions” after the birth of a child and by introducing 
improvements into the public healthcare system.208 In this way, Tymoshenko has not only 
adopted a third wayism of capitalist and socialist policies and notions in her rhetoric but 
has also done so within her apparent appeal as feminist.  
Tymoshenko's political history provided her with much-needed experience and 
expertise in creating legislation, directing ministries, and leading a major political party. 
Farida Jalalzai (2004) observes that a woman’s political experience is critical to access 
executive positions. Jalalzai (2004) notes that 66 percent of women political executives 
have had high levels of political experience, conventionally working their way through 
national political institutions or moving through the political pipeline before attaining 
more prominent roles in executive or government leadership.209 Jalalzai (2014) observes 
that 62 percent of women prime ministers or presidents in Europe have both legislative 
and cabinet experience.210 Therefore, like many women political leaders in Europe, 
Tymoshenko’s political experience strengthened her resume by demonstrating her 
leadership skills and political wherewithal.  
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Jalalzai (2014) further notes that several women have gained political experience 
through their commitment to nationalist and activist movements.211 Tymoshenko did 
have activist experience during her time in the Komsomol, before her political leadership 
in government. She would subsequently organize protests against President Leonid 
Kuchma after her first arrest and played an essential part of the 2004 Orange Revolution, 
proving her ability to rally citizens and politicians to support her. 
  Opposing President Kuchma and the Orange Revolution, 1999-2004  
Tymoshenko's dismissal from her position as deputy prime minister for fuel and 
energy as well as her arrest and subsequent release from prison led her to her strong 
opposition to President Kuchma. This period would define her as a charismatic yet 
polarizing politician, capable of rallying politically dissatisfied Ukrainians which 
facilitated her political popularity. Her politics during this period revolved around 
mobilizing others to oppose Kuchma. 
Tymoshenko’s political identity fluctuated during this period. As a member of 
Hromada and leader of Fatherland, Tymoshenko’s politics oscillated back and forth from 
pro-presidential in 1998 to opposition from 1998-1999, back to pro-presidential from 
1999-2000 (to unfreeze her assets), eventually remaining opposed to the president in 
2000.212  
Tymoshenko's political oscillation during this period was related to the more 
significant Ukrainian political landscape and the political crisis. Taras Kuzio (2007) 
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describes Ukrainian political parties as aligning as either in support of or in opposition to 
President Kuchma from 1998 to 2002. The political parties were aligned as follows: 
 
▪ Pro-presidential: For a United Ukraine (ZYU) and Social-
Democratic Party of Ukraine-United (SDPU-o)  
▪ Strongly anti-presidential: Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), 
the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT), and the Socialist Party of 
Ukraine (SPU)  
▪ Ambivalent: Our Ukraine213  
This party alignment for or against President Kuchma was a result of the Ukrainian 
political crisis. The political crisis was primarily a result of several scandals surrounding 
President Kuchma including his proposed constitutional amendments that potentially 
could result in Kuchma’s indefinite re-election in addition to Kuchma’s apparent 
involvement in the murder of senior journalist and critic, Georgyi Gongadze. 
 These events, as well as Tymoshenko's arrest, consolidated Tymoshenko’s 
opposition to the President by 2001. Moreover, Tymoshenko would capitalize on the 
political crisis to further her political profile as an opponent to Kuchma. Specialist in 
comparative politics of CIS countries Kimitaka Matsuzato describes President Kuchma as 
exploiting clan rivalries of Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk during this period.214 For 
example, Kuchma had first appointed Lazarenko from the Dnipropetrovsk clan to the 
position of prime minister from 1996 to 1997 and had also appointed Viktor Yanukovych 
of the Donetsk clan to prime minister from 2002 to 2004 which agitated politicians from 
Dnipropetrovsk.  
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As leader of BYuT, Tymoshenko demonstrated her ability to perform in elections. 
In her first parliamentary election as leader of BYuT, the Bloc received 22 seats, making 
it the fifth largest party in the Verkhovna Rada. Table 2.1 presents the results of the 2002 
parliamentary election, held March 20 with a Mixed Member Majoritarian political 
system which is more favourable in yielding higher numbers of women to parliament as 
opposed to the system used in 1996.215 Despite receiving a smaller percentage of the 
popular vote, the For a United Ukraine Party received the most seats in the Rada as they 
won 66 single member seats – the most of any party.  
Table 2.1      2002 Parliamentary Election Results216 
Party Percentage of vote Seats 
For a United Ukraine 11.8 121 
Our Ukraine 23.5 112 
Community Party 20 65 
SDPU(o) 6.2 28 
Tymoshenko Bloc 7.2 22 
Socialist Party 6.9 22 
2002 Election used a Mixed Member Majoritarian system different from the system in 1996** 
As leader of the fifth largest political bloc in the Rada, Tymoshenko was central to 
rallying and building coalitions between the parliamentary opposition parties. Although 
Fatherland was not leftist, Tymoshenko aligned with the Communists and Socialists to 
oppose Kuchma. These three political parties would use formal protests in the Rada by 
voting against legislation supported by Kuchma and attracted other members of 
parliament to their parties. Opposition party leaders, led by Tymoshenko, used less 
formal political means such as organizing protests outside the Rada and rallying citizens, 
                                                          
215 A Mixed Member Majoritarian system is a combination of the single-member district system used in 
the first election Tymoshenko was elected to office and a party-list proportional representation system.  
216 IPU Archive, “Elections Held in 2006,” accessed December 15, 2017, http://archive.ipu.org/parline-
e/reports/arc/2331_06.htm. 
 91 
 
including the support of mining, part of one of the most significant economic resources in 
Ukraine, to protest Kuchma, despite orders from the Supreme Court banning such 
protests. The three party leaders even occupied Ukrainian state television UT-1 on 
September 23, 2002, when they demanded airtime to promote the protests scheduled the 
following day. The demonstrations of September 24, marked the two-year anniversary of 
the disappearance of Gongadze, attracting five thousand protestors to the Supreme 
Council building in Kyiv. 217 Tymoshenko’s defiance towards Kuchma at this time 
resulted in the Prosecutor General re-opening past investigations of her on charges of 
embezzlement related to her time as head of UESU.218 The same day as her proceedings 
were re-opened, Tymoshenko was involved in a car crash in Kyiv. The cause of the crash 
was suspicious. 
Tymoshenko’s charisma united other political factions from parliament as well as 
members of the Rada to the BYuT. However, other members of parliament perceived 
Tymoshenko as divisive and saw her as unwilling to negotiate with pro-presidential party 
members. These members, including centrist parties and pro-presidential moderates, 
isolated the BYuT. For example, following the 2002 parliamentary elections, 
Tymoshenko was left out of Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party’s attempt at 
forming a coalition. As Kuzio (2013) explains, although the BYuT and Our Ukraine 
competed for the same voter blocks from Western Ukraine and among Ukrainophones, 
the two parties were split between ideology (BYuT) and pragmatism (Our Ukraine). 
Ideology-driven parties such as BYuT cooperated with anti-oligarch populists who were 
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against ‘pro-Russian’ political forces while pragmatic parties consisted of businesspeople 
who did not want to risk opposing authorities because of close ties to their businesses.219 
An ideologically-driven populist and staunchly pro-Ukrainian, Tymoshenko was 
disinterested in collaborating with Kuchma, or pro-Kuchma parties, and instead, saw 
political opportunity in taking advantage of his political vulnerability (scandals and 
wavering popularity).  
Criminal investigations into Tymoshenko's business and her associates were used by 
pro-presidential factions to discredit her. Although corruption charges levied against 
Tymoshenko were dropped by May 13, 2003, days later a court ruled that two of 
Tymoshenko's energy associates, including her father-in-law, be taken into custody. 
Subsequently, Tymoshenko and Yushchenko both announced their associates were under 
investigation therefore providing fuel for the pro-presidential factions to politically 
discredit them.220 However, opposition against Kuchma was successful to some degree 
when, a year later in July 2004, Kuchma announced he would not run for re-election.221 
Although he did not run pro-presidential and pro-Russian officials continued to push 
against national democratic alliances in favour of an authoritarian system in the 2004 
presidential election.  
In 2004, a million Ukrainians took to the streets of Kyiv to protest the blatant 
rigging of the second round of the presidential election. Ultimately this popular uprising 
known as the Orange Revolution challenged authoritarianism. The Orange Revolution 
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was also significant to Yulia Tymoshenko's political success as she gained political 
leverage with her opposition to President Kuchma. However, the Orange Revolution 
provided more popular widespread support for Tymoshenko and attracted invaluable 
amounts of international attention during the 2004 election.  
  Kuchma would not stand for a third presidential term but instead supported his 
handpicked, pro-Russian candidate, former Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.222 
Additionally, two national democratic parties, Our Ukraine and BYuT formed a pact 
agreeing that Tymoshenko would support traditionalist Yushchenko in the presidential 
election but only on the condition that if successful, Yushchenko would appoint 
Tymoshenko as prime minister.  
Yanukovych and Yushchenko were the top two candidates heading into the first 
round of the presidential election set for October 31st, 2004. The success of Yushchenko’s 
party, in the 2002 parliamentary elections made him a popular alternative to Yanukovych. 
Kuchma’s allies were worried that a Yushchenko win would result in their persecution 
due to their implications in serious criminal activities during Kuchma’s presidency and a 
shift in foreign policy away from aligning with Russia towards Europe.223 Therefore, 
Kuchma’s allies were willing to rig the presidential election to avoid any consequences.  
Prior to the first round of voting, Yanukovych's team employed several election-
rigging tactics to tarnish Yushchenko's image by using state-administrative resources and 
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state-controlled media. Despite Kuchma's allies' actions, Yushchenko's popularity was 
unwavering. As a result, Yushchenko was poisoned which left him off the campaign trail 
for a month. Corruption followed with the slow release of the first round of the election 
results. Yanukovych's team hacked into the Central Election Commission and changed 
the results.224 Alternatively, the slow release of the election results also allowed the 
Orange Revolution protesters to unite and rally citizens to oppose the fraudulent election 
results.  
At the center of this opposition was Yulia Tymoshenko, who had been 
campaigning and rallying citizens to support Yushchenko during the presidential 
campaign. Tymoshenko used the colour orange, the colour of Yushchenko’s political 
party, to rally Ukrainians and demonstrate the popular choice for president by wearing 
the colour orange or taking pieces of cloth and tying them to public spaces. Tymoshenko 
had mixed motives for supporting Yushchenko. For Tymoshenko, it was necessary for 
Yushchenko to win the presidency, not only so she could become prime minister but to 
validate her Kuchma protests and to avoid jail time associated with her previous 
corruption charges. Accordingly, Yushchenko came out ahead of Yanukovych after the 
first round of voting despite Yanukovych’s election rigging tactics.  
Yanukovych won the run-off election held November 21 through increased vote 
tampering by ballot stuffing, abusing absentee ballots, and voting from home. In some 
cases, turnout increased by 20 percent in pro-Yanukovych regions.225 However, the 
Yanukovych campaign team had greatly underestimated any response from civil society 
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as well as the negative response from the international community. Ukrainian civil 
society mobilized into massive protests likely surprising Yanukovych and his team as 
civil society protests were non-existent during the Soviet period. Additional, the 
Yanukovych team underestimated the refusal from the international community to 
recognize the tarnished presidential election results. Once Yanukovych was declared the 
winner, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko led hundreds of thousands of Orange Revolution 
protestors through the streets of Kyiv. These peaceful protests lasted until December 3, 
2004, when the Supreme Court, and the Rada, declared the second round election results 
invalid. Once the third round of voting took place December 26 and Yushchenko was 
again declared the winner, negotiations led by European countries resulted in revising 
electoral laws to avoid the repetition of fraud. 
Additionally, constitutional reforms came into effect after the March 2006 
parliamentary elections, reducing the powers of the presidency. The combination of the 
unity among national democrats as well as Tymoshenko's experience with organizing 
protests contributed directly to overturning the first set of election results so Yushchenko 
could rightfully become president. Tymoshenko's popularity and charisma helped to lift 
Yushchenko to power in unity over a common autocratic enemy. 
During the Orange Revolution, Tymoshenko had successfully deployed her 
charismatic leadership skills to rally huge groups of supporters for her fellow nationalist, 
Viktor Yushchenko. With active opposition to President Kuchma, Tymoshenko began to 
establish herself politically as a courageous and strong leader, prepared to defend Ukraine 
from Kuchma and his apparent Russian allies. Tymoshenko was viewed as a courageous 
political leader, who, although facing criminal charges and jailed for some time in 2001, 
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continued to defy Kuchma's threats of punitive action. No doubt Tymoshenko's courage 
was also related to her enormous wealth that allowed her to pay for legal costs to help her 
fight and evade legal troubles.  
During this period of Tymoshenko’s political transformation with anti-
presidential protests and establishing pro-western political alliances (and ultimately the 
rejection of pro-Russian influences) there occurred a symbolic transformation in 
Tymoshenko’s physical appearance from a dark-haired, Russian-speaking woman to a 
blond, Ukrainian-speaking, berehynia. Tymoshenko donned a peasant braid on her head 
and dressed elegantly in feminine, white clothes. The image of a heart symbolized 
Tymoshenko's political party, Fatherland and BYuT, and she often spoke about love 
when discussing political policies. Kis describes Tymoshenko as fulfilling two feminine 
ideals of women in the post-Soviet era in Ukraine: the berehynia and the Barbie. The 
berehynia is a historical and nationalist symbol of Ukrainian motherhood with its roots in 
pagan beliefs, matriarchal myths, and some Christian ideas. By donning a traditional 
braid, and adopting a loving persona, Tymoshenko's appearance strategically advanced 
her Ukrainian nationalist agenda. Her use of the image of a Barbie, according to Kis, is 
closely associated with the market economy and consumer culture. Tymoshenko’s 
physical beauty and the way she dressed fulfilled a culturally acceptable idea of 
Ukrainian femininity. Tymoshenko furthered her image as a berehynia by embracing 
maternalist policies such as increasing mother’s pensions given after the birth of a child 
and introducing improvements to the public health system.226 
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Alexandra Hrycak (2011) credits Tymoshenko’s physical transformation to be the 
result of commentary by political competitors describing her as "too sexy" to be 
successful in masculine positions. This femininity supposedly defaulted her from being a 
"good" Ukrainian woman.227 According to Hrycak, Tymoshenko consciously transformed 
herself into a berehynia by three means: learning to speak Ukrainian; donning her head-
wrap around peasant braid; and allying herself with Viktor Yushchenko.228 Therefore, 
although Tymoshenko achieved many political feats such as winning her parliamentary 
seat by a record number of votes during her first election; holding a cabinet position; 
building extensive legislative experience; holding a position of political party leadership, 
and; being an active campaigner, she still was compelled to purposefully alter her 
physical appearance in order to conform to, and exploit, an expected image of gendered 
nationalism in order to gain greater political credibility.   
Tymoshenko’s representation in the English-speaking print journalism is more 
comprehensively discussed in my subsequent chapter on media representations. However, 
my mention of this transformation is significant to the central themes of this chapter as it 
highlights Tymoshenko’s consciousness of gendered strategies needed to navigate her 
rise to a political platform. Tymoshenko altered her identity to become politically 
successful, this time in a more physical manner.  
After the Orange Revolution: Prime Minister Tymoshenko, 2005-2005, 2007-
2010 
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Ultimately, Tymoshenko's political experience; her campaigning, and purposeful 
physical transformation would only take her so far politically. She faced significant 
barriers during her two terms as prime minister due to her relationship with Viktor 
Yushchenko and her policies in favour of economic intervention. As per their agreement 
that Tymoshenko would support Yushchenko during the 2004 presidential election in 
exchange for her appointment as prime minister. Tymoshenko became prime minister 
first on February 6, 2005, until September 8, 2005, and subsequently on December 18, 
2007, until March 4, 2010. During Tymoshenko’s first term, embezzlement charges that 
had initially been opened against her in May 2004, were dropped because of this alliance 
with Yushchenko. The accord made in 2004 between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko 
quickly soured however with Tymoshenko's first prime ministership lasting a mere seven 
months. In fact, Viktor Yushchenko's terms as president and both of Tymoshenko's terms 
as prime minister are characterized by scholars as divisive as well as unproductive. Both 
of Tymoshenko's terms as prime minister were marked by disputes with coalition 
governments and by power struggles between her and Yushchenko. Furthermore, her 
promised reforms related to the Orange Revolution protests that were meant to root out 
corruption to help Ukraine flourish failed.  
Although Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were both national democrats sharing 
similar political goals including less dependence on Russia and creating stronger ties to 
the rest of Europe, they failed to agree on how to achieve policy goals. Yushchenko and 
Tymoshenko disagreed on domestic economic policies. Yushchenko was for a more 
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liberal market whereas Tymoshenko advocated for increased government intervention. 
Furthermore, Tymoshenko attempted to re-privatize industrial assets.229 
Issues arising during Tymoshenko’s first term as prime minister include struggles 
over Tymoshenko’s review of economic policies associated with Kuchma rule. 
Yushchenko believed these concerns should be left alone on the basis of a free market 
economy supporting a 30 percent increase in the price of natural gas from Russia in May 
2005. Tymoshenko on her part opposed Yushchenko by capping gas prices to the 
consumer and citing the increase as Russia’s pointed attempt to sabotage the Ukrainian 
Government. President Yushchenko countered by reversing Tymoshenko’s caps claiming 
they were neither liberal nor free-market oriented.230 Yushchenko subsequently dismissed 
Tymoshenko and her cabinet in September 2005. Opposition to Tymoshenko in the Rada 
also resulted in the cancellation of charges against Tymoshenko that were lodged by the 
Russian government. Charges against Tymoshenko were understood as a means to 
discredit her and her government as well as punish her for aligning with Yushchenko and 
his pro-western camp.  
 In November 2005 Yushchenko and Tymoshenko attempted to reconcile their 
disagreements in preparation for the upcoming parliamentary elections in the following 
March. Because Our Ukraine and BYuT were deemed less popular than Viktor 
Yanukovych's Party of Regions, the two leaders worried Yanukovych could become 
prime minister. In March 2006, parliamentary elections marked the beginning of 
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constitutional reforms agreed upon during the 2004 presidential re-run negotiations that 
transferred presidential powers to the Verkhovna Rada. However, these constitutional 
amendments were confusing resulting in sharpening the power struggles between 
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko.231 Furthermore, although Tymoshenko was no longer 
heading the government as prime minister her replacement, Yuriy Yekhanurov, was 
unable to stimulate economic growth and GDP numbers situation which challenged 
Yushchenko’s presidency.232 Confusion over the division of political powers as well as 
economic troubles weighed heavily on the two Orange leaders. Their relations grew 
increasingly strained their relationship. However, they united once again against their 
common enemy, Viktor Yanukovych, and were able to momentarily overcome their 
differences ahead of the March 2006 elections.   
 Tymoshenko and Yushchenko’s worries were confirmed on March 31 when the 
Party of Regions, led by the villain of the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yanukovych, won 
the most seats in the Rada. Table 2.2 below presents the results of the 2006 parliamentary 
election. While the Party of Regions won the most seats, the BYuT came in second in 
2006, making gains from the 2002 elections. The agreement made between members of 
the Orange coalition was that the coalition member party with the greatest number of 
seats –Tymoshenko – would be appointed prime minister. However, Yushchenko held 
negotiations with both Tymoshenko and Yanukovych.233 Yushchenko delayed appointing 
a prime minister for four months, as he mulled over coalition options. On August 4, 2006, 
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Yushchenko appointed Yanukovych prime minister, rather than Tymoshenko as 
originally agreed. However, although Yushchenko and Yanukovych generally sought to 
maintain the oligarchic status quo as compared to Tymoshenko, Yanukovych’s 
appointment would not last.  
Table 2.2   2006 Parliamentary Election 
Party Percentage (%) Seats 
Party of Regions 32.12 186 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 22.27 129 
Our Ukraine 13.94 81 
Socialist Party of Ukraine 5.67 33 
Communist Party of Ukraine 3.66 21 
 
The contentious issues affecting Tymoshenko and Yushchenko's relationship 
while jointly governing continued during Tymoshenko's time during which she waged 
active opposition to Prime Minister Yanukovych. Difficulties between Yushchenko and 
Yanukovych were mostly due to power struggled over cabinet appointments and foreign 
policy issues such as NATO. While Yushchenko and Yanukovych engaged in power 
squabbles following the 2006 parliamentary election, Yushchenko and Our Ukraine 
repaired to some extent their relationship with the Tymoshenko Bloc.   
Tensions continued to build and deteriorate Yushchenko and Yanukovych’s 
relationship in the new year. Government economic stagnation led to a political crisis in 
March 2007. Yushchenko's struggle to pass legislative amendments as well as his failure 
to work cooperatively with Yanukovych led to another dissolution of parliament. 
Parliamentary elections were held in September 2007. Table 2.3 represents the 2007 
election results where Yanukovych's Party of Regions won the most votes. However, 
 102 
 
once again Yulia Tymoshenko's BYuT won the highest number of seats of the Orange 
Coalition parties, while Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party experienced a decline. As 
Tymoshenko's party held the second highest number of seats, 
Table 2.3    2007 Parliamentary Election Results234 
Party Percentage of vote Seats 
Party of Regions 34.4 175 
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc 30.7 156 
Our Ukraine 14.2 72 
Communist Party 5.4 21 
Volodymyr Lytvyn Bloc 2.5 20 
 
she was re-appointed prime minister in December 2007 with a small majority coalition. 
Her appointment as prime minister was tied to an agreement her and Yushchenko would 
both support NATO and EU membership and promised neighbourly relations with 
Russia. 
Tymoshenko's second term as prime minister lasted from December 2007 until 
March 2010. During this term, Tymoshenko faced parliamentary blockades from not only 
the Party of Regions but also antagonism from the President and his staff.235 
Tymoshenko’s dysfunctional relationship with Yushchenko and Russian manipulation 
created significant problems economically and politically for Ukraine. With the power of 
the president diminished, Yushchenko seemed to be grasping for power, making 880 
demands of Tymoshenko within her first 100 days of government.236 From 2008 to 2009 
                                                          
234 IPU Archive, “Ukraine: Elections Held in 2006,” http://archive.ipu.org/parline-
e/reports/arc/2331_06.htm (Accessed, May 27, 2017). 
235 Taras Kuzio, “The Tymoshenko Government’s Domestic and Foreign Policies: The First 100 Days,” 
(presentation, George Washington University, April 17, 2008): 1. 
236 Comparatively, Yushchenko made 260 demands of Yanukovych within his first 100 days of his prime 
ministership. Ibid., 3. 
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Yushchenko, and chief of staff Viktor Baloha, did everything in their power to sabotage 
Tymoshenko's government to replace it with a grand coalition.237 Furthermore, the 
president and prime minister consistently disagreed over government privatization. 
Tymoshenko opposed privatizations of intermediary natural gas companies transporting 
and selling gas from Russia to Ukraine. Domestically, Tymoshenko and Yushchenko 
quarreled over the type of privatizations that Ukraine should adopt as part of funding the 
country had received from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 
tensions between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko were related to accessing IMF funding 
which meant a possible rise in utility prices and cuts to social spending which 
Tymoshenko had blocked in March 2009.238 Accordingly, Yushchenko vetoed over one 
hundred pieces of legislation during his single term.239 Yushchenko and Tymoshenko 
also disagreed over Russian foreign policy. Internationally, Ukraine's discussions with 
NATO and the EU about membership in both organizations deepened tensions with 
Russia. Russia initiated a dispute over its naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea. Furthermore, 
the Russian company Gazprom threatened to cut off Ukraine's supply of natural gas in the 
winter of 2008-2009 if Ukraine did not pay its debts. Essentially the divisions between 
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko were based on the prime minister advocating for 
transparent privatizations, reducing corruption in the energy sector, and for democratic 
reforms and the repayment of Soviet-era savings lost in Oschadbank.240 Conversely, the 
president's stance was to uphold the status quo at all costs.  
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Tymoshenko's second term as prime minister solidified her as an anti-
establishment politician. She was, as Kuzio (2013) describes, an anti-oligarch populist 
politician, viewed as dangerous to the established political order or as Kuzio notes, the 
"partial reform equilibrium," from which Yushchenko and Yanukovych had benefited.241 
If she were to win the 2010 presidential election, she would be seen to disrupt that 
“partial reform equilibrium.”242 A criminal investigation into Tymoshenko began in the 
summer of 2008 when the Yushchenko administration alleged her guilty of treason based 
on Tymoshenko’s agreement to buy Russian gas at higher prices in January 2009.243 An 
investigation of the contract that was signed under Tymoshenko by Russia initially led by 
Yushchenko shows how he used the latter part of his presidency to politically discredit 
Tymoshenko. Yushchenko was so unpopular by the beginning of the 2010 presidential 
campaign he employed his campaign to negatively tarnish Tymoshenko in order to 
elevate Yanukovych as a viable competitor for president. 
  During 2005 when Tymoshenko held the post of prime minister, her political fate 
rested in the hands of President Yushchenko. But he would eventually dismiss her. With 
the powers of the president altered by March 2006, Yushchenko no longer possessed the 
capacity to dismiss Tymoshenko without parliamentary approval, although he attempted 
to do so on two occasions. Nonetheless, Tymoshenko was able to hold onto power 
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between 2007 and 2010 because the presidency became less powerful and more vaguely 
defined.  
The 2010 Presidential Election 
The campaign for the 2010 presidential election began October 19, 2009, with 
five main candidates vying for the position. The top two candidates were Tymoshenko 
and Yanukovych. The enthusiasm and civic engagement that was witnessed during the 
2004 presidential election had by 2009 turned into disillusionment among voters due to 
constant political in-fighting and the decline in the quality of living for the general 
population. The electoral agenda, as described by Nathaniel Copsey and Natalie 
Shapovalova (2010), was dominated by populist politics with concerns expressed on 
billboards.244  
Tymoshenko ran her campaign on her reputation as a hardworking prime minister 
responsible for the state treasury and capable of dealing with an economic crisis. She had 
proposed necessary reforms to preserve Ukraine’s economy during the economic crisis 
while other politicians wasted time.245 The campaign highlighted Tymoshenko's political 
work in allocating necessary funds to the mining industry, agriculture, and the public 
healthcare system. She held a tough position on anti-corruption.246 In support of the latter, 
she exposed her primary opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, as illegally obtaining his state 
residency. She sought to demonstrate how she had improved Ukraine's investment 
                                                          
244 Nathaniel Copsey and Natalia Shapovalova, “The Ukrainian Presidential Election of 2010,” 
Representation 46, no. 2 (July 2010): 217. 
245 Ibid., 218. 
246 Ibid. 
 106 
 
climate. Tymoshenko's billboard slogans concurred by announcing, "She is working," or 
"They Block – She Works," distinguishing her from her opponents.247  
Her opponent Viktor Yanukovych was seen as the pro-Russian candidate and yet 
in this campaign he shied away from a robust pro-Russian position. Instead, he used more 
inclusive slogans such as "Ukraine for the People."248 Incumbent Viktor Yushchenko ran 
on a platform as a defender of democracy, although his dwindling popularity meant he 
was not seen as a viable challenger for the presidency. Yushchenko and Yanukovych 
both targeted Tymoshenko in their election campaigns. Yushchenko blamed Tymoshenko 
for the government stalemate during his presidency whereas Yanukovych described 
Tymoshenko as a liability to the stability of the government.  
The first round of voting took place on January 17, 2010 with the two top 
candidates, Viktor Yanukovych, and Yulia Tymoshenko respectively receiving 35.32 
percent and 25.05 percent of the vote. As no one candidate won 50 percent of the vote in 
the first round, a second round of voting was scheduled for February 7, 2010. Before the 
run-off, Yanukovych strategically boycotted a televised debate to avoid a public debate 
with Tymoshenko. Yanukovych's advisors believed that his debate with Tymoshenko, a 
strong and charismatic public speaker, would threaten Yanukovych’s credibility. 
Eventually, Yanukovych would win with 48.95 percent of the vote. Tymoshenko came in 
a close second with 45.47 percent. Tymoshenko refused to accept the results of the 
election until February 20, accusing Yanukovych of rigging the election. Unfortunately, 
there was little proof of widespread vote-rigging, and no mass protests rallied in support 
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of Tymoshenko. These circumstances forced her to concede defeat. Ultimately, 
Yushchenko's opposition to Tymoshenko combined with voter disillusionment resulted in 
her loss of the 2010 presidential election. 
Tymoshenko’s results were explained by scholars Copsey and Shapovalova and 
Hrycak (2011) in the following four ways: low voter turnout; Yanukovych carrying 
support in central Ukraine; the number of the “against all” vote; and the gendered split 
between men and women in voting results.   
Copsey and Shapovalova discuss the low voter turnout experienced by both 
Tymoshenko and Yanukovych in the 2010 presidential election.249 Although both 
candidates received less votes, key Orange voters in western and central Ukraine stayed 
home in the second round of voting. The authors describe how Yanukovych lost some 
votes in comparison to 2004 in the region of Luhansk and Donetsk and Tymoshenko 
picked up some support in the Eastern region of Ukraine compared to Yushchenko in 
2004. However, Tymoshenko was unable to rally support from Orange voters, shedding 
significant numbers in the south and Crimea (260,000); central Ukraine (1.7 million) and 
in western Ukraine (1.2 million) in comparison to Yushchenko in 2004.250 As a result, 
Yanukovych benefited from this lack of voter turnout, especially in the second round of 
voting where turnout decreased to 69 percent in 2010 from 77 percent in 2004, and 
especially in the western and central regions where Tymoshenko relied on most of the 
Orange support.251  
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 The second factor discussed by Copsey and Shapovalova was the increase in 
Yanukovych’s support from the central regions of Ukraine, where every election since 
independence has been decided. Copsey and Shapovalova describe how Yanukovych’s 
vote share increased by 10 to 16 percentage points in 2010 from 2004 in three oblasts in 
central Ukraine (Kirovhrad, Sumska and Vinnytska).252  
A third factor for Tymoshenko’s loss was the strength of the “against all” vote 
which reached 1 million votes for the first time. Tymoshenko as the incumbent prime 
minister bore the brunt of the “against all” vote most notably in the capital city Kyiv (8 
percent) and in Tymoshenko’s home city of Dnipropetrovsk (7 percent).253  
The final factor related to Tymoshenko’s loss is the gendered split of the vote 
between men and women. This is evident within the previous three factors. Hrycak 
(2010) notes that nationwide Tymoshenko did slightly worse among men than women. 
Hrycak notes that although these differences may not appear to be substantial, 
comparatively in 2004 Yushchenko held a 6-percentage point lead among men, while 
Yanukovych received 6-percentage points among women than men.254 The gender gap 
was most notable in the western and central regions: in the west where there was a 4 
percent gender difference (81 percent for women and 77 percent for men) who voted for 
Tymoshenko.  In the centre, a region that Yanukovych won, there was an 8 point spread 
(67 percent for women and 59 percent for men).255 As Hrycak indicates, the results are 
interesting because in 2004 there was no gender gap, as men and women exhibited 
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similar levels of support for Yushchenko.256 Hrycak notes that Orange voters in the 
western and central regions withheld 3 million votes, two-thirds of those were withheld 
by male voters (1.8 million) which Hrycak concludes lost Tymoshenko the election.257 
Therefore, despite Tymoshenko’s physical transformation as a berehynia, her gender 
likely played a role in her loss of the election as male voters were less likely to cast their 
ballots for Tymoshenko. In addition, Tymoshenko’s association with the Orange 
Revolution presented her as the incumbent candidate, unable to push through democratic 
reforms.  
 
Things further fell apart in March 2010, when parliament voted Tymoshenko out 
as prime minister. She stayed on as leader of her party however the prosecutor’s office, 
with encouragement from Yanukovych’s allies, illegally re-opened her criminal case 
from 2004 (that had been closed by the Supreme Court in 2005). In December 2010 
Tymoshenko was officially charged with abuse of power, then a year later charged with 
embezzlement and tax evasion. Tymoshenko was imprisoned shortly thereafter in 
Kharkiv, Eastern Ukraine. Former President Yushchenko further sought to destroy 
Tymoshenko’s political career by testifying at her trial.258  
Tymoshenko's imprisonment was condemned by the international community 
who perceived the attacks against her as Yanukovych getting rid of his enemies. Her 
incarceration lasted until February 22, 2014, coinciding with Yanukovych being run out 
of the country by protesters for political corruption. Parliament voted quickly to curb 
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once again the powers of the president that had been changed under Yanukovych and to 
alter the legal code to release Tymoshenko from prison.259 
Following Tymoshenko's release, as well as Yanukovych's escape and 
resignation, a presidential election was held May 25, 2014. Tymoshenko once again ran 
for president in 2014 however her showing was quite poor with the election not even 
reaching the second round of voting. Petro Poroshenko won the most votes, receiving 
54.7 percent of the vote, while Tymoshenko won only 12.81 percent of the vote. With 
these results, it appears Tymoshenko’s opponents had succeeded at discrediting her as a 
political leader. 
Despite, the many attempts to discredit her, Tymoshenko remained leader of the 
Fatherland Party, and, to date, continues to hold a seat in parliament. Corruption 
allegations towards the current president, Petro Poroshenko diminished his popular 
support. This climate could provide yet another opportunity for Tymoshenko in the 2019 
presidential election. As of August 2017, polls indicated that Tymoshenko's popularity 
exceeded Petro Poroshenko's at 9.5 percent and 7.3 percent respectively.260 Although 9.5 
percent of the vote does not represent a strong endorsement, depending on events in 
Ukraine in the next few years, Tymoshenko may become Ukraine’s next president. 
However, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the South-East part of the 
country means events evolve very quickly and are quite unpredictable. 
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Conclusions 
Tymoshenko rose to strong leadership by 2009 but ultimately lost to a more 
politically well-placed, corrupt, Yanukovych in 2010. As reported in domestic and 
international media, she exhibited the charisma and decisiveness understood to 
characterize a political leader. Her career began with credible business affiliation as the 
head of a Ukrainian gas company in 1996. Her status as an affluent oligarch positioned 
her well among other politicians.261 Her wealth also provided Tymoshenko with a 
measure of stability when battling court cases, although that was not necessarily the case 
in 2011.  
 In 2005, at the height of her political success, Tymoshenko would purposefully 
transform her appearance to reinvent herself as a charismatic nationalist persona as a 
Ukrainian berehynia even though she was born to an ethnically Russian mother and an 
Armenian father. This transformation represented her cultural and political awareness 
required to signify her as a proper Ukrainian woman. Nonetheless, her position as a 
woman leader in parliament and subsequent nicknames referring to her gender continued 
to signify her as an outsider or "space invader." Her decision to transform her outward 
appearance politically positioned her as an acceptable space invader. In other words, 
Tymoshenko knowingly used gender mythologies, specific nationalist and feminine traits 
to strategically advance herself politically and to appeal to voters. These nationalist myths 
                                                          
261 Although Tymoshenko was likely one of the first millionaires in Ukraine in the post-Soviet era, she is not 
listed as one of Ukraine’s top 100 wealthiest people in 2016. Forbes Ukraine, “Forbes Rating: 100 richest – 
2016,” Forbes Magazine, (accessed January 15, 2018) http://forbes.net.ua/ratings/4. 
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reinforce her policies on state-funded support of motherhood allowances and her 
commitment to public healthcare spending.   
Throughout Tymoshenko's political career she was threatened with investigations, 
criminal charges and imprisonment precisely when circumstances show her as a threat to 
the political status quo of threat to political opponents. For example, Tymoshenko's first 
arrest in 2001 was a direct result of her reforms of the energy industry that threatened the 
wealth of President Kuchma and his allies. Additionally, international meddling on the 
part of Russia during her first term as prime minister in 2005 left her unable to visit 
Russia because she would have been arrested. In 2005, when she moved into opposition 
and no longer held the prime ministership, Russia dropped those charges as she was no 
longer allied with Yushchenko. The most serious criminal charges came after her loss in 
the 2010 presidential election, resulting in her incarceration for several years because of 
her opposition to Yanukovych. Criminal charges and jail time leveled by her male 
political opponent were symptomatic of the attempts to punitively control and silence 
Tymoshenko. Although other politicians, including her former political ally Pavlo 
Lazarenko, similarly faced charges, former President Kuchma who was implicated in 
murders and electioneering conversely faced no criminal charges for his behaviour. 
Alternatively, her greatest opponent Viktor Yanukovych, once he became president, cost 
Ukraine an estimated 100 billion dollars for building an incredibly luxurious house 
outside of Kyiv with taxpayer dollars, yet he was essentially granted permission to flee 
the country. There certainly appears to be a record of gendered double standard for those 
in Ukraine's leadership during the last two decades. 
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Furthermore, Tymoshenko and Yushchenko’s fragile alliance following the 
Orange Revolution proved problematic for Tymoshenko – there are reasons why 
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko as national democrats did not join forces before late 2004. 
They disagreed on the amount of government intervention should be exercised especially 
concerning IMF requirements for funding, a dispute which exacerbated the power 
struggle between them. Nonetheless, Yushchenko needed the increasingly popular 
Tymoshenko for him to hold power in the Rada and consequently, Yushchenko would 
appoint Tymoshenko as prime minister once again. Part of Tymoshenko's popularity may 
have been related to upholding and promoting government programs. Additionally, her 
support for social welfare programs reinforced Tymoshenko's persona as a maternal 
figure of the berehynia. 
  During her second term, however, Yushchenko would also consistently try to 
remove her from her position caused the Orange camp to dissolve. Additionally, to 
further discredit Tymoshenko, Yushchenko appeared to agree with Yanukovych, a man 
whose 2004 presidential campaign entourage had attempted to kill Yushchenko. 
Yushchenko's disdain for Tymoshenko showed through his actions. Thus, Tymoshenko's 
power as prime minister was weakened but Yushchenko also sabotaged his own career by 
trying to control and discredit Tymoshenko. 
Finally, the themes evident in this case study of women in political leadership 
appears to coincide with Jalalzai’s (2013 and 2014) theorizes that women achieve prime 
ministers more often than as presidents. As she (2013) has noted, the powers associated 
with positions of power may affect women’s access to leadership positions. She states 
that the nature of prime ministerships are less stable and less powerful than presidencies 
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and therefore fewer women achieve positions of president.262 Furthermore, Jalalzai 
(2013) notes that women as presidents have disproportionately entered their positions 
during times of significant instability.263 This fact may be relevant for Tymoshenko in 
2019 if she decides to run for president.  
This chapter has shown that Tymoshenko presented herself strategically to the 
public, and easily adapted to the expectations of her political environment. Ultimately, 
the biography shows how Tymoshenko’s political career has outlasted the career of both 
Yushchenko and Yanukovych despite their respective attempts at discrediting her. 
Although her detractors are critical of her actions and implicated in the scandals that have 
surrounded her, Tymoshenko has shown herself to be a brilliant as well as incredibly 
resilient politician with a career spanning over twenty years. Using gender as an analytic 
tool, the subsequent Chapter will address how media narratives affect how the public 
perceived Tymoshenko during significant moments in her political career. 
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Chapter III: International Media Representations of Yulia Tymoshenko, 
2004-2010 
The sense of excitement - already high in the wake of a parliamentary vote that called for 
the firing of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich and his government - boiled over as a 
diminutive blond woman in a black fur coat and high-heeled winter boots was lifted on 
top of the bus. "Yulia! Yulia!" they chanted at the sight of their heroine.264  
 
This quote by Mark MacKinnon and Carolynne Wheeler from the Globe and 
Mail, a Canadian newspaper, is one of the numerous passages discussing Yulia 
Tymoshenko's physical appearance. While pre-occupied with her femininity and 
diminutive status the statement also demonstrates her popularity and ability to rally 
Ukrainians. In this case, she is perceived simultaneously as a "proper" woman as shown 
by her feminine appearance and as a forceful political leader. This type of binary 
description framed much of Tymoshenko's press coverage especially during the Orange 
Revolution in 2004 when she supported Viktor Yushchenko, her ally at the time and 
presidential candidate.265 The Orange Revolution in Ukraine was one of a series of colour 
revolutions, occurring after the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and before the Tulip 
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. These revolutions represent peaceful mass uprisings 
of civil society protesting against corrupt, authoritarian governments and demanding 
democratic reforms in post-communist countries. This quote echoes other discussions of 
                                                          
264 Mark MacKinnon with a report from Carolynne Wheeler, “The princess, power, and the people; Once 
reviled as a self-serving billionaire, Ukraine's political crisis has made Yulia Tymoshenko a heroine of the 
Orange Revolution,” The Globe and Mail, December 11, 2004. 
265 As discussed in the previous chapter, in 2004 Tymoshenko's career her political achievements included 
becoming the leader of her own political party and briefly held the position of Minister of Energy.  
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contemporary women political leaders at this time by focusing on their physical 
appearance as well as political credibility.266  
This consistent focus on Tymoshenko’s appearance as exemplified in the Globe 
and Mail and other English-speaking media begs the question: with limited space to 
present news stories, why are details about Tymoshenko’s femininity made central? 
Furthermore, how do these representations situate or reinforce Tymoshenko’s status as a 
“space invader” rather than a credible political leader?267 Also, more specifically, what is 
the implication of these biases in the representations of female politicians in the 
international context of trends among women political leaders?  
Using a gendered analytic framework, this chapter uses content from three major 
English-language newspapers, with an international readership and from three primarily 
English-speaking countries, the Globe and Mail (Canada), the New York Times (the 
United States), and the Guardian (the United Kingdom). I analyze specific gendered 
themes to ascertain how portrayals of Yulia Tymoshenko persist or vary during 
significant points of her political career. Especially notable is how her femininity is 
reinforced and emphasized in particular ways during those moments when she rose to and 
held the greatest power.  Also significant is the representational landscape during those 
moments when she lost power. I retrieved gendered references of Tymoshenko, a highly 
visible Ukrainian woman, in international news coverage that either reinforced or 
challenged feminine stereotypes. I monitored how international journalistic coverage of 
Tymoshenko changed over time and whether she was singled out based on the 
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(Routledge, 2005), http://www.myilibrary.com?ID=5919 (accessed April 19, 2018). 
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convergence of her political ambition and gender within these newsprint articles. What is 
evident in the reportage is that women's access to political leadership is helped or 
hindered according to popular perceptions of political leadership as repeated by the press.  
My analysis reports on four time periods from November 2004 to March 2010.  
1. November 22, 2004, until January 24, 2005, marks the beginning of the 
protests of the Orange Revolution to the first period that Tymoshenko became 
prime minister. This period marks Tymoshenko's rise to international fame, 
until the second presidential election in 2005 when Tymoshenko's ally Viktor 
Yushchenko was elected president. 
2. August 8, 2005, to September 10, 2005: 268 This second period covers the lead 
up to, and a few days after, Tymoshenko's firing as prime minister and the 
reporting on her broadcasted official response to her loss as documented in the 
English press.  
3. November 18, 2007, to December 20, 2007: covers the month before 
Tymoshenko's re-appointment to the position of prime minister and includes a 
few days after.  
4. January 4, 2010, to March 4, 2010: includes of the first and second rounds of 
the Ukrainian presidential election held January 17, 2010, and February 7, 
2010, respectively. This third period includes when Tymoshenko lost the 
                                                          
268 I extended this date to the end of October 2005 for articles in the Guardian because they did not cover 
Tymoshenko’s firing exclusively but did not include them in the number of articles analyzed.  
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position of prime minister by a no-confidence vote held in the Ukrainian 
parliament on March 4, 2010. 
These specific periods of time are analyzed because the English-language press 
generalize ideas of women political leaders from a western democratic perspective. Using 
this international perspective allows me to discuss national issues to talk more generally 
about gender and leadership. 
Media representations offer insight into political issues, concerns of citizens, and 
represent cultural events. Trimble et al. (2013) note, “media texts are powerful, cultural 
forms, discursively revealing and reinforcing the sex stereotypes and cultural norms that 
construct gender identities.”269 Jalalzai and Krook (2010) explain how cultural factors 
and norms are rooted in parts of public and private divides which socializes women and 
men into distinct gender roles. These factors can negatively impact the popular perception 
of women as political leaders by reinforcing traditional notions of women’s economic 
and social status as subordinate to men as well as elites’ view of potential candidates 
through a gendered lens that women do not occupy the political realm.270 These 
perceptions are further compounded by the media who draw on gendered stereotypes that 
may negatively impact potential women leaders in some cases but can positively impact 
women in other cases.271 Therefore, the media's effect in discussing women candidates is 
generally negative but also appears to have mixed results in some cases. Furthermore, 
there are similar yet diverse paths that women leaders have taken to access political 
                                                          
269 Linda Trimble, Angelia Wagner, Shannon Sampert, Daisy Raphael, and Bailey Gerrits, “Is It Personal? 
Gendered Mediation in Newspaper Coverage of Canadian National Party Leadership Contests, 1975-
2012,” The International Journal of Press/Politics 18, no. 4 (2013): 463. 
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leadership in their countries that depend on cultural assumptions of gender at the local or 
national levels. These assumptions differ across nations. While there are country-specific 
gender norms and assumptions associated with historical perceptions of gender that are 
reinforced through ideal citizens of the nation, the way in which women are withheld 
from positions of leadership may be similar internationally. Therefore, women's strategies 
for accessing these positions are similar and why it is important to use the international 
press. 
The media, arguably, is a powerful tool in shaping national attitudes and 
international perceptions of current political affairs, including election campaigns. As 
Trimble et al. (2013) note, “media texts are powerful, cultural forms, discursively 
revealing and reinforcing the sex stereotypes and cultural norms that construct gender 
identities.”272 Analyzing perceptions of Tymoshenko by the international English-
language media further adds to scholarship on gender and leadership. The media 
demonstrates how Tymoshenko's career successes and failures—the rollercoaster rise to, 
and loss of, power--were perceived internationally. Her rise to and fall from power are 
essential to understanding what context gender is an advantage to candidates and when it 
is a drawback. Most significant to my analysis, media directs popular understandings of 
current events, narrating important aspects and critical details of a female leader within a 
particular national political landscape in post-communist Europe. These representations 
shape popular and perhaps more specifically international perceptions of Tymoshenko as 
a political leader. 
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In this chapter I will first briefly explain what I looked for in the media texts. 
Second, I outline some of the most relevant existing literature about media 
representations of women in politics. The scholarship identifies persistent trends when it 
comes to portrayals of women in politics and exposes the different narratives employed 
by the print media to describe women's visible participation as in important political 
contests. Third, and in conclusion, I discuss my findings to reveal how in international 
English-speaking coverage Tymoshenko embodies a feminine style of political leadership 
that ultimately was successful in her becoming prime minister but not the more 
prestigious position of president. Within these representations she is characterized as a 
strong leader while also embodying the Ukrainian nationalist myth of femininity, the 
berehynia. The berehynia is a representational form specific to women in Ukraine that, in 
this case, is used to offset masculine traits associated with leadership such as 
aggressiveness and assertiveness with feminine traits such as being demure and polite, 
while also intertwined with Ukrainian nationalist identity. Whether this gendered 
representational landscape weakens or strengthens Tymoshenko’s position as a political 
leader, in the eyes of the journalism of the international press, demands a multi-faceted 
answer.  
Methodology  
A gender analytic framework assists me to understand how portrayals of Yulia 
Tymoshenko varied during the three distinguishing periods over the course of her 
political career from 2004 to 2010. The English-language press coverage consistently 
distinguished Tymoshenko as a female politician. My practice was to identify the main 
topic of the news article initially, and then determine whether Tymoshenko was the main 
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subject, or if she was only secondary to the main interests of the coverage. I wanted to 
examine whether Tymoshenko was discussed differently based on whether she was the 
primary or secondary preoccupation of the reportage. When Tymoshenko was the 
secondary topic, she was briefly described with a catchy word such as “fiery” or 
“firebrand” or that she was “ambitious” or “charismatic.” In some instances of these 
articles she was described as "radical" or a "populist." Most of these instances occur 
before the 2010 presidential election when she is referred to more often as the prime 
minister or a representative of the Orange Revolution. 
 In those articles where Tymoshenko was the primary focus, I isolated keywords 
used to describe her. I examine the types of policies and politics that were discussed in 
these articles relative to her leadership and how she was presented as a woman in 
addressing these policies. I consider whether the press is convinced she is able, or unable 
to implement specific policies and whether policy matters are themselves gendered. 
Furthermore, I isolated narratives that addressed Tymoshenko’s public visibility in the 
Orange Revolution to determine whether the English-language press reproduces any kind 
of an east-west rhetorical political division using Tymoshenko as symbolic of that 
division. I correlated these narratives relative to Ukrainian election issues. 
 I observe that references made to the Orange Revolution, the West, pro-European 
and pro-democracy were, on the one hand, referred to by the English-language press, 
while references to the East, pro-Russian and pro-authoritarian were often synonymously 
referenced and commonly used in opposition to references made to the Orange 
Revolution. Much of Ukrainian politics during this period were separated by issues of 
East versus West or pro-European versus pro-Russian, and candidates generally aligned 
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themselves along these lines. However, the international media mostly focuses on 
Tymoshenko's position as pro-European to reinforce the rhetoric that she is a democratic 
leader, although several instances suggest otherwise. In other words, despite 
Tymoshenko's physical re-making as a Ukrainian nationalist, she was perceived as a 
Western-style politician. However, these major English-language news sources' 
perceptions of Tymoshenko as a Western-style politician, promoting Western-style 
democratic values may differ from the reality as an oligarchic politician in a post-
communist country. References to her gender as discussed by the international press 
allows in most cases for her to be unquestioningly associated with democratic values of 
the west, and more importantly, moving away from the autocratic characteristics of the 
Russian state.   
The number of newspaper articles I reviewed is listed by title of newspaper and 
year, with the total number of articles reviewed at the bottom in Table 3.1 below. Each 
newspaper published at least one article profiling Tymoshenko’s leadership specifically: 
The Globe and Mail and the Guardian both published profile articles during the time of 
the Orange Revolution because she eventually becomes such a public figure in the 
campaign whereas the New York Times published a Tymoshenko profile following the 
first round of voting for the 2010 presidential election. This observation is potentially 
significant because while Tymoshenko's achievements and actions were acknowledged 
by the Globe and Mail and the Guardian in 2004 during the Orange Revolution, the New 
York Times paid far less attention to Tymoshenko at this time. Instead, the New York 
Times profiled Tymoshenko in 2010 during the presidential election when she was one of 
the frontrunners in the Ukrainian presidency among her male counterparts and valuing 
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her position when she was closest to the power of the Ukrainian presidency. Likely the 
increase in the number of articles from the New York Times in 2010 is related to whether 
the United States would have an ally in Ukraine, a strategic country because of its 
proximity to Russia. In 2009, Russia had been – and still is – an “aggressive outlier” 
towards NATO, the Russian occupation of parts of Georgia, intimidation of Russian 
opposition members and protests and using its gas supplies as a weapon towards Ukraine 
(at the time a NATO aspirant).273 
Table 3.1       Number of Newspaper Articles Reviewed from 2004-2010 
Year Newspapers   
  Globe and Mail Guardian New York Times All papers 
2004 
        
10* 9** 3 22 
2005  
      
4 0 6 10 
2007  
      
2 1 2 5 
2010  
      
6 15 21* 42 
Total 22 25 32 79 
One * includes one special article profiling Tymoshenko, and ** includes two special articles. 
The second section of my chapter discusses secondary literature by Jalalzai and 
Krook (2010), Campus (2013) and others to show how women in political leadership 
cannot escape notice. These scholars focus on various repeating themes visible in media 
reportage: the charismatic rising of a political figure; woman as a maternal figure, and; 
woman as the protector of democratic values and agents of change. I have combined the 
themes of protector of democratic values and agent of change because in 2004 
Tymoshenko represented both these concepts. She was one of the leaders of the Orange 
                                                          
273 Steven Erlanger (The New York Times), “Identity crisis dogs NATO over Russia,” The International 
Herald Tribune, April 10, 2009, 3. 
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Revolution, advocating for the right of the Ukrainian people to democratically elect their 
president while also protesting a period of authoritarianism which subsequently ushered 
in a period of democracy in Ukraine (for reference, see Table 1.3 for periods of 
oscillation between democracy and authoritarianism in Ukraine). Tymoshenko also acted 
as an agent of change at the same time because Kuchma’s presidency ushered in an 
autocratic period in Ukraine. Therefore, during 2004, Ukraine moving to a democratic 
system from an authoritarian system, and Tymoshenko’s position as a leader during the 
mass protests demanding democracy, means there is overlap in these themes. These 
themes guide my analysis of the representations of Tymoshenko in the English-language 
press.   
I use additional themes as established by rhetorician and composition specialist 
Rebecca Richards (2015) who examines women world leaders' use of narratives of the 
nation-state. Richards notes that the presence of women leaders can change the masculine 
narratives around the nation-state. However, in most cases, women leaders end up 
aligning themselves with traditional values of the nation-state and its masculine 
narratives, and in turn do not challenge the status quo of political (masculine) leadership. 
Richards observes that English-language media outlets discuss whether gender is or is not 
an issue for a person’s candidacy and why the press focuses so predominantly on 
reinforcement of gender norms through descriptions of/emphasis on dress and personality 
characteristics.274 Richards’ scholarship helps me to argue that women political leaders 
may strategically utilize narratives of national traditions and myths to reinforce their 
credibility as political leaders. However, while women political leaders may be 
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positioned in press coverage of political races as “space invaders,” these women do not 
necessarily challenge and demasculinize positions of political leadership because of their 
use of language and the way they present themselves.275 The results of such rhetoric 
about women's political ambitions invoke doubt among the readership of the candidate's 
abilities. I use Richards's thematic frame because of the persistent presence of these types 
of gendered rhetoric encourages the widespread perception that women are "out of place" 
or an exceptional intrusion as political leaders. 
Part II: Scholarship on Gender Stereotypes and the Personalization of 
Politics 
Scholarship analyzing women's representation in print journalism is extensive and 
is based on qualitative feminist analytics. The scholarship is comparatively focused on 
the way women seeking political office are treated relative to their male counterparts. 
This scholarship is also quantitative including calculating the amount of media coverage 
women candidates receive and how women are representationally feminized. For 
example, scholar Dianne Bystrom et al. (2004) states that during American elections 
before 1998 women seeking political office were subject to substantially fewer media 
coverage and also more negatively reviewed than their male political counterparts.276 
After 2000, however, women candidates began to receive the same amount of coverage 
as their male counterparts.277 Although Bystrom et al. have found that the quantity of 
news coverage focusing on men and women candidates’ campaigns is equal in amount, 
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the manner in which the candidates are represented differs according to gender and is 
highlighted through discussions of their appearance and marital status.278 
Media scholars such as Maria Braden (1996), Bystrom et al. (2004), Miller et al. 
(2010), Jalalzai (2013), Trimble et al. (2013), Campus (2013), Paxton and Hughes (2014) 
and Gerrits et al. (2017) discusses the ways in which narratives in print or broadcast press 
present women and men differently to argue gender norms are reinforced. For example, 
Maria Braden (1996), Bystrom et al. (2004), and Miller et al. (2010) have all focused on 
how media fixates on women's appearance, including irrelevant details about their hair 
and wardrobe. Press accounts also describe a woman candidates' family lives more 
frequently than a man's. In these instances, the intimate lives of female politicians are 
publicly exposed and, as Trimble et al. (2013) describe, these personal characteristics 
supposedly illuminate the type of leader these politicians will become once elected.279 
These repeating genres of representation about women's political candidacy are essential 
because they frame women and men in specific conventional gendered terms and they 
highlight women's feminine traits and maternal roles while focusing on men's normalized 
position as a political leader and perceptions of men's roles as detached from the family. 
Masculinity is the default whereas femininity is the exception and therefore the gendered 
environment women navigate demands elaboration.   
The extent of the media’s influence in shaping political barriers or opportunities 
for women is discussed by Farida Jalalzai (2013) who reveals the effect of gender 
stereotypes on women as political leaders. Stereotypes are specific traits that are 
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naturalized according to assumptions about fixed and biological gender binaries.280 
Considering the reproduction of cultural understandings of gender and how the media 
plays a part in reinforcing these cultural understandings of gender stereotypes, Jalalzai 
(2013) notes how positions of political leadership are commonly associated with 
masculine traits. For example, the press consistently aligns women with “feminine” 
issues including family and social welfare, domestic rather than international concerns 
regardless of whether those issues are part of a candidate’s political platform or not.281 
Moreover, as Jalalzai continues, popular attitudes towards women’s political candidacy 
affect women’s capacity to achieve political status.282 Personal characteristics of 
candidates are projected on the candidate to reinforce gendered assumptions about that 
candidate's political views, such as stances on traditionally feminine issues such as 
healthcare or education. According to Jalalzai (2013), cultural power structures are 
arranged and saturated by gender stereotypes. Building off scholarship by Inglehart and 
Norris (2003), Jalalzai suggests that in addition to institutional factors, more women in 
parliament are more frequently elected in countries where cultural attitudes towards 
women's traditional gender roles influence the number of women parliamentarians in 
national parliaments, with some exceptions.283 
This explicit link between gender and electoral success is also established by 
Trimble et al.’s (2013) qualitative study of personalization of a candidate within political 
campaigns. They describe print journalism as, “reinforcing the sex stereotypes and 
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cultural norms that construct gendered identities[...]” to claim how cultural 
representations of gender, reproduced through media narratives are especially pertinent 
because of media’s fixation on the personalization of politics.284 As these scholars 
collectively show, gender stereotypes in the media are of increasing importance 
especially with the personalization of political campaigns, where substantive political 
issues are pushed aside in favour of personal lives and the charisma or celebrity renown 
of the candidates. Therefore, media’s fascination with candidate’s personal characteristics 
rather than substantive policy proposals combined with cultural, gendered assumptions of 
political leadership as primarily masculine puts women at a disadvantage when seeking 
political leadership because they do not fit a masculine mold. 
Clearly, assumptions about candidates based on the gendered narratives help or 
hinder candidates during an election campaign undermining their ability to be taken 
seriously in cases where they are hindered. Jalalzai and Krook (2010) note how women’s 
access to political leadership is closely influenced by the following two factors: (i) 
familial ties to male politicians, especially in instances when male relatives have died or 
were assassinated; and (ii) a country’s lack of institutional development to the degree the 
government is unable to enforce laws or operate without corruption. With the first factor, 
for example, women may tend towards election success during instances of political crisis 
especially in the case of a male predecessor’s assassination or death, especially if that 
male predecessor is a relative. The second factor also allows personal charisma to 
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predominate in a nation’s weak institutional political system which may work for male or 
female candidates.  
Tymoshenko fits the second contextual factor as Ukraine’s political institutions 
have a history of corruption and fractured political party development. Tymoshenko may 
be seen to be a charismatic leader that “talks” her way to the top, which is not necessarily 
gendered and has used her position as a “space invader” to present herself as ethical. The 
“space invader” as an ethical politician is associated with the gendered trope that women 
are immune to corruption. Furthermore, prevailing institutional features of the political 
system (i.e., parliamentary, presidential, or a hybrid of both as in Ukraine) and the type of 
electoral system any individual nation employs (i.e., direct election based on popular 
support or voted in by parliament) are influential factors to women’s access to political 
power. For example, globally there have been more women prime ministers than 
presidents based on the types of power allotted to the positions of prime minister or 
president and the manner in which women are appointed or elected to those positions.285  
In the case of post-communist Europe, Gal and Kligman (2000) note that many 
women's activist organizations find legitimacy in the region based on maternal issues. 
Maternalist organizations have historically stressed the unique value of women's caring 
capacity in the private sphere, or propose that women should inject ethics into society, 
sometimes identified as maternal feminism.286 These organizations resemble maternalist 
organizations emergent during the period of women’s suffrage when women advocated 
for political rights based on presenting women as “social housekeepers” of higher morals 
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than men, and that women were meant to be fixers of social and civic impurities. 
Nationalism and maternalism in this view converge because maternalism is meant to keep 
nationalism virtuous and good. In these situations, gender stereotypes reinforce the 
popular myth of women as caregivers or social housekeepers for the nation who, unlike 
men, are best equipped to fix a "broken" situation. Therefore, in some cases, women may 
take advantage of their prescribed gender roles as nurturers by providing moral guidance 
to facilitate access to political leadership.  
Donatella Campus (2013) reinforces Jalalzai and Krook’s (2010) arguments that 
gendered stereotypes are significant in women’s ascendancy to political leadership. 
Building off Gal and Kligman (2000) and Jalalzai and Krook (2010) attend to the trope of 
women as caregivers. Campus (2013) similarly suggests women may be portrayed as 
more nurturing, more democratic, and more likely to protect social safety net, welfare 
systems or education than male counterparts.287 Subsequently, in some elections, women 
have been ushered in the following periods of time with leaders with authoritarian 
tendencies because women are perceived as nurturing and more inclusive than their male 
predecessors.288 Further Campus notes that the visibility and hyper-sexualization of 
women's bodies impact the public's acceptance or rejection of women politicians. The 
press inevitably caters to and feeds this appetite. Campus explains that female candidates 
may mobilize a “tactical outsider" strategy to present themselves as inherently distinct 
from other candidates as their physical bodies are so visibly different from the male 
norm.289 Moreover, the persona of woman as “tactical outsider” reinforces the belief that 
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women are agents of change.290 When conceived as “tactical outsiders,” women’s success 
may be ensured during a period of political corruption, or when political, economic or 
social change is needed or desired as women may be stereotyped as immune from 
corruption.291 The popular fixation further enhances the woman as "tactical outsider" 
trope on the physical appearance of women politicians.   
Puwar's (2003) discussion of women as "space invaders" in the political sphere 
complements Campus's conceptualization of woman as succeeding due to their perceived 
status as a "tactical outsider." As Puwar determines, the political sphere has traditionally 
been occupied by white, upper-class male bodies.292 For this reason, women may be seen 
as political “space invaders” and therefore subject to public mistrust unless they prove 
otherwise by working harder to measure up against men.293 However, as Jalalzai (2013) 
notes gender sometimes works to women’s advantage which depends on the specific time 
and place.294 Campus (2013) suggests that in some cases it has been observed that the 
"outsider" frame may work to a candidate's advantage who is unable to shake the 
characterization.295 She states that those candidates presented as "outsiders" because of 
their sex have the possibility of exploiting "the advantages inherent to the typical style of 
leadership of outsiders."296 The “tactical outsider” chooses to play the role of the outsider, 
which allows them to ignore conventions to accomplish goals. Therefore, in some cases, 
women may also take advantage politically of their place as the "space invader" in times 
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of political upheaval or demands for change from citizens by positioning themselves as a 
"tactical outsider." 
Campus (2013) similarly theorizes Puwar’s point about the normalization of the 
non-racialized (white) male bodies in political space. Campus shows that the historical 
exclusion of women from public spaces also reinforces certain behaviours deemed 
masculine that are expected from political leaders. For example, Campus states that 
“historically, the power of men has been public and visible, whereas when women had 
power, it was mostly covert and informal.”297 Campus explains that until the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, women’s influence in government and politics was exerted 
through personal relationships with men in power as wives or mistresses.298  
The relationship between men, power, and authority closely overlap because 
power is conventionally masculine.299 This male empowerment, Campus observes, is 
conceptualized as an ability to wield strength, force, and authority over others including 
other men—a capacity supposedly women lack.300 Positions of political leadership, 
therefore, rely on these widespread gender norms and social perceptions of men as 
embodying power, and women as unable to fully embody power or the authority to 
inform citizens. Conversely, women’s perceived capacities as nurturers do not equate as 
an ability to control or maintain a nation and therefore these feminine characteristics 
cannot hold or wield political authority like men except in specific contexts. For example, 
Rebecca Richards (2015) defines the general constructs of masculinity as hierarchical and 
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autocratic behaviours whereas femininity is supposedly more collaborative. Men, in this 
logic, are decisive, assertive, and independent.301 Richards explains that women are 
oppositionally characterized as emotional, sensitive, dependent, or lacking ambition.302 
Furthermore, she observes that when discussing leadership, there is a particular need by 
the press to qualify, or hyphenate, women leaders as “women.” Rarely, if ever, is the 
word “man” used to qualify the term, leader.303 In some historical and social perceptions 
of leadership inform readership that men are ‘natural’ or ‘normalized’ leaders whereas 
women in positions of leadership disrupt this norm; invading the spatial prerogatives of 
men. Therefore, the language used by the popular press to describe the campaign 
platforms; the issues covered, as well as how media describe or identify women seeking 
political leadership fundamentally contour popular perceptions of women's competency.  
Feminine stereotypes and the sexualization of women’s physical bodies are 
further emphasized through the media’s practice of personalizing politics by focusing on 
a candidate’s personality rather than policy. Although personalization of politics affects 
all candidates, Trimble et al. (2013) describe how the personalization of politics fixates 
on women’s bodies and the expectation that they engage in stereotypical domestic 
routines.304 This presumption results in political campaigns that aspire to sell an 
appealing or charismatic image but by doing this may stereotype women candidates at a 
deeper level. Personalization of politics may benefit or impede women when framed 
through gender stereotypes because women may or may not fit either favourable or 
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unfavourable feminine stereotypes related to political leadership depending on the 
prevailing concerns of the election platform. As a result of the media’s focus on personal 
traits during a campaign, policies or ideology are usually abandoned. The campaign may 
then be framed as a horse race between two candidates and their relative personal 
attractions.305 Framing elections as a horse race permits the use of aggressive narratives 
about strength or stamina which, in turn, increases women's vulnerability for failure. 
According to Campus, when the context is framed in aggressive terms, women risk 
appearing weak if they do not react to an issue. Alternatively, they violate feminine 
norms if they respond with comparable aggression. Campus goes on to state that when 
women act in a manner seen as unfeminine it is perceived as negative and this reaction is 
counterproductive to their electoral success because they are "seen as deviant from 
[femininized] standards of kindness and understanding."306 
Pamela Paxton and Melanie Hughes (2014) note that politicians are consistently 
subject to gender-biased reporting styles of the media. When the political candidate is a 
woman, a gender media bias may focus on the other candidate’s personal characteristics 
rather than the candidate’s political message while at the same time exacerbating gender 
stereotypes. Research by Kim Fridkin Kahn (1996) and Catherine Whitney (2000) show 
the indirect and explicit ways in which the misrepresentation of women’s political United 
States Senate and gubernatorial campaigns in prominent US news media undermined the 
effectiveness of these women’s campaigns.307 Instead of focusing on campaign issues, 
Kahn (1996) found the media focused exclusively on women's negative chances in the 
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Senate or gubernatorial races to show how the candidates were criticized as absent of 
appropriate or "winning" personality characteristics.308 Similarly, Whitney (2000) 
analyzed the 1990 California governor race when now democratic Senate leader Dianne 
Feinstein was deemed by one news source as an equal to opponent Pete Wilson. In 
comparison, the Los Angeles Times referenced Feinstein’s looks to propose her a less 
viable candidate.309 Likewise, Kittilson and Fridkin's (2008) transnational comparative 
qualitative study of 2004 and 2006 election campaigns in Australia, Canada, and the 
United States showed how women candidates were quizzed on more stereotypical 
maternal issues by the press such as education and healthcare whereas men were 
questioned about issues such as foreign policy and the economy.310   
Scholars focus on how literary tropes used by the media have "othered" women 
from positions of political leaders. For example, in their research on the impact of 
combative political battlefield narratives and metaphors on women's political leader 
representations, as compared to men, Gerrits et al. (2017) confirm that print media 
situated women differently than men.311 Four types of power communicated by 
aggressive metaphors were used to understand how men and women are differently 
described concerning battlefield metaphors.312 The metaphors fall into four different 
categories: power over, power to, power with, and power as.313 Power over metaphors 
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describe candidates as having dominance over others that can include manipulation, 
exploitation, and coercion.314 Power to metaphors describe a candidate as having the 
capacity to bring about that candidate’s intended consequences.315 Power as metaphors 
are used to describe candidates who embody political power or who possess “inner 
strength.”316 While these three metaphors are applied to individuals seeking power, power 
with metaphors are used to describe power encompassed by people working together to 
achieve a common purpose.317 The amount and type of violent language used to discuss 
leadership contenders varied based on a candidate’s proximity to power, their likelihood 
of success, and the features of their respective campaigns.318 Moreover, the authors found 
that the Globe and Mail referred to women leadership candidates as "powerful players in 
pugilistic politics," who could use their strength and influence to challenge opponents, 
using power over metaphors to achieve their goals being described as power to 
metaphors.319 In other words, the Globe did not shy away from describing women 
leadership candidates as enacting forms of power traditionally associated with men and 
masculinity.320 However, Gerrits et al. (2017) confirm they did find many instances when 
aggressive metaphors delegitimized women candidates’ performance of power. For 
example, Kim Campbell, Canada's Progressive Conservative federal leadership candidate 
in 1994 emerged as the front-runner candidate, but the Globe’s coverage of Campbell’s 
position was treated with discomfort. Descriptions of her lack of power over metaphors 
                                                          
314 Ibid. 
315 Ibid. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Ibid. 
318 Ibid., 1099. 
319 Ibid. 
320 Ibid. 
 137 
 
describe her as a frontrunning candidate.321 A nuanced understanding of how language 
positions the success or failure of political candidates. However, Gerrits et al. conclude 
by asking whether voters punish women candidates for the perception of their actions as 
overly aggressive and therefore need to explore the electoral impacts of narratives of 
power in the media.322 Although linguistic nuances may be necessary in understanding 
how women candidates are positioned, I focus more so on a broader analysis of power in 
my methodology. Furthermore, I believe that in the case of Tymoshenko, it is also 
essential to understand how Tymoshenko wields and is represented as using soft power.   
Before the 2000s, the scholarly literature on media representations of women in 
politics focused on quantitative data on women politicians. Scholars determined women 
were covered less than men. However, as media trends changed to include women 
candidates more frequently, the focus shifted onto how media language and rhetoric 
reproduced gender biases beyond the narratives of inclusion. Literature after 2000 
revolves around how women politicians are represented, including the obsession on 
femininity, physical appearance, and concepts of woman as a signifier of family and 
domesticity. More recently, after 2000, scholars focused on how women candidates are 
comparatively positioned to men. Clearly, this latter gender approach dismantles the idea 
that the gender-sex system is fixed and biological rather than fluid and constructed by 
rhetoric and ideologies of difference. Reiterating the ideas of Joan Scott (1986) from 
Chapter 1, gender is used as a tool of analysis to understand power relations between 
women and men as the characteristics of these categories of identity are understood as 
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oppositional. Instead, Scott describes these categories as non-essentialist due to differing 
and ongoing processes of gender socialization across time and space.323 Gender identities 
of “woman” and “man,” and other facets of identity are relational. In other words, traits 
stemming from these identities that are deemed “feminine,” or “masculine” are 
influenced by cultural perceptions of identity traits such as class, race, ethnicity, and 
sexual orientation. According to Scott, understanding women requires an understanding 
of men due to the nature of their characteristics as oppositional. A gender system outlines 
what behaviours are expected or acceptable based on social perceptions of gender over 
time and space.  
Section III – Findings: The fiery princess, protector of democracy and 
berehynia (mother) of the nation  
My assessment of the English international press representations of Tymoshenko 
borrows conceptual thematics offered by feminist literature. The three print news media 
that I analyzed consistently described Tymoshenko in gendered terms. The press 
representations of Tymoshenko including her roles as "mother of the nation," as the 
protector of democratic values, as the tactical outsider, or as an agent of change 
thematically provide my analysis with insight into how the international press feminized 
Tymoshenko according to their gender standards. However, these representations also 
offer insight into how she strategically presented herself to advance her own political 
success. 
 The personalization of politics and female candidates 
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As previously mentioned, elections are commonly framed around personal 
characteristics of the candidates rather than distinguished by the respective policies or 
ideologies held, or advocated, by each. This rhetoric, implying a first to the finish 
scenario, overemphasizes conflict and correspondingly candidates are compelled to create 
and highlight a specific appealing, or charismatic, persona for voters.324 Media narratives 
focus on specific attributes of the individual life of the candidate: physical appearance, 
family and business life, and speaking abilities. Such personalization of Tymoshenko 
characterizes the narratives of the media sources I analyzed. Tymoshenko's physical 
presence was referenced a total of twenty times by all three newspapers in a sampling of 
articles over a six-year period. Seventeen of these instances occurred in biographical 
profiles featured by each newspaper about Tymoshenko. These articles often referenced 
her blond plaited peasant braid. The Globe’s Mark MacKinnon and Carolynne Wheeler 
and The Guardian’s James Meek both published articles in 2004 during the height of 
Orange Revolution. The majority of these references to Tymoshenko's physique occur in 
this period. The references to Tymoshenko's appearance in 2004 are likely a result of the 
international attention the Orange Revolution received. The Revolution catapulted 
Tymoshenko onto the international stage. As one of the principal leaders, along with 
Yushchenko of the Orange Revolution, Tymoshenko was physically distinguished from 
the predominantly male political leaders in the region. Consequently, she received quite a 
bit of press but primarily she was mentioned for her activism and her support of 
presidential candidate Yushchenko, with whom she was aligned as part of her opposition 
to the former president Kuchma and his ally, Yanukovych. 
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As noted in the prefatory citation, in 2004, the Globe’s MacKinnon and Wheeler 
described Tymoshenko as “a diminutive blond woman in a black fur coat and high-heeled 
winter boots,” in possession of a “glamorous look and penchant for stirring rhetoric,” 
with her hair “usually intricately braided in Ukrainian peasant style.”325 This chain of 
physical reference to Tymoshenko—her attractiveness and glamor evokes appropriate 
femininity but also diminishes her as a politician. In contrast, the press almost never 
commented on Yushchenko’s appearance except for commenting on his “lesion-riddled 
face” an effect from being poisoned during the 2004 presidential campaign, 
demonstrating his sacrifice to defeat Yanukovych.326 Furthermore, the press isolated 
Tymoshenko’s appearance while at least alluding to Yushchenko’s politics as a free-
market reformer. Yushchenko was portrayed as a pro-western politician as well as a free-
market politician in MacKinnon and Wheeler’s 2004 Globe article about Tymoshenko.327  
The majority of references to Tymoshenko’s politics focused on her personal 
relationships with the other politicians such as her feud with Kuchma.328  
Journalists from the Guardian discussed Tymoshenko’s physical appearance in 
similar terms. A 2004 article by Meek begins by noting that Tymoshenko’s looks could 
be compared to “an international tennis star, a Hollywood actress or a supermodel.”329 
This fascination with Tymoshenko’s apparent celebrity attractiveness implies that she 
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could have had a different career related to her looks and also that the author is surprised 
Tymoshenko is a politician instead. Drawing attention to Tymoshenko’s glamour 
predictably undermines her actual skills and longstanding political accomplishments on 
Ukraine’s national stage as well as implies that politicians, in general, are never 
physically attractive. By emphasizing Tymoshenko’s appearance and comparing her 
looks to that of a celebrity, the media questions her abilities as a politician expressing 
surprise of the political power she wields as they call into question her succession to 
power. Noting her physical appearance draws attention to her physical irregularity as a 
woman in a position of leadership from the normalized political landscape dominated by 
men. Furthermore, for Tymoshenko as a politician, focusing on her beauty may also lend 
suspicion because her beauty and glamour may indicate she did not earn her position, but 
rather that she honed her power to get where she is because of her beauty. Perhaps this is 
one of the reasons Tymoshenko was such an easy target when it came to the charges 
levied against her for corruption as the charges legitimized people’s suspicions.  
During the era of her campaign of the 2010 presidential election references to 
Tymoshenko’s physical appearance in the New York Times occur three times in their 
biographical profile article and twice in two other individual pieces. Journalist Clifford J. 
Levy who authored the biographical article followed her campaign in 2010 and 
documented Tymoshenko’s physical transformation from a “Russian speaker from the 
east with long dark hair” to a “champion of the Ukrainian language.”330 Levy also 
suggests that long before the 2010 presidential campaign Tymoshenko transformed 
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herself into a proper Ukrainian woman by exclusively speaking Ukrainian and by so 
doing physically and linguistically created a persona appealing to a broader range of 
voters.   
Each print media outlet features Tymoshenko's braid plait hairstyle at least once. 
Like the Guardian article, Levy refers to Tymoshenko's blond "peasant braid" on two 
occasions in his coverage of the Ukrainian election.331 Both times Levy identifies 
Tymoshenko as renowned for her passionate speeches but always with a mention of her 
peasant braid. As prime minister, Tymoshenko was “an Orange leader known for her 
impassioned speeches and peasant braid.”332 This union of political passion and the braid 
is noteworthy because it balances characteristics of a competent and strong leader with 
femininity and feminizing the leadership of the Ukrainian nation-state. Significantly, in 
Levy's article, "Toppled In Ukraine But Nearing A Comeback" covering Viktor 
Yanukovych's comeback from losing the 2004 presidential election in the wake of the 
Orange Revolution before the first presidential vote, Levy, describes Tymoshenko as 
Yanukovych's main opponent.  Levy's subsequent article published three days later, 
discusses the presidential election as heading to a runoff. In this article, Tymoshenko is 
described as offering "provocative speeches" and wearing a "peasant braid" but also 
significantly described as a "polarizing figure."333  
Consistent in both instances of Levy's description is Tymoshenko's sporting of her 
peasant braid reminding the reader that while she demonstrates strong leadership 
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characteristics, she also exhibits feminine characteristics. Levy's tone in the first article 
before the first round of voting changes in the second article published after the first vote. 
Levy presents Tymoshenko as a strong leader because of her position as a front-running 
candidate against Yanukovych. However, the tone to describe her in the second article is 
much less appealing when he describes her as giving “provocative speeches” and a 
“polarizing figure.” Although both characterizations are accurate, they were not used by 
Levy in his article before the first round of voting. Likely, Levy used a more somber tone 
in the second article when Tymoshenko enters the second round of the vote far behind 
Yanukovych. However, Levy references Tymoshenko's "peasant braid" in both articles 
which reinforces her status as a Ukrainian woman. His combination of "provocative 
speeches" with the emphasis on her "peasant braid" may also reinforce her position as an 
acceptable leader by exhibiting strong leadership characteristics and proper femininity. 
This combination implies that Tymoshenko's ability to lead comes from her physical 
appearance which does not challenge ideas of femininity and leadership, but instead 
upholds masculine forms of leadership as valuable. In other words, Tymoshenko as a 
woman is an unconventional leader in Ukraine especially considering all her main 
opponents are men. However, by highlighting her feminine traits tied to the Ukrainian 
nation, she continues to uphold the norms of leadership in Ukraine. 
Tymoshenko's braid helps visualize her as a national symbol of femininity and is 
mentioned in news articles from 2004 to 2010. Ethnographer Oksana Kis (2007) and 
sociologist Alexandra Hrycak (2011) discuss how media concentrates on Tymoshenko's 
physical appearance became an essential part of her political career as these referrals 
legitimize her as a proper, compliant Ukrainian woman not entirely adopting a masculine 
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persona of leadership. Kis claims Tymoshenko intentionally models her appearance on 
two popular feminine symbols in Ukraine: Berehynia and Barbie.334 Kis states 
Tymoshenko’s appearance merges these two predominant models of femininity where the 
berehynia is the traditional Ukrainian myth of an embodiment of femininity native to the 
region, and Barbie represents post-communist capitalist consumer culture.335 
Tymoshenko's braid, for example, harmonizes with the peasantry of the berehynia as a 
traditional mature Ukrainian mother, while her fancy clothes might be classified as part 
of her mimicry of the westernized and affluent attributes of glamour doll, Barbie. 
Therefore, references to Tymoshenko’s duality—Ukrainian traditionalism and peasantry 
versus western, post-soviet affluence—construct her procured image of the proper 
Ukrainian woman. Kis’ reference to Tymoshenko as embodying the cultural essence of 
Barbie can be related to the surprise of her as a politician. Barbie is not known as an 
intelligent figure but rather by her aspiring quality of beauty. Therefore, Tymoshenko as 
resembling a Barbie also questions her intelligence and objectifies her. 
The braid helps reinforce Tymoshenko’s position as a berehynia and discussion of 
the braid emphasizes Tymoshenko's performance to costume herself more definitively as 
a mother of the nation rather than an affluent businesswoman or an authoritarian-leaning 
politician which will be discussed a bit later. Furthermore, this descriptive language 
creates and reinforces an image of nationalism that Tymoshenko is trying to sell.336 The 
2010 Levy article in the New York Times even explicitly identifies Tymoshenko’s braid 
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as symbolizing nationalism. The images of Tymoshenko and Yushchenko as a couple 
discussed in a subsequent section compound the use of soft power imagery as do the 
discussions of her braid to portray Tymoshenko as a mother of the nation.  
In as much, frequent references to Tymoshenko's physical feminine appearance 
distinguish her from Ukrainian male competitors whose bodies have been normalized in 
the political sphere. These references to her appearance could be a double-edged sword. 
The consistent media impulse/tendency to feminize or nationalize Tymoshenko makes 
her stand out in a supposedly beneficial way for her pro-democratic stances, connecting 
her non-stereotypical feminine appearance to her efforts of presenting herself as a 
different kind of politician. Tymoshenko's non-stereotypical, feminine appearance as a 
politician also suggests she is a new kind of politician that is pure (not corrupt) and 
truthful. These types of references may appeal to those readers who value democracy or 
Ukrainian national identity. 
On the other hand, this type of feminization could also potentially be detrimental 
because an ultra-feminine appearance is not generally associated with stereotypical 
politicians and could draw suspicion to Tymoshenko’s political motives as an out of the 
ordinary politician. Whereas the representational emphasis on Tymoshenko's appearance 
merges the traditionalism of Ukrainian women with western post-Soviet modernism; the 
latter tendency reinforces and normalizes the English-language international media's 
fascination with women politician's physical appearance. As will be apparent in other 
parts of this analysis, emphasis on Tymoshenko's feminine appearance reinforces the 
types of policies she is associated with and is believed to uphold. Lastly, it is important to 
note that Tymoshenko crafted her berehynia/Barbie image, as Kis describes, as a means 
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to stand out and position herself as distinct among other politicians.337 Tymoshenko, 
therefore, has likely used media's personalization of politics as a way to craft her own 
image.  
The charismatic/fiery leader 
In each newspaper over the four distinct periods under analysis, Tymoshenko is 
consistently portrayed as a charismatic leader who gained power in a time of political 
upheaval during the Orange Revolution. Characterizations of Tymoshenko as 
“charismatic” or “ambitious” are important because as Jalalzai and Krook (2010) 
describe, the lack of institutional political development in Ukraine at this time leaves 
more room for the personalization of politics and therefore the possibility of the rise of 
charisma as essential to successful leadership.338 Furthermore, as Jalalzai (2013) 
contends, many women political leaders have reached positions of leadership during 
periods of social or political shifts or unrest. In this case, the media profile of 
Tymoshenko's ambition and charisma were significant in her eventual achievement of the 
position of prime minister following an era of a major popular uprising and social 
transformation.   
As Table 3.2 illustrates, Tymoshenko was identified in some manner as either as 
“charismatic” or “ambitious” a total of 16 times in the three papers. The instances of 
these characterizations of her as a “charismatic” politician increased over time used most 
frequently in 2010 during the Ukrainian presidential election campaign and less 
frequently in the first period from 2004 to 2005 during the Orange Revolution. Being 
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described as "charismatic" is part of why Tymoshenko met success and this attribute 
seems especially helpful in launching her popularity in 2004 during a time of political 
crisis in Ukraine, which is also beneficial for the success of women's politicians. 
Table 3.2   References to Tymoshenko as "charismatic" or "ambitious" * 
 Period Globe and Mail The Guardian New York Times Total #  
2004-2005 1 1 0 2 
2005 2 0 2 4 
2007 1 1 1 3 
2010 3 2 2 7 
Total 7 4 5 16 
*the total number of articles can be found in Table 3.1 
However, although charismatic traits are essential to contemporary political 
leadership as defined by Paxton and Hughes (2014) and Richards (2015), charisma – 
except for Tymoshenko as explained above – is most commonly reserved as a masculine 
trait of leadership. Paxton and Hughes (2014) claim specific characteristics are expected 
of leaders just as there are distinct gendered social expectations for men and women.339 
However, the authors believe that the most common characteristics of masculine 
leadership are aggression, competitiveness, and decisiveness.340 Social behaviours 
expected of women, on the other hand, are nurturance, compliance, likeability, 
gentleness, and politeness. Richards’s (2015) discussion of social behaviours attributed to 
men and women, states that although women may exhibit characteristics of charisma and 
ambition, such qualities may be perceived, or subtly framed, as unbefitting of women.341 
Therefore, although charisma and ambition are necessary aspects of political leadership, 
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references to Tymoshenko as charismatic could have risked hindering her chances to 
attain presidential leadership. Charisma, however, worked for Tymoshenko in her rise in 
the political ranks from a member of the parliament to cabinet minister to party leader to 
the prime minister – but not sufficiently for her to achieve the presidency.  
Instances of rhetoric portraying Tymoshenko as an excellent public speaker, 
capable of leading and moving people’s emotions are documented in Table 3.3. 
Tymoshenko was regularly referred to as a “firebrand” politician or delivering “fiery” 
speeches. Table 3.3 also demonstrates how these references dissipated over time. In 2004, 
Tymoshenko was referred to as a “firebrand” or “fiery” politician ten times, the most of 
any period. Comparatively, these references occurred only four times in 2010 during her 
run for president. 
Table 3.3 References to Tymoshenko as "impassioned," "fiery" or 
"firebrand" 
  Globe and Mail The Guardian New York Times Total # of articles 
Period       
2004-2005 8 2 0 10 
2005 2 0 3 5 
2007 1 0 1 2 
2010 0 0 4 4 
Total 11 2 8 21 
 
In 2004, the Globe referred to Tymoshenko as “fiery” eight times, including, for 
example, pairing Tymoshenko as “Yushchenko’s fiery ally,”342 or “Mr. Yushchenko’s 
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ambitious firebrand ally.”343 In 2005, Globe columnist Graeme Smith cited Tymoshenko 
as firing back in a "fiery TV speech," accusing those close to the president of corruption 
and presenting herself as providing the country with moral guidance by stepping away 
from the president and calling out the corruption of his followers.344 The Guardian used 
the term “fire” to describe Tymoshenko however, the Guardian’s journalist James Meek 
uses the term to describe how she could rally people, rather than using the term as a 
personal trait as in the Globe. Meek and co-journalist Paton Walsh describe Tymoshenko 
as wielding power over people stating, “It was Tymoshenko whose oratory put fire in the 
bellies of a column of demonstrators, sending them marching up the steep slope from 
Kreshchatik towards the government district” while then putting carnations in their police 
shields.345 As Gerrits et al. describe power over metaphors indicate the politician in 
question is legitimated as competent. Meek’s and Paton Walsh’s representation of 
Tymoshenko’s leadership abilities implies she rallies people to march achieving results 
absent of violence. As riot police had installed themselves opposite to the protestors, 
Tymoshenko’s insertion of flowers, a symbol associated with peace, into police shields 
contrasts the hard power of the police and further demonstrates how Tymoshenko 
reinforces gender roles through her femininity, not merely physical charisma.  
While Tymoshenko acted in a manner that exhibited peaceful actions and a soft 
power approach such as inserting carnations into police shields as well as identifying as a 
pacifist, there are some examples of her implying that her actions may escalate to 
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aggressive, militant actions. In the context of the Orange Revolution, while addressing a 
million people in the streets of Kyiv, Tymoshenko is quoted by Meek of the Guardian as 
stating, “We are launching a siege of the authorities.”346 MacKinnon of the Globe and 
Mail quoted Tymoshenko as stating, “Either they will give up their power, or we will take 
it.”347 Kis affirms that Tymoshenko, in fact, does not shy away from this image as a 
militant. She notes that in 2004 Tymoshenko matched her revolutionary mood by wearing 
a black leather jacket in the style of the Bolsheviks in 1917 and an orange sweater with 
the inscription "revolution" on it.348 Furthermore, she states Tymoshenko’s 2006 
parliamentary electoral poster presented her as a part of the “Army of the Light” (from 
the movie Night Watch) dressed in a black leather coat holding a sword.349 Therefore, 
Tymoshenko takes on both personas.  
Scholar Marian J. Rubchak (2009) describes that the strong Ukrainian woman as 
protector of the nation also reinforces myths of the empowered Ukrainian woman and 
Ukrainian matriarchy which is also part of the image of the berehynia.350 The berehynia 
exemplifies an Amazon-like statue of a woman with men around her feet symbolizing the 
military, scholarship, politics, and labour that appear subordinate to the Amazonian.351 
Rubchak points to several Ukrainian sculptors of these statues, including Kyiv-based 
sculptor Anatoly Kusch, who created sculptures of strong women based on these myths 
                                                          
346 Ibid. 
347 Mark MacKinnon, “The Threat of Violence Grows as Ukraine's Elections Protest Widens,” Globe and 
Mail, November 24, 2004, A1. 
348 Kis, “Beauty Will Save The World!,” 44. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Marian J. Rubchak, “Ukraine’s Ancient Matriarch as a Topos in Constructing a Feminine Identity,” 
Feminist Review no. 92 (2009): 135. 
351 Ibid., 136 
 151 
 
of empowered women and the Ukrainian matriarchy.352 Tymoshenko's appearance may 
have been considered conventionally less feminine however she continued to uphold the 
ideal of the berehynia. 
Tymoshenko adopted charismatic leadership traits associated with male styles of 
leadership alongside strategic feminine actions or actions of soft power and peacemaker 
to reinforce her position of "mother of the nation" as well as display her abilities to wield 
power as a female politician. Tymoshenko is presented in the media as a strong leader, 
capable of rallying protestors while simultaneously trying to keep the peace. Narratives of 
Tymoshenko as peacemaker generate another feminine characteristic but also a figure 
interested in doing the right thing without violence. The emphasis on Tymoshenko’s 
peaceful protests represents another component of her deployment of soft power. For 
example, James Meek cites a situation when Tymoshenko stood among protesters 
rallying them to "Be on the side of Ukraine!" while at the same time asking the police, "to 
support the people and the president elected by the people!" and putting carnations 
through the riot polices' shields to invoke images of soft, feminine forms of power.353 
Tymoshenko used flowers, braided into her hair, as a personal means to symbolize soft 
power and to contrast the hard and, potentially, authoritarian state power of the police. 
Her calls to both police and protestors suggest her ability to unify those constituents 
formally posed as antagonists. Moreover, this setting demonstrates Tymoshenko's well 
thought out strategy to perform femininity to obtain more power. Additionally, in 2004 
Mark MacKinnon from the Globe reinforced her narratives of soft power able to subdue 
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police authoritarianism by describing Tymoshenko as striding past police to enter a 
negotiations with Yushchenko’s and Yanukovych’s teams. MacKinnon initially described 
Tymoshenko as “a diminutive blond woman in a black fur coat and high-heeled winter 
boots,” then continues to state Tymoshenko was “[captured] on camera staring down a 
line of helmeted policemen.”354 Her courage to challenge an armoured force exemplifies 
how the representations of Tymoshenko contrasted between feminized or soft power 
versus masculinized hard power. The image of Tymoshenko as “diminutive” represents 
the differentiation of soft power to the police’s possession of hard or authoritarian power. 
Each newspaper published articles in 2004 that referred at least once to 
Tymoshenko’s address to protesters to focus on her ability to hold their attention with 
fiery oratory skills, signalling her as a capable leader. In 2004 even the New York Times 
who seldom mentioned Tymoshenko in articles about the Orange Revolution covered her 
calls to Ukrainians for mass civil disobedience. They state that demonstrators "should 
under no circumstances give it up," portraying her as a strong leader but not as a primary 
character in the Orange Revolution.355  
The characterization of Tymoshenko as rallying the popular masses, as a strong 
protestor and demonstrator recurs across all time periods reviewed. The Globe described 
Tymoshenko as the brains behind the protests urging Yushchenko, a moderate free-
market liberal, to do things he usually would not do.356 In this instance, Tymoshenko is 
presented as truly in charge of the revolution, while the presidential candidate, 
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Yushchenko listens and obeys seemingly a subordinate. Tymoshenko exhibits masculine 
leadership norms through her ability to rally Ukrainians and persuade male politicians, 
such as Yushchenko, to obey. Yushchenko understood Tymoshenko’s power both during 
and after the Orange Revolution; he used Tymoshenko’s charisma to advance his own 
needs at this time, while also recognizing her power as a threat following the Orange 
Revolution and during his term as president. The latter revelation led him to campaign 
against her in the 2010 presidential election. 
Discussions of this rhetoric expressed in popular journalism also hindered 
Tymoshenko's capacity to be seen as a strong leader because a strong, forceful protester 
may not fit the prescribed feminine gender norms. As discussed earlier, women who 
negatively attack other candidates are viewed as deviating from feminine norms. 
Negative attacks, a regular occurrence in politics, is a double-edged sword for women. 
According to Campus not responding to, or engaging in, these types of political rhetoric 
may typify a woman candidate as weak whereas engaging in rhetorical attacks on her 
opposition may imply the woman candidate diverges from feminine norms of kindness 
and politeness. Eventual discussions of Tymoshenko as an oligarch and a motivated 
businesswoman lead to widespread suspicion of her character as self-serving. This view 
was evident in the English-speaking journalism especially in 2004 during mass protests 
of the Orange Revolution amidst Tymoshenko's rise to popularity. Tymoshenko became 
suspect precisely in an international context because of her drive as both a high-ranking 
politician and a successful businesswoman. On the other hand, skills and expertise could 
alternatively be perceived as valuable work experience as a professional, giving 
Tymoshenko experience valued in the political sphere.  
 154 
 
Family Life and the Reinforcement of Heterosexuality  
The references to Tymoshenko’s family life are far fewer than those that 
characterize her physical appearance, personal strengths, or charisma. Familial references 
appear most frequently in the three biographical profiles published by the Globe in 2004. 
The Globe mentions her husband Oleksandr who was jailed and in hiding. Likewise, the 
Guardian in 2004 mentions Tymoshenko’s husband as well as her daughter Yevgeniya 
who studied politics at the London School of Economics. Evocations of the family are 
relevant to women's ambitions as politicians because, in many ways, the media uses the 
family as a means to exile women as political outsiders by situating them in the feminized 
"private sphere" and by discussing their private lives. The media often proposes that 
women's dual commitment to their career and family life as conflicting interests. 
According to sociologist Liesbet van Zoonen (2005), Dutch gossip magazines present 
women politicians as living conflicting lives, arguing that families suffer directly as a 
result of a woman's career choice.357 Two references to Tymoshenko’s family life in the 
Globe and Guardian in 2004 are brief. This lack of family discussion may be because 
Tymoshenko's daughter Yevgeniya was an adult by the time of the Orange Revolution 
and Tymoshenko's husband had been jailed and accused of crimes related to their jointly-
held gas business. Neither daughter nor husband seems to play a visible role in her career 
at this crucial point. Therefore, it appears mention of her family made little difference in 
positioning her as an outsider. In comparison, references to her femininity were weighted 
more heavily as factors in Tymoshenko's rise to success.  
                                                          
357 Liesbet van Zoonen, “Feminization? Female politicians, family, and celebrity,” Entertaining the Citizen: 
When Politics and Popular Culture Converge, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005), 
91. 
 155 
 
Also, more relevant are the print press discussions of Tymoshenko that directly 
reference the Orange Revolution and the so-called “fairy tale” relationship that was 
imagined to exist between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. The press uses the metaphor of 
a close, romantic relationship as a euphemism for democracy, which also implies 
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko are like husband and wife, symbolizing the intimacy of 
their political relationship. For example, in the 2004biographical profile featured in the 
Guardian, James Meek describes Tymoshenko as having “appeared at the right-hand side 
of the opposition leader, Viktor Yushchenko. Arm in arm, they make a noble couple,”358 
suggesting more of a marital than professional union. The reference to Tymoshenko and 
Yushchenko as a "noble couple" also implies they form a cohesive pro-democratic family 
unit, protective of their children. In this case, children metaphorically represents the 
protestors and Ukrainian populous who must be shielded from the threat of 
authoritarianism from the political competition posed by pro-Russian politicians 
Yanukovych and Kuchma.359 This reference extends the intimacy of the political couple 
into a metaphor of parenthood because Tymoshenko and Yushchenko are coupled as 
protectors of the Ukrainian nation. Furthermore, the press’ emphasis on Tymoshenko’s 
physical appearance combined with the “fairy tale” relationship between her and 
Yushchenko may play a part in the portrayal of Tymoshenko as suspect with her physical 
beauty allowing her to influence powerful men. 
Once Tymoshenko and Yushchenko spar politically, the marriage and intimacy 
metaphor is taken further by the press. In 2005, following the firing of Tymoshenko as 
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prime minister by Yushchenko, Graeme Smith from the Globe stated that “The political 
marriage at the heart of the Orange Revolution suffered an ugly breakup yesterday." 360 
This statement further reinforces the image of Tymoshenko and Yushchenko as in a 
romantic, intimate and potentially volatile personal relationship during the Orange 
Revolution. Metaphors such as these of Tymoshenko and Yushchenko as a couple 
position Tymoshenko as a mother and wife figure, and in this case, the mother of the 
nation. However, the metaphors of a marriage ending between Yushchenko and 
Tymoshenko evokes disappointment of the couple to protect the nation.  
Moreover, references to Tymoshenko in a marital relationship with Yushchenko 
implies she is his subordinate. Political theorist Wendy Brown cites the way in which the 
family is considered a naturalized unit by liberalism’s sexual contract: women are 
mutually subordinate in the family and the economy.361 Therefore, when Tymoshenko 
challenges Yushchenko’s power, she also challenged his position as having power over 
her as “husband” compounding a perception of his masculine superiority.  
The “fairy tale” narrative of this marriage between the two leaders during the 
Orange Revolution were reinforced in 2010 by the Guardian when, on five occasions, 
they positioned Yanukovych as the “villain” of the 2004 presidential election. The 
Guardian portrayed Tymoshenko and Yanukovych as bitter rivals,362 setting the prior 
fairy tale but anticipating an unfortunate divorce. Tymoshenko was the lone political 
survivor of the Orange Revolution, who eventually was confrontationally estranged, or 
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divorced, from her former husband/ally and by then, President Yushchenko. In an 
apparent plot twist, Yushchenko joined forces with Yanukovych, who is cast in the role 
of the villain seeking a possible comeback and is used by Yushchenko to get back at 
Tymoshenko in their messy divorce. The Guardian, however, was the only paper to 
depict Yanukovych’s villainy. 
Casting Tymoshenko and Yushchenko in a romantic and marital intimacy, 
fighting the evil Yanukovych, narratively romanticized Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. 
This imagined romance between the leadership of the Orange Revolution also reinforces 
a romantic heteronormativity which otherwise would not have been present had 
Tymoshenko been a man. Moreover, this narrative of heteronormativity intersects with 
the narratives about democracy briefly discussed here and in the next section. The Orange 
Revolution was framed as a protest against state authoritarianism headed by a single man, 
with the advocacy for democracy proposed by a couple supported by many children. 
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko emerge as the couple who champion the Orange 
Revolution. As a result, they both were associated with the promise of democracy. 
Romanticizing their relationship also sensationalized the political landscape 
unrelated to politics. These romantic narratives distracted or masked the fact that 
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko’s true alliance was based on their unified opposition to 
President Kuchma and his handpicked predecessor Yanukovych rather than based on a 
shared desire to uphold democratic values through a popular revolution of the people. In 
reality, Yushchenko, a pro-establishment pragmatic national democratic politician with 
self-interest in maintaining his power and business investments, reacted to being pushed 
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out of the system by Kuchma in 2001 when he was demoted from the position of prime 
minister.363  
Tymoshenko may be understood as a savvy political strategist. While publicly 
appearing to be anti-establishment in other aspects of political leadership, she was 
accused of authoritarian tendencies during her time as prime minister. For example, 
accusations of Tymoshenko’s authoritarian actions come from her support for increasing 
transformation of the gas-trading industry to suit her. Suspicions circulated she increased 
government intervention to reconfigure the gas-trading industry to a cash system, 
supposedly diverting cash to members of Russia’s natural gas trading company 
Gazprom.364 Additionally, Tymoshenko allegedly barred some journalists from 
participating in a talk show with her. These accusations have in some cases deemed her to 
potentially be the next Vladimir Putin and predicted that if she were to gain the power to 
the presidency, she might threaten to sell out to Russia.  
The protector of democratic values and the “tactical outsider” 
The themes of women as the protector of democratic values or as “tactical 
outsider” frequently overlap because of the discussions of democracy evident in all of the 
newspaper articles about Tymoshenko. While Campus (2013) distinguishes these two 
themes, I find it useful in this case to consider them as linked because Tymoshenko was 
consistently associated with democratic values of the Orange Revolution during this 
                                                          
363 Kuzio, “Yushchenko versus Tymoshenko,” 219. 
364 Julia Ioffe, “Kiev Chameleon,” The New Republic, January 4, 2010, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/72252/kiev-chameleon. 
 159 
 
period of authoritarian threats from Yanukovych and Kuchma. Furthermore, news articles 
often intertwine these themes. 
First, Tymoshenko’s association with Yushchenko during the Orange Revolution 
meant both were coupled as a euphemism for democracy. For example, in 2004 Globe 
journalist MacKinnon explicitly pointed to Tymoshenko as democratic when he 
described her as adopting “the garb of a defender of democracy” during the protests of 
the Orange Revolution.365 In the same passage MacKinnon counters that Tymoshenko 
was also "reviled as a self-serving billionaire," drawing suspicion on Tymoshenko for her 
reasons to enter politics.366 However, the majority of the coverage reinforces her position 
as a democratic politician. These cases generally overshadowed accusations the suspicion 
that her personal wealth and affluence brought suspicion.  
Although Tymoshenko’s wealth and business success are deemed suspicious to 
some, I would argue that her wealth and affluence also reinforced her image as princess 
in a position of authority. For example, the Globe profile of Tymoshenko is titled, “The 
princess, power, and the people: Once reviled as self-serving billionaire, Ukraine’s 
political crisis has made Yulia Tymoshenko a heroine of the Orange Revolution,” exhibit 
gendered language in its use of “princess” and “heroine.” These two nouns are consistent 
in representing Tymoshenko as a triumphant protector of the Ukrainian people. On the 
other hand, “princess” may imply that Tymoshenko was an aspiring member of the 
leadership, not the primary leader. Therefore, the term has mixed implications.  
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As Hrycak discusses, the use of “gas princess” to describe Tymoshenko by her 
detractors possibly implied that she was too “sexy” to be involved in the supposedly 
masculine domain of energy trading.367 The Globe was the only newspaper to qualify 
Tymoshenko as "gas princess," with the term used twice in 2004 and three times in 2010. 
By referring to Tymoshenko as a "princess" asserts that she is a monarchist, rather than a 
democrat. More importantly, references to Tymoshenko as a princess suggests that she 
would not earn the position of president on her own merit, it would be given to her based 
on a one-dimensional reason such as her associations with men. Furthermore, her 
association with natural gas also draws suspicion to her political motives because of links 
to Russian natural gas, especially the company Gazprom, with ties to the Russian 
government. Additionally, there is a class-related theme associated with calling 
Tymoshenko a “gas princess” as the reference brings attention to her wealth, and to some 
extent tarnishes her past business accomplishments.  
The media, therefore, described Tymoshenko in somewhat contradictory terms 
ranging from the "gas princess" to a "heroine." As the "heroine" of the Orange 
Revolution ultimately positions Tymoshennko as a pro-democratic politician because she 
seemingly opposed the authoritarianism of the pro-government officials. As such 
Tymoshenko's opposition to pro-government officials also presents her as an agent of 
change, seeking to oust a corrupt, authoritarian, government closely associated with the 
former imperial power of Russia. By identifying Tymoshenko's gender through the 
words/rhetoric of "princess" and "heroine," journalists representationally differentiate her 
from other Ukrainian politicians, the majority of men. Therefore, her gender transforms 
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her into a game-changing candidate as she appears physically distinct from other 
politicians in a competitive arena. 
Interestingly, the Globe referred to Tymoshenko as “princess” six times (three 
times in 2004 and three times in 2010) and was the only paper to do so. The Globe calls 
Tymoshenko a “heroine” three times in 2004,368 and the New York Times refers to her 
once as a “heroine” in 2010.369 
Tymoshenko’s persona as a heroine is reinforced by Mark MacKinnon of the 
Globe when he writes that Tymoshenko “transformed into a heroine and dubbed a "Slavic 
Joan of Arc" by supporters.”370 This Joan of Arc persona was strategically embraced by 
Tymoshenko allowing her to take advantage of situations of persecution, making her 
appear to be some kind of martyr. This occurred when she was thrown in jail in 2001 to 
2002 and broadcasts show her looking tired and unkempt.371 Although there were no 
instances of journalists describing Tymoshenko as tired or dishevelled in 2005 and 2010 
after she lost the prime ministership, certainly Tymoshenko continued to use the heroine 
narrative for her own purpose.  
Tymoshenko positioned both as a defender of democracy and a game changer in 
Ukrainian politics.372 Kis argues the media contrasts Tymoshenko’s slender and delicate 
feminine appearance with her enormous energy and political ambition. The latter was 
associated with masculine traits to allow comparisons to the French heroine, Joan of 
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Arc.373 Kis describes this image of Tymoshenko as a “pure personification of patriotism” 
which is strategically beneficial to both her and her enemies.374 Kis describes that 
Tymoshenko's rivals commonly critique her based on gender. For example, "one such 
joker," asked, "if Tymoshenko is the Ukrainian Joan of Arc, when is she to be burned at 
the stake?"375 This rhetoric positions Tymoshenko as a pro-Ukrainian patriot, against 
Russian authoritarian interests.  
Portrayed in the media simultaneously as a defender of democracy and a game 
changer, Tymoshenko utilizes these representations to benefit her progress. The English-
speaking press continually associated Tymoshenko not only with the Orange Revolution 
to position her as a pro-democratic and pro-European Union but as pro-Ukrainian and 
anti-Russian. While Tymoshenko is perceived as an agent of change because the platform 
of the Orange Revolution rejected for authoritarianism she makes use of these portrayals. 
In a feature comment piece published in the Globe Tymoshenko discusses the plight of 
Ukrainians during the Orange Revolution in her appeal for international support. In the 
587-word editorial, she references democracy eight times. 
We defy those who seek to corrupt our democracy, but we stand with the hand of friendship 
extended to all of our neighbours, including Russia. It has no reason to intervene. A vibrant 
Ukrainian democracy will need the comradeship of Russia and of Europe to build the kind 
of society that our people desire. Our boldness is tinged by realism. By securing our 
democracy, we help secure Russia's own.376 
Tymoshenko uses this international opportunity to reinforce the media’s representations 
of her as a defender of democracy as evident in her attempt to build democratic ties to the 
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west as well as Russia. In 2004 especially the media upheld the image Tymoshenko 
wished to portray of herself as a defender of democracy, even though she may have been 
otherwise.   
By 2010, Tymoshenko and Yanukovych were respectively framed in the media as 
the pro-western and pro-Russian candidates. Although Tymoshenko was described as 
having authoritarian tendencies by the Guardian, she was more consistently associated 
with the Orange Revolution, and therefore she was privileged as the democratic, and even 
an incumbent candidate during the 2010 presidential election. Journalist Luke Harding of 
the Guardian notes that “others suggest Yanukovych would be a less autocratic and more 
consensual leader than Tymoshenko, whose authoritarian instincts have spooked many 
educated voters.”377 After the Orange Revolution, each newspaper refers at some time to 
Tymoshenko as a "populist.” No instances of Tymoshenko being called a populist exist in 
any of these print media sources during 2004. However, by 2005 when Tymoshenko was 
fired from her position as prime minister, Graeme Smith of the Globe describes 
Tymoshenko as a “fiery populist, whose rhetoric and iconic status helped the Orange 
Revolution topple a regime that was widely accused of corruption[...]”378 Clifford J. Levy 
from the New York Times similarly reinforced Tymoshenko as staging a “populist 
campaign.”379 Referring to Tymoshenko as a “populist” retrospectively may question her 
true commitment to democracy and to challenge her public persona as a defender of 
democracy. Over time her democratic character leadership and populism was called into 
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question. References to Tymoshenko’s populism caused supicion regarding her motives 
as a politician. However, as political scientist Kuzio notes, Tymoshenko is, and most 
politicians in Ukraine can be described as, chameleonic rather than populist because of 
their shifting ideologies.380 Arguably the media’s contradictory impressions of 
Tymoshenko are both as a chameleonic politician, and a populist.  
Tymoshenko as Mother of the Nation 
As Campus (2013) contends, the "mother of the nation" is a culturally approved 
model of female leadership that evokes traditional values related to feminine nurturing 
and caring.381 Female candidates may use this rhetoric to represent themselves 
strategically and usefully deploy physical characteristics as well as “soft power” to 
convince the voter of their efficacy despite their status as women.382 Furthermore, the 
“mother of the nation" would also be dedicated to upholding a culturally accepted form of 
leadership that would not disrupt the status quo of gender and heteronormative relations. 
The "mother of the nation" persona is also reinforced through the heteronormative 
romanticized relationship between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko as discussed earlier. 
This apparent romanticized relationship emphasized Tymoshenko's power during the 
Orange Revolution yet delegitimizes her power while prime minister at a time when she 
was no longer part of the strong marital unit. Moreover, this romantic 
patriarchal/heteronormative metaphor and “mother of the nation” trope is strengthened 
through traditional power relations of marriage exhibited between Tymoshenko (the 
mother) being subordinate to Yushchenko (the father) during and following the Orange 
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Revolution. Therefore, although Tymoshenko physically differs from that of traditional 
male leaders, her position as a culturally accepted "mother of the nation" figure maintains 
traditional gender relations. Several subtle examples of Tymoshenko being described as a 
"mother of the nation" using soft power to promote her political messages and capability 
are evident in the English press coverage. 
As discussed earlier, Tymoshenko's physical appearance is an integral part of her 
persona as a Ukrainian politician. The narrative of soft power is emphasized through 
Tymoshenko's embodiment of the femininity of the nationalist symbol of Ukrainian 
motherhood, the berehynia. Mothers and motherhood are generally associated with 
comfort, kindness and fairness: all characteristics associated with soft power. In addition 
to the strategic actions that Tymoshenko uses, as documented by journalists, she also 
physically styles her hair and clothing to represent the berehynia.  
While there are few instances of Tymoshenko speaking described by news 
articles, Kis describes how Tymoshenko utilizes language to reinforce her person as 
“mother of the nation” and to soften the rhetoric of charisma. Kis describes how 
Tymoshenko uses maternal rhetoric associated with “warmth” during national, Christian 
or professional holiday greetings.383 Tymoshenko’s messages to the people of Ukraine 
and as Kis describes, reinforces her image as maternal include, “may autumn warm your 
heart,” “accept my warm greetings,” and “may Easter …warm our souls with blessed 
warmth.”384 
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During the Orange Revolution Tymoshenko demonstrated her willingness to 
perform the role of "mother of the nation" using her physical appearance and performing 
gender roles associated with Ukrainian nationalism. Contrasting soft power with 
masculinized hard power and her performance strategy as a berehynia, Tymoshenko 
transformed herself into the "mother of the nation." Further, Tymoshenko demonstrated 
her ability to protect Ukrainian nationalism from threats from Russian sympathizers. The 
strategy likely worked for her during this period of the Orange Revolution however into 
her second term as prime minister from 2007 to 2010, her performance faltered. 
Tymoshenko made deals with Russian President Vladimir Putin during her term, and 
some Ukrainian nationalists perceived her actions as betraying of her identity as a 
"mother of the nation." This situation may also have attracted suspicion on Tymoshenko's 
political motives since she was such a staunch nationalist and she had countered this 
staunch nationalism by embodying a traditional form of feminine Ukrainian nationalism. 
Sum of Findings 
Feminist scholars document the way in which women politicians' gender has been 
central to but at other times hinder their political careers. This occurs most commonly by 
framing women who enter the political sphere as "space invaders" as defined by Puwar. 
Yulia Tymoshenko's political career during a six-year period from 2004 to 2010 is 
indicative of how international print journalism conceive a woman as a space invader 
when competing for political power. Furthermore, gender normativity was a focus in the 
four profile articles published by all three news organizations: Canada's national paper 
the Globe & Mail, Britain’s Guardian and the United States, the New York Times.  
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These biographical profiles were distinct from news articles where the main topics 
were events in which Tymoshenko's involvement was significant but secondary to the 
event.  Since the primary focus of the three biographical profiles was Tymoshenko's 
political suitability for political power more detail is provided about her past, present and 
potential future than in news articles describing events in which she played less than a 
central part. Obsession on her appearance necessitates an increase in the use of gender-
specific language to distinguish Tymoshenko from male competitors. Within these 
profiles, personal characteristics such as charisma, family, hairstyle, and allusions to her 
sexuality attract significant concentration. Tymoshenko in these characterizations is 
charismatic, yet delicate for instance as a leader of the Orange Revolution. The latter 
female quality effectively undermines her political charisma especially by those who find 
women in leadership suspicious. 
The fixation on women’s physical appearance, fashion and maternal nature, over 
and above the candidate’s substance or platform, is convincingly argued by feminist 
political scholars.385 As such, the characterization of Tymoshenko as a maternal figure 
especially relative to her close relationship with Yushchenko in 2004 is sustained into 
later years, dissipating somewhat during the 2010 election campaign. Discussions of 
Tymoshenko's physical appearance, as examples from the three English speaking papers 
show, consistently drew attention to her gender and associate her as a mother of the 
nation charged with the protection of Ukrainians synonymous with the nation's 
population. Furthermore, as feminist scholars Kis (2007) and Hrycak (2011) note, the 
discussion of Tymoshenko's traditional braided hairstyle decisively emphasizes the 
                                                          
385 Dianne G. Bystrom, et al. Gender and Candidate Communication. 
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outward construction of her image as the mother of the nation embodying the traditional 
image of a berehynia with the use of this simple visual device. The berehynia was an 
identity that Tymoshenko clearly and strategically exploited for political self-promotion.   
Finally, Tymoshenko is more generally portrayed as a democratic politician, 
distinct from other more corrupt or authoritarian politicians such as President Kuchma, or 
President Vladimir Putin of Russia. This representational trend occurs primarily during 
the 2004 period of the Orange Revolution. These references explicitly associate 
Tymoshenko with democratic values because of her visibility in leading the Orange 
Revolution. Tymoshenko appears as pure and politically ethical compared to the more 
corrupt, authoritarian male allies or enemies in the political realm of the time despite 
public recognition of her tremendous personal wealth. However, some articles do report 
to Tymoshenko's authoritarian tendencies. Additionally, by identifying Tymoshenko as a 
populist, journalists in all three papers imply she was potentially self-serving and 
opportunist, therefore, casting aspersions on her political motives. To be self-serving 
rather than appropriately self-effacing de-feminized Tymoshenko thus detrimentally 
working against her success in the political sphere.  
In response to the question I posed at the beginning of the chapter as to why the 
media focused on the personal details of Tymoshenko during these crucial moments in 
her political campaign and rise to popularity, I suggest that Tymoshenko has strategically 
established and intertwined her physical appearance closely with her political ambition, 
especially relative to the need to represent herself as a populist. Essentially, while 
Tymoshenko was politically visible during this era, she met specific cultural requirements 
that allowed her as a woman, to succeed as a political leader in Ukraine. However, 
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Tymoshenko also produces ambivalence among the electorate because her atypical 
femininity combined with her political ambition was not uniformly approved. While 
Tymoshenko's strategies of feminine-specific beauty and her association with Ukrainian 
nationalism provided her with power and political legitimacy, these characteristics 
simultaneously worked against her especially following her time as prime minister. 
Therefore, her femininity allowed her a certain degree of power while also broadcasting 
some suspicion on her motives for becoming a politician which were exacerbated 
following her failure to become president.  
Tymoshenko intentionally positions herself as a moral "tactical outsider" by 
professing to be a game-changing politician seeking to uproot corruption and shift the 
establishment by intertwining her feminine physicality with her populist politics. Kis 
states that this image of Tymoshenko as a game changer works exceptionally well for 
her.386 The journalists in the English-speaking press of three nations – Canada, Britain 
and the US – emphasize these qualities as expressed by their preoccupation of female-
appropriate appearance. 
Like other international women political leaders, Tymoshenko adopted political 
strategies to her national context. Kis explains Tymoshenko is different every time you 
see her: “she looks different, speaks differently, and she behaves differently depending 
upon the political context, the particular situation and the audience being addressed.”387 
The international press focused on attributes Tymoshenko was seeking, such as her 
female property, as a “mother of the nation” or as a defender of democratic rights. 
                                                          
386 Ibid., 45. 
387 Kis, “Beauty Will Save the World!,” 36-7. 
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However, after 2005, the focus on physical appearance attracted suspicion to remind the 
reader that as a woman Tymoshenko is a “space invader.” This chapter has presented the 
strategies women leaders take in countries dealing with threats from authoritarian 
neighbours as well as to combat authoritarianism from within their own countries. Likely, 
other leaders might adopt some of the strategies Tymoshenko adopted. However, 
although Tymoshenko was capable of becoming prime minister, the focus on her 
feminine appearance by the media drew suspicion upon her in the years leading up to her 
run for president. Furthermore, it appears her strategies drew her support from other 
parliamentarians to become prime minister twice but failed to get more fulsome support 
from the general populous in Ukraine.  
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Chapter IV: Conclusion: Obstacles and Opportunities to Tymoshenko’s 
Political Leadership 
 In this thesis, I have used a feminist lens to theorize the concepts of space, and 
more specifically political space, to understand how gender is an essential element of 
political leadership in the case of Yulia Tymoshenko. I place Tymoshenko in 
conversation with feminist scholars working in political science, gender, and history who 
discuss women politicians as space invaders due to the historical and nationalist 
expectations that are reinforced over an extended period. This case study has described 
and analyzed the personal background and political career of the former prime minister 
and presidential candidate of Ukraine, Yulia Tymoshenko. This thesis has also examined 
media representations of Tymoshenko in the English-language press to understand why 
she could attain the position of prime minister in 2005 and 2007 to 2010 but lost the 
position of the presidency in 2010.  
Analyses of the relationship between gender and political space inform my study 
of how Tymoshenko is a space invader. The concept of theorizing political space was 
inspired by scholar Nirmal Puwar (2004) whose study focused on women 
parliamentarians as "space invaders" as a result of the historical and social 
masculinization of political space. This study also utilizes scholar Farida Jalalzai's (2013, 
2014) studies of political leadership that describe women political leaders as less likely to 
attain positions with high concentrations of power such as strong presidencies due to the 
prevalence of stereotypical perceptions of gender. The literature review discussed of how 
gender stereotypes are associated with the types of spaces men and women occupy, as 
well as their connection to the role of social organization by the nation-state. In post-
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communist Europe, a discussion of the nation-state is essential in understanding how 
gender roles and the meaning of space were reconfigured and reimagined during the 
transition period from authoritarian communism to a free market economy in the late 
1980s and early 1990s in the region. Lastly, the review included discussions the barriers 
women experience in politics worldwide and in post-communist states.  
Subsequent chapters dealt with Tymoshenko’s biographical information and 
English-speaking media representations. The methodology of this case study is based on 
previous studies of women leaders such as the analysis of their backgrounds and political 
careers as well as the numerous studies of the media representation of women in politics. 
While the biographical chapter traces Tymoshenko’s personal and political career to 
identify her qualifications, politics, struggles, and talents associated with attaining 
political leadership, the chapter about media representations provides insight into the way 
Tymoshenko’s political and leadership skills were recorded by journalists and 
represented to the public. Both methods present exciting findings in that Tymoshenko's 
gender plays a vital role in her political persona, whether she was in control of those 
representations or not. But media representations also positioned her as a “space invader” 
in Ukrainian politics. 
While Tymoshenko overcame certain political factors to become a successful 
politician, she also came from a relatively privileged and affluent background. For 
instance, she was elected in a single member district electoral system at a time when there 
were few women politicians. However, as an ethnic Russian politician in Dnipropetrovsk 
(a region with a high percentage of predominantly Russian speakers) Tymoshenko won 
favour during the Soviet era and took advantage of opportunities with the Communist 
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Party’s Komsomol or young communists. Moreover, she benefited from secure socio-
economic status, attaining a high level of education and possessing a great deal of wealth. 
She married into a family with connections to the Communist Party which benefited her 
and her husband when they created the United Energy Systems (UES) gas trading 
company following the end of the Soviet Union and from which they became billionaires.  
While Tymoshenko was a “space invader” she benefitted from her wealth gained 
through UES. Therefore, even though women politicians made up 4.3 percent of 
parliament (after dropping drastically after the end of the Soviet Union), for the most 
part, wealthy oligarchs dominate the Ukrainian political scene. Thus, Tymoshenko’s 
wealth helped her fit in with other politicians and provided her with funds to run for 
elections, and eventually overcome several court cases. Ultimately, Tymoshenko’s wealth 
and connections to the Dnipropetrovsk region and Hromada party leader Pavlo Lazarenko 
helped her win a seat in parliament in 1996. This type of partner patronage is one key to 
increasing opportunity for women politicians to win parliamentary seats and thus why 
Tymoshenko won her parliamentary seat at a time when women in politics in Ukraine 
was exceptional rather than a norm. 
Beyond the analysis of how wealth and party affiliation enabled Tymoshenko, her 
work after she won the election highlights her credentials and demonstrates her political 
abilities which Jalalzai (2013, 2015) notes is key to women achieving positions of power 
worldwide and specific to Europe. Tymoshenko’s political experience include being a 
cabinet minister, a political party leader and subsequently, prime minister for two terms. 
Furthermore, Tymoshenko lead the only female-led political party to make it into 
parliament, the Fatherland Party. She remains the only female prime minister in Ukraine 
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since independence. She was understood as crucial for organizing and leading the Orange 
Revolution, and before that she organized protests against then-President Leonid Kuchma 
for his authoritarian actions. This opposition to Kuchma positioned her as a democratic 
leader. Tymoshenko has demonstrated her leadership skills and is arguably one of the 
most successful, internationally visible, and longstanding politicians in Ukraine – 
regardless of sex. 
Throughout her political career, Tymoshenko has altered her appearance to align 
with her politics, utilizing specific gendered stereotypes to strategically reinforce her 
political viability. Like Tymoshenko, many other Ukrainian politicians are chameleonic 
in that they alter their political stances to suit particular political motives. However, she 
altered not only her politics but also her appearance according to the political context. It 
is necessary to keep in mind that there is a lack of institutional and political party 
development in Ukraine and that Ukrainian politicians are less occupied with political 
policies that in longstanding democracies. In Tymoshenko’s case when in the late 1990’s 
her politics shifted towards an anti-presidential stance and towards nationalist rhetoric, 
she made decisive changes to her physical appearance. As a result, in 2005 her physical 
appearance to conform to the trope as a “mother of the nation” to match maternalist 
policies such as improving mother’s pensions and improvements to public healthcare. 
This maternalist persona allowed Tymoshenko to strategically align herself with 
traditionalist values while navigating a system where she was sometimes unwelcomed as 
a woman. Therefore, Tymoshenko used the myth of the berehynia to perform certain 
aspects of traditional femininity, while operating in a space that is predominantly 
occupied by men.  
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Tymoshenko walked the fine line between appearing overly feminine and overly 
masculine. While Tymoshenko performed femininity in the way she dressed and styled 
her hair, she countered with appropriation of other strong leadership attributes such as her 
charismatic and fiery speeches as well strong debate skills that are associated with 
masculine of leadership. In other words, Tymoshenko sought to appear as a strong leader 
that would not be pushed around while also playing a motherly, caring figure who wished 
to protect the Ukrainian people from authoritarianism.  
Tymoshenko’s ability to simultaneously embody masculine and feminine political 
features, and her enactment of blonde mother of the national uniform, did not go 
unnoticed by the English-language press. The English-language press articles represented 
Tymoshenko as a strong, charismatic leader, defender of democracy, and mother of the 
nation while highlighting her physical appearance. These articles certainly reinforced 
Tymoshenko's reinvention of herself as the mother of the nation but also positioned her as 
a “space invader.” The articles focused on Tymoshenko's role in the Orange Revolution 
and her pro-Ukrainian and democratic stances. However, for the most part, the articles 
seldom discussed her politics to instead focus on her personal characteristics and 
feminine appearance. During the 2010 Ukrainian presidential election, the tone of the 
news articles was less enthusiastic in comparison to the articles from 2004 to 2007. These 
articles mostly discussed Tymoshenko's role in the Orange Revolution, her time as prime 
minister and her broken, seemingly marital, relationship with President Viktor 
Yushchenko. However, Tymoshenko's leadership during the Orange Revolution made her 
appear to be the incumbent candidate. Her broken alliance with Yushchenko who 
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campaigned against her in the 2010 presidential election, was her undoing and the media 
supported this downfall. 
Furthermore, a likely source of friction is related to Ukrainian voting cleavages. 
Tymoshenko's perceived ability to stand up to the authoritarianism of President Putin and 
the Russian state was incredibly influential in Ukraine as the primary election issues in 
Ukraine involve Russian influence. Additionally, Putin’s self and media representations 
as a hypermasculine figure were juxtapose to Tymoshenko’s appearance as a weaker 
candidate because of her femininity. Tymoshenko's friendly political interactions with the 
Putin, during her second term as prime minister antagonized some nationalist voters and 
drew suspicion on her motives for wanting political power. This suspicion came as part of 
Tymoshenko’s rhetoric during the Orange Revolution, causing the Orange protests to 
move to Russia. 
Tymoshenko had a better chance of becoming the prime minister than the 
president in that her becoming prime minister because at both times this situation was 
negotiated by a small number of politicians rather than a massive test of the population 
through a direct vote. When Tymoshenko ran for president, she could not negotiate the 
same way with the Ukrainian population that she could with the president and members 
of parliament. Furthermore, while Tymoshenko achieved the prime ministership, she was 
removed by a vote of no confidence if or when she became a problem for the male 
politicians in power. Therefore, Tymoshenko's actions were held to account by male 
competitors. 
 This study contributes to the pre-existing scholarship on women’s access to 
positions of political power in the following ways. First, this study concretely applies 
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Puwar’s notion of the “space invader,” and to Jalalzai’s (2013, 2014) assertion that the 
powers designated to positions of political leadership are a jumping off point to theorize 
women’s complex relationship to positions of leadership. The case study demonstrates 
how these theories, that centre gender as a category of analysis, as described by Joan 
Scott (1988) have worked in practice in the case of Ukraine. Furthermore, the study adds 
to the scholarly assertions about women prime ministers and presidents in post-
communist Europe and also identifies transnational trends of women politicians that 
Tymoshenko experienced in her case.   
Some questions require further investigation. This study is similar to other studies 
such as Genovese (1993) about how individual women seeking political leadership have 
navigated gender to positions of political leadership. This thesis looks at this gender 
navigation in post-communist Europe. How have other women political leaders in post-
communist Europe navigated through political systems to become political leaders? What 
are the similarities and differences between these other women and Tymoshenko? 
Concerning media coverage of women led political campaigns, how did Tymoshenko 
herself understand the kind of gendered coverage to which she was subject? To what 
extent has she manufactured her image to conform to the depictions fabricated in the 
English-language press? In other words, what degree of agency did Tymoshenko possess 
in constructing her own political image?  Furthermore, would press coverage of 
Tymoshenko have been different had female journalists been covering these news 
stories? 
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